It’s not as easy as A-B-C

An article from the Economist yesterday had some thoughtful observations about the possible bilateral nuclear cuts between the U.S. and Russia.  With Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's sights set on a START following as evidenced by his statement, "This treaty, the present treaty, has become obsolete,"  there is still more homework to be done to adequately address some of the obstacles facing further nuclear reductions.   The Economist explains,

So might an early and radical chop in weapons numbers be announced by the two presidents next month? Mr Obama has already set "getting to zero" as the guiding principle of his nuclear policy, to loud applause from would-be disarmers. Some have speculated that he could go for an eye-catching first cut to 1,000 warheads each, with more to come. But that could be dangerously over-ambitious.

Some of the primary problems facing substantial reductions include: Increasing Russian transparency

The lower the numbers go, the trickier the problems get. Imagine cutting to, say, 1,500 on each side and imposing stricter counting rules to meet Russian concerns that America could otherwise still rebuild its arsenal a lot faster, if it so chose: that would require a lot more transparency from Russia's defence ministry and arms factories than they have ever accepted.

Weapons counting

Russia will demand tighter curbs on delivery systems, not just new rules for counting warheads; it will also want any missiles dedicated to "prompt global strike" to be counted in the nuclear tally, since they could be switched back to nuclear use.

Possible implications for the triad

Go to 1,000 and America at least would have to consider abandoning one leg of its strategic triad of land-based missiles,nuclear-armed submarines and strategic bombers.

The implications for other nuclear powers

[A]t such low numbers, the smaller arsenals of China, France and Britain (not to mention India, Pakistan and Israel) loom a lot larger. So does the problem of missile defences, and not just in Europe.

With about 9 months looming until the START treaty expires, negotiations for a new verification treaty will be an arduous task to get completed in that time.   There will be substantial bureaucratic red tape in creating an agreeable document in a few ways.  First, those in charges of the negotiations will have to constantly check and recheck how much they are allowed to say or give in negotiations.  Second, the countries will have to find compromises or solutions on a number of issues (some above) that will have to be included in a new agreement.  Third, the U.S. will have to try to account for views from State DoD, and others which will inevitably differ at some point.  Of course, this all begs the question of our ability to effectively translate a final product.