The Lives of the "Modernization" Cat

All things "modernization" had an interesting pair of developments in the past couple of days. These developments include:

• Bill Gertz reported General Chilton is headed to the Hill with his plans for B61 modernization,
• Ellen Tauscher gave an interview to the Cable saying, or what is being interpreted as, RRW is dead.

These stories beg two major questions: 

How big of a deal is Tauscher's statement?

In a short answer: probably not as big as some may think.  Nukes of Hazard described it as "Tauscher Ties a Rock to RRW's Ankle and Tosses It in a Deep Lake" and similarly Matthew Yglesias argued: 

Reviving the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime requires the United States to regain the confidence of non-nuclear states by demonstrating our own commitment to play by the rules. That means not developing new generations of nuclear weapons and instead moving forward on bilateral talks with the Russians. Press reports have repeatedly indicated that the Obama administration is divided on the RWW issue (with Robert Gates, in particular, being a fan) so it’s good to see a clear statement that they intend to stay on the right side of this

but I am very skeptical that Tauscher's interview with the Cable represents any meaningful end to the RRW discussion.  There is a strong chance that when she said

I think there are a lot of people that still hope for the return of RRW and they are going to be sadly disappointed

it may not have meant much more than "there will not be a program titled "Reliable Replacement Warhead" sent to the Hill."  As I've argued elsewhere, there are simply too many people that see a need, whether political, technical, or strategic, for substantial additional "modernization" efforts beyond what is currently occuring to let the issue fall by the wayside for the sake of appearing to play by the rules internationally (including the bipartisan letter sent by some very influential Senators to Obama mandating a new plan for the stockpile to accompany START).  This list very well may include Assistant Secretary Tauscher, who just recently left her position representing the district home to LLNL, who emphasizes the importance of the labs ("jewels in the crown") and sees the value of a modernization program that is within the broader agenda of eliminating nuclear weapons.  The answer to this question won't be a yes modernization/no arms control or yes arms control/monderization but rather a delicate balancing act of how much will the administration have to give on "modernization" to get START (and then CTBT which we have been writing about here and here). 

Why "Modernization?"

Much of the discussion about "modernization" is reduced to one side championing "safe, secure, and effective" and the other saying we can't undermine our international standing.  At its core, modernization should be a technical question.  Do we currently have, or more accurately looking into the future will we have the technical confidence we need that our stockpile will work in the unfortunate event it needs to.  Largely, this seems to be a question of "effective" or "reliable," whichever word you prefer.  Having a "safe" and "secure" arsenal is no doubt important but the warning lights people point to arguing for modernization seem to have much more to do with the effective/reliable component.  If you are doing some "modernization" work on a warhead it can provide you the opportunity to add some new safety and security features to warheads but the reason nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown from Minot, for example, was lack of Air Force/DoD personnel lack of attention on the "nuclear mission" (see the Schelsinger Task Force Phase I and Phase II reports) not technical problems with our warheads.  From a technical perspective, are our warheads effective/reliable?  This is an area lacking in the public debate.  While trying to have a technical discussion about warheads intended help resolve questions about "modernization" for larger audiences will inevitably be tough due to the complexity and classification issues, those in favor of "modernization" should outline the a, b, and c technical components that refurbishment alone cannot effectively deal with and those opposed to "modernization" should explain why reuse and/or replacement are unnecessary for a, b, and c.  For example, while the briefing slides included with Gertz' article warn against "Warheads acting as chemistry experiments as they age" those opposed to "modernization" cite the JASON report about the long life of a plutonium pit.  The problem, however, is that these are somewhat different claims and so a discussion needs to be had by both sides, for example, about the problems of an aging chemistry experiment in light of the findings about plutonium pits.  Another example is the vacuum tube debate.  There has been an ongoing debate between General Chilton and Jeffrey Lewis/Kingston Reif about vacuum tubes.  While both sides have opposing views on their relevance, Dick Garwin's comment that Chilton's statements are "obfuscating" probably hint to the additional explanation necessary and/or focus on different technical arguments as to why "modernization" might be needed by those in favor.  That said, Lewis' recent endearing comments about an acting four star in the last 2 paragraphs probably don't help much.