Limits of a Multilateral Fuel Bank

By John K. Warden

RIA Novosti reports that Russia plans to have the first international fuel bank up and running by the end of 2010:

Russia will provide by the end of 2010 the first batch of low-enriched uranium for an international nuclear fuel reserve bank under control of the UN nuclear watchdog, the head of Russia's state-run nuclear power corporation Rosatom said.
Russia has earlier proposed to establish international reserves of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to ensure stable fuel supplies to IAEA member countries in case of emergency, including "insurmountable political difficulties."
"I believe that the first part of these reserves could be formed by the end of this year," Sergei Kiriyenko said at an international conference on nuclear energy in Paris on Monday.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors approved the fuel bank last November hoping that it would help reduce proliferation risks as more countries develop civilian nuclear energy programs.

The fuel bank is designed to provide guaranteed, though limited, supplies of low-enriched uranium to states in compliance with the NPT.  Therefore, a country that relied on imported enriched uranium for its civilian nuclear program would not have to worry about the supply being cut off for political reasons.

Proponents hope that this guarantee will persuade countries to develop nuclear energy programs without enriching uranium on their soil, substantially reducing proliferation risks.

However, many countries are unlikely to accept the bargain.  While a country like Iran will cite guaranteed access as a reason it needs to enrich uranium on its soil, its motivation goes beyond access.

Iran, like other members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), believes it has an "inalienable right" under the NPT to pursue peaceful nuclear energy.  More importantly, Iran believes that the "inalienable right" guarantees it access to the full fuel-cycle.

Some might ask:  if Iran has no desire to develop nuclear weapons (it's unclear whether Iran has made a decision to pursue nuclear weapons, but the most recent IAEA report concludes that Iran's program may have military dimensions), why would it want access to the full fuel-cycle? 

The answer is prestige.  As long as countries like Iran believe that developing the full fuel-cycle is key to gaining international power and status, they will continue to seek indigenous enrichment capabilities.

Unfortunately, decreasing the prestige attached to the fuel-cycle will be extremely difficult, especially as nuclear power is heralded as a solution to climate change.  Finding a way to encourage the growth of nuclear power while decreasing the prestige of the fuel-cycle will be a difficult, if not impossible, task.  Finding a solution, however, may be the key to limiting proliferation risks.