Missile Defense Can Offer "Meaningful Protection"

In an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Pavel Podvig lays out the case against missile defense.  Podvig’s primary argument is that, even with better technology, missile defense cannot guarantee our safety from a nuclear attack:

The fundamental problem with this argument is that missile defense will never live up to these expectations. Let me say that again: Missile defense will never make a shred of difference when it comes to its primary mission--protecting a country from the threat of a nuclear missile attack. That isn't to say that advanced sensors and interceptors someday won't be able to deal with sophisticated missiles and decoys. They probably will. But again, this won't overcome the fundamental challenge of keeping a nation safe against a nuclear threat, because it would take only a small probability of success to make such a threat credible while missile defense would need to offer absolute certainty of protection to truly be effective.

Podvig is right that missile defense probably cannot provide complete protection against a nuclear attack, but overall, he doesn't lay out a convincing case against missile defense.  There are two main problems with his argument.  First, it ignores the important assurance benefit that missile defense can provide.  In the case of Eastern Europe, Podvig acknowledges that ending proposed missile defense deployments could be perceived negatively by allies:

[I]t won't be easy for Obama to reverse course on European missile defense. Poland and the Czech Republic would hate to see their 15 minutes of fame end as key U.S. allies when it comes to missile defense, and other NATO allies would certainly wonder how seriously the United States takes its commitments.

I wrote about this in detail here and here.  While I agree that the third site is probably unnecessary to counter Iranian missiles, I think the US should take other actions to convince Poland and the Czech Republic that we are committed to their defense.  This could include forward deployment of missile defense systems designed to counter short- and medium-range missiles.

Cooperation with allies on missile defense can provide an important assurance benefit.  The United States has been working with Japan to develop a missile defense capability to counter a potential North Korean attack.  The U.S. has also cooperated with Israel on missile defense.  In the near future, the U.S. and Israel will be involved in joint exercises on missile defense.  And, according to the most recent Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) report on missile defense, Israel is increasingly interested in missile defense cooperation:

The impetus for missile defense cooperation has strengthened in Israel as a result of Iran’s nuclear program and repeated threats against Israel emanating from Iran’s leadership...The Israeli commitment to missile defense underscores the perceived need for protection against a spectrