Let’s Make a Deal…On the CTBT!

As mentioned in a previous post, the AP noted that there appears to be considerable hurdles to Obama getting the CTBT passed in the immediate future. Although the “signed but not ratified” approach has bought the U.S. time up until this point, it seems like hope is no longer sufficient to hold over U.K lawmakers.

Tony Lloyd, chair of Britain’s Parliamentary Labour Party, while visiting Washington said that he and other members of parliament were in Washington

…to see whether this [commitment to Obama’s stated goal of a nuclear free world] is just aspirational or whether there is something real in the Obama agenda…Can he deliver on the process that takes us farther toward a nuclear-free world?

That doesn’t appear to be the words of someone who sees the “signed but ratified approach” on the CTBT as an acceptable long-term policy for the Obama Administration. It is fairly safe to say that the views of the U.K. are representative of the current disposition of the international community.

In the same article, David Hannay, a former British Ambassador to the United Nations and what is now the European Union, is quoted as saying,

If the United States does not take the lead [On the CTBT] in a sense, as we saw in the last eight years, nothing happens.

So that seems to leave the Obama Administration with a frustrated international community demanding action on the CTBT and a Senate who is unlikely to ratify it. The only way for the Obama Administration to have a valid chance of ratifying the CTBT and ensuring progress is made on their goal of moving towards a nuclear free world is compromise.

The Obama Administration could likely bring enough parties to the table if, in the near future, the CTBT is presented to Congress as part of an "all-or-nothing" arms control legislative package which could include:
• legislation to fund the Reliable Replacement Warhead, or some modified form of it;
• a dual use capability for the F-35, and
• an arms reduction treaty with Russia which potentially exchanges missile defense for a massive reduction in Russian tactical nuclear forces in the European theater.

Such a package would minimize the “fear of international law contingent” because the CTBT’s international enforcement mechanisms/ legal regimes are no longer such a prominent feature of the package as a whole. Additionally, the package can be conveyed to proponents of the RRW as the only way the program will be supported by the White House.Senator Kyl, one of the more outspoken opponents of the CTBT, said he could support a follow on agreement to the 1991 Strategic Arms reduction treaty if,

the administration backs funding to modernize nuclear stockpiles and infrastructure

If the Administration promised conditional support for funding of the RRW and a nuclear capable F-35 it may be enough to divide the Kyl contingent and lead Senators such as Lugar, Snow, and McCain, to ratify the CTBT.

Additionally, this legislative package may actually get interested members of the defense lobby behind the package and in turn some Senators who would have been otherwise opposed. Further, the arms reduction treaty would quell complaints from the more liberal elements of the party that too many concessions are being made and give something for the liberal caucus to rally behind.

Recently, a NTI article explicitly mentioned Secretary Clinton putting the RRW on the table as a bargaining chip. The package approach has been recognized by senior officials and has to be on the table if any legitimate attempt at ratifying the CTBT is to be made.

Those who may feel that funding the RRW program and adding a nuclear use to the F-35 would undermine the Obama’s commitments to a nuclear free world must not let the perfect be an enemy of the good. Ratification of a treaty is one of the few instances in American government where bipartisanship is almost always required. Unwillingness on the part of the Administration to make concessions to Senate members such as Kyl will convey an unwillingness of the Obama Administration to expend political capital on the nuclear issue to members of the international community and will likely stagnate any near term progress.

Regardless of one’s views about the RRW or a nuclear capability for the F-35, if a legislative package similar to the one mentioned here made it through Congress, it would be a substantial arms control victory for the Administration and signal to the world that the U.S. is finally willing to take the lead on international nuclear arms reduction.