Let's Get Ready to R(RW)umble

It's official: game on. The push for RRW, RRW 2.0, RRW 0.5, E(ffective)RW, REWR, Not RNEP, "a modernization program that differs from SSP," or whatever you want to call it is back in a big way. After murmurings over the past couple of months that some key players throughout the administration were insisting on some sort of new modernization efforts (starting back in October with Gates' Carnegie speech), Elaine Grossman's top notch piece in GSN yesterday helps shed some light on how the issue is playing out. During a June Principle Committee meeting, SECDEF Gates "volunteered that a warhead-replacement effort would be vital to maintaining the nuclear arsenal's viability, particularly after additional arms control reductions are taken." I differ from ACW's characterization that "The short version is SECDEF Robert Gates tried to revive the RRW program at a Principal's Committee meeting in June that was supposed to provide guidance on START negotiations. Only Vice President Biden stopped him" in that whether the CPR efforts were successful at the actual June Principle Committee itself doesn't matter much because I have an inkling GSN is right that

Few expect the Principals' Committee exchange to represent the final word on the warhead-replacement matter.

What is important news from the meeting is that

During the interagency meeting, [Secretary of Defense] Gates reportedly volunteered that a warhead-replacement effort would be vital to maintaining the nuclear arsenal's viability, particularly after additional arms control reductions are taken.

and then

Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, provided Gates backup at the meeting

and then

His successor at U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin Chilton, stirred some controversy this spring after voicing similar worries about vacuum tubes.

and then

[Secretary of State] Clinton, also at the June meeting, joined in supporting Gates by noting that a U.S. nuclear modernization program that includes warhead replacement might be necessary for domestic political reasons

and then

Energy Secretary Steven Chu . . . reportedly weighed in on the June discussion with a modest show of support

therefore leaving Biden as the lone disclosed opposition at the power packed meeting. What does that mean going forward? A few things.

1. "A modernization program" that looks different from the status quo is probably inevitable. There are simply too many big hitters that have lined up in favor of "modernization" that there's a strong chance Biden is going to lose on this issue. When the 3 main cabinet secretaries relevant to nuclear weapons, the VCJCS, and the head of STRATCOM all more or less seeing eye to eye on the issue, that's a lot of key players to try to overcome (obviously Chu's support was a bit more reserved). Not to mention the bipartisan letter sent to Obama arguing for something similar, depending which Senator's interpretation one uses. The GSN article and modernization discussion in general waver a bit as to whether that modernization effort will be part of the START package or the CTBT package. It seems logical it will be the former based on the aforementioned Congressional letter and Gates "specifically linking a domestic warhead-modernization imperative to the ongoing START follow-on negotiation." That will also reduce obstacles for the administration to try to get CTBT done next spring/fall.

2. It is possible that support for renewed modernization efforts is based on the conclusion that there are strong practical reasons we need it as opposed to ideological efforts to undermine the President's nuclear free vision. There are some strong arguments that the complex is in shambles and that worries about the safety, security, and reliability of the warheads will only increase over time if we continue on the current course. In other words, it's possible that arguments about needing to shore up the stockpile while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear as part of the President's strategy are compelling to people like Gates, Clinton, Cartwright, Chilton, and Chu. As such, tweets like "Elaine Grossman details how Gates is making a mockery of the Prague Speech" are probably off base in that the Prague speech did include a "safe, secure, and effective" clause. GSN correctly highlights that the difficulty moving forward is how to square that with the rest of the vision laid out in the Prague speech which is the tough task people should devote their energy towards solving. I do think the language coming out of Kyl's office about the administration "treading water" on the modernization question does have some merit (which I will preemptively note should not be read as "PONI = Jon Kyl") and the fact that key players in the administration are starting to engage that question should not be viewed as such a bad thing.

3. The Long and Winding Road. I'd draw attention to Rose Gottemoeller's explanation of the title of her recent remarks which were quite good:

I've titled this speech "The Long Road from Prague." And it really is a long road to a nuclear free world. There will be obstacles along the way; the journey will be difficult

