Killing 'em with Kindness

Well, not exactly, but the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran is apparently causing some conflict within the Iranian government. Gerald Seib, Washington bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal, recently reported that while the P5 + 1 (or the EU3 + 3, take your pick) debate the merits of another round of harsh economic sanctions, “more meaningful stress fractures are showing up within Iran itself.” Since Iranian negotiators in Geneva agreed, in principle, to the exportation of low-enriched uranium for conversion into fuel for the Tehran medical research reactor, there has been a substantial split in rhetoric among Iranian officials.

In subsequent remarks, Iranian officials suggested they would refuse to transport the fuel out of the country, that they would prefer to buy the reactor fuel directly from the West, and that, “Should talks fail or sellers refuse to provide Iran with its required fuel, Iran will enrich uranium to the 20 percent level needed itself.” In the past week, Iran has also dismissed a temporary proposal to ship fuel to any number of third party countries - including Turkey, whose government is on good terms with Tehran - until the reactor fuel arrives. Instead, Iranian officials stated a desire to keep the uranium on Iranian soil under IAEA supervision.

President Ahmadinejad has urged acceptance of the deal, framing it as the West caving to Iran’s demands and implicitly recognizing its right to enrichment. Ahmadinejad, avoiding mention of the deal specifically, used a similarly conciliatory tone today in a primetime address, urging international cooperation on nuclear issues while framing it as a sign of Iran’s advancement:

"Today, Iran's nuclear conditions are stabilized and we've entered the phase of nuclear interaction and cooperation, and today an important issue is international nuclear cooperation in construction of nuclear power plants, reactors and even Iran's contribution to a world fuel bank . . . We have the necessary technology and material . . . but there is always quid pro quo, cooperation and investment." 

In contrast, both reformists and hardliners have criticized the deal. On the eve of the anniversary of the 1979 U.S. Embassy takeover, Ayatollah Khamenei declared that Iran would not be deceived into reconciliation. Reformists seem to see the hypocrisy of the deal; Ahmadinejad openly criticized their past enrichment suspension and may fear that a diplomatic breakthrough would increase his support among Iranian youth and intellectuals. Members of Iran’s reformist parliamentary minority have supported the direct purchase of reactor fuel, and former presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi recently criticized the deal as well, stating that consummation of the deal could not truly be considered a victory for Iran due to fears that France and Russia cannot be trusted to return the material:

"It seems that most of the fruit of the country’s nuclear activities, which has caused … several UN sanctions resolutions, should be delivered to other countries [according to the deal] in the hope that they might be kind enough to provide us with some nuclear fuel at some time in the future. Can this be called a victory?"

The U.S.’s outreach has gone a long way towards attempting to reassure Iran of its sincerity. U.S. ambassador to the IAEA Glyn Davies recently stated that "We want to give some space to Iran to work through this. It's a tough issue for them, quite obviously, and we're hoping for an early, positive answer from the Iranians." In an interview on Monday, President Obama urged patience with Iran, acknowledging that, given current political instability, Iran cannot be expected to make quick decisions on the deal. Such talk goes a long way toward putting the lie to claims that the U.S. will only negotiate halfheartedly as a pretext for military force should talks fail. The U.S.’s drawing down of support for the Iran Democracy Fund, the Bush administration-era attempt fostering regime change, is another indication that the Obama Administration is committed to giving Iran every reason to cooperate on the nuclear issue. (For a quick take on the viability of actually linking human rights and nuclear issues, see Kirk Bansak's post over at NOH)

Whatever the approach, if Iran is unable to come to an agreement sometime in the near future, then the world powers will have to decide whether or not to proceed with sanctions. As Mark, Micah, and I have written in the past, the U.S. faces several difficulties in getting Russia and China to go along with sanctions severe enough to produce a significant change in Iran’s position over the short term, and it is uncertain if they would have the intended effect. The Obama administration will cross that bridge when it comes to it, but for now it appears that the charm offensive and patience are at least compelling leaders within Iran to actually debate the issue, as opposed to continuing to fall back on heated rhetoric in response to perceived antagonism.

[Photo: IAEA / IAEA Imagebank]