Lucky 21: The Global ZAP

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The Global Zero Commission yesterday released their “Zero Action Plan” that mapped out a 4 phase process to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2030.  Very Aggressive, in the words of Teddy KGB. 21 years to get from 23,335 to 0 is a gargantuan task, to say the least.  While the Zero Action Plan is admittedly a rough blueprint for phases to get toward zero, there are initially a couple of potentially worrying things that stick out:

1. The negotiations fast track- The START follow-on negotiations are in hyperdrive as the respective negotiating teams try to get something hammered out by 5 December.  Even should something get produced, however, it will have taken almost a year to produce a very modest reduction without tackling any of the highly contentious issues, not to mention the Bush administration had already started a lot of homework on the issue.  3 years to negotiate a further 1/3 reduction (1500 to 1000) that will probably have to involve nonstrategic weapons and missile defense when START I took almost 10 will be a very tough task, particularly when the 1500 to 1000 leap seriously starts to implicate force structure, “second to none,” extended deterrence commitments, etc.  Vegas is probably putting their money on the over.

2.  Cold War centrism- The primary focus of the first two steps which is almost a decade of the 21 year plan is upon getting the United States and Russia to drastically cut their arsenals.  While this is a necessary step because they possess 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons, the goal that

all other nuclear weapons countries are strongly encouraged not to increase their nuclear weapons programs

is not particularly convincing.  The P4 might, just might, be able to “strongly encourage” the Chinese to the point they would agree to a no increase pledge to avoid isolation but that doesn’t take into account Israel who “does not have a nuclear arsenal” to cap, Pakistan, North Korea, and last but not least Iran which Richard Burt deemed a potential “show stopper” in saying:

If they were to decide over the next couple of years that they want to acquire nuclear weapons and were to go forward and deploy them, then it’s hard to see how global zero goes anywhere

Even if the U.S. and Russia can fast-track reductions down to 500 by 2018, the difficulties in getting every country to sign a global disarmament treaty are astonishing.

3. Crime and Punishment- The subpoint of verification and enforcement that reads

Agreed mechanism for resolving disputes and enforcing compliance

cannot be taken lightly.  While there is a robust debate on whether international regimes like the NPT, CTBT, MTCR, etc. have or could be “successful,” however that is defined, they have one thing in common: their punishment for noncompliance is not overwhelming.  Exhibit A: North Korea and the NPT.  The ability to have even one nuclear bomb would be such a gamechanger in a strategic environment without any that the punishment for being caught trying to achieve that has to be so overwhelming that it deters countries from embarking on that journey.  That could prove very difficult to codify in an international accord that necessarily must be signed and ratified by every country.  Given the magnitude of joining such an agreement, there is also a “you first” paradox that may plague the effort to get members.

Achieving a world without nuclear weapons is no easy task and discussing why is important.

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