Moving towards a world without nuclear weapons is going to be a long and arduous process that may not occur in Obama's lifetime (and he's a young President). What is the implication of that? It means every effort not completely in line with how some of the more optimistic abolitionists think should not be lambasted as completely destroying the value of the Prague speech because of the possible negative PR it can create. For example, when Hans Kristensen says the modernization efforts:

essentially signal [to the world] that the president's nuclear elimination pledge is just another ultimate goal and not different from what any other president has uttered

that can be counterproductive for their position in two ways. First, it does a complete disservice to the truly historic nature of the Prague speech. Remember: the Prague speech, which has been out now for just over 4 months, lays out a vision that will take decades to achieve even by optimistic standards. Decrying any potentially contradictory effort as therefore nullifying the speech's value this early in the game sets the bar too high and makes "failure" according to that standard the likely outcome. As the gang of 4 has mentioned, it is about trying to set up a "base camp" from which we can see the top of the mountain but setting up that camp may require some actions not entirely in line with the trek to the top once at base camp. In other words, those strongly in favor of abolition may have to lose some battles to win the war. Second, efforts to dismiss Prague as no different from past presidents just feeds ammunition to those in the international community who will inevitably be trying to criticize the United States for more of the same which leads into the next question:

4. What can U.S. nonproliferation credibility tangibly get us and how will modernization efforts impact that? According to GSN "Biden reportedly argued that the international community would almost certainly cry foul on a replacement-warhead effort, particularly given Obama's pledge to work toward the long-term elimination of nuclear weapons around the world." and that "Washington is attempting to build international consensus against Iran's suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons and North Korea's maintenance of its nascent arsenal." At the outset, it should be highlighted that there seems to be a near consensus that U.S. nonproliferation credibility will not directly impact the decisionmaking of Tehran and Pyongyang. The question is whether it can conjure up support from other key allies and players to help create cooperation that can change the calculus of these regimes away from adopting nuclear weapons (which will be a very tough task). The benefits of soft or smart power are inevitably tough to measure because there are not usually concrete answers like "if you forgo modernization steps, x, y, and z countries will support a, b, and c measures." As such, I remain skeptical of how far this new found credibility can get us (even if we forgo modernization) because countries like Russia and China will continue to stymie a lot of Security Council efforts and others will continue to be unwilling to go as far as the U.S. but obviously it can't hurt to try. That said, I don't buy Stephen Young's argument made in the GSN that RRW means CTBT won't enter into force internationally because a. it probably won't even enter into force domestically without these type of measures (Clinton's argument) which is why I also disagree with Joe's characterization that current supporters are "offering concessions up that should only come down to the last resort" and b. the "near zero chance," according to the Strategic Posture Commission, that CTBT enters into force is because of problems like North Korea opposition to signing or Egyptian discontent with Israeli nukes not because the U.S. is considering RRW. With regards to how modernization implicates our moral nuclear standing, there are certainly countries looking to make the "more of the same" argument and modernization efforts may be a piece in that puzzle for them (although it is interesting to note that "details" do not matter at all for (extended) deterrence but are a deal breaker for nonproliferation/credibility) but that campaign will inevitably be waged with or without RRW. People will argue START follow-on won't go far enough, we should have been at zero long ago, we don't have a NFU pledge, we still support Israel, etc. etc. The question is whether taking the risks associated with failure to further modernize are worth the tough-to-quantify boost (or lack of drop) in credibility. Gates, Clinton, Cartwright, Chilton, and Chu have their answer to that which will undoubtedly be noted by a President who is known for seeking a wide range of opinions.

5. The PR campaign is crucial. If further modernization efforts are in fact in the "likely" camp, the focus should not be criticizing Pentagon officials as "weak" and "short selling the President" but instead on constructing an effective PR campaign to sell both at home and abroad about how modernization measures fit within the broader framework of the Obama administration's nuclear policy. This PR package has to be done a subtle and detailed manner well beyond the purview of this blog post but as a starting point there should be an emphasis upon the ways in which modernization is actually consistent or at least not a large hindrance to moving to a world without nuclear weapons which could include arguments like:

• It falls within the existing U.S. framework of no new fissile material, no tests, and no new military capabilities
• It allows the United States to ratify the CTBT (which is a much larger lightning rod for determining the status of the nonproliferation regime) which possibly could be (somewhat correctly) blamed on the Senate.
• It allows us to move to lower numbers because there is higher confidence in our weapons as Gates argues
• It shores up our extended deterrent which discourages further nuclear proliferation
• It reduces the chance of theft
• It reinvigorates a decaying scientific enterprise that will be invaluable in producing solutions to verification and other challenges facing the march toward zero

These have to be spun so that it does not appear like the U.S. is just making excuses and is operating with the interests of the international community in mind which will be a though, albeit not impossible, task but nonetheless a vital one.