The Jump to Conclusions Mat

Frank Gaffney's recent op-ed draws a number of bold conclusions in a very short space.  The basic premise is that Obama's solutions to deal with the nuclear threat

reflect nostalgia for a world now gone but that risk blowing up the one we now inhabit.

Chalk one up for alarmist rhetoric but the real question is how that conclusion is drawn.  Gaffney argues that current plans are a "throwback" to the bilateral superpower relationship of the Cold War.  From the outset, this premise needs to be questioned.  A START follow-on is currently the top arms control priority of the Administration because it expires in December probably more so than Cold War nostalgia.  Obama has been less than enthusiastic about missile defense which may come into US/Russian agreements at some point but that does not mean they view the world through a Cold Waresque bipolar lens.  It means they will try to deal with Iran and North Korea in other ways.  Truth of the premise aside, Gaffney says:

Far from discouraging proliferation, gutting our strategic forces in a new treaty with the Kremlin would increase that phenomenon. Our severe reductions would only embolden China and other prospective foes to build up. Meanwhile, allies who have heretofore relied on our nuclear "umbrella" would lose confidence in us and go nuclear themselves.

There are a couple of very generalized statements in this argument.  The claim that a START follow on is automatically "gutting out strategic forces" deserves some scrutiny.  Moving just below SORT levels would probably not be "gutting" our forces.  While ambitious numbers like 1000 require some serious thinking about how that changes strategic calculations it certainly doesn't leave the U.S. empty handed.  That would still leave the Chinese with a large sprint to parity, somethings many would argue they have no interest in doing even though their intentions still remain difficult to ascertain.  It's also unclear what "other prospective foes" would build up.  The last point is right in that it is important to try to evaluate how moving to lower numbers can worry allies but it seems a leap to argue an agreement with Russia automatically means the 30+ allies referred to in the Interim Report go nuclear. Gaffney's sentiment that

America needs an informed and rigorous national debate before adopting defense budget cuts and arms control initiatives

is right on but his piece may not meet the criteria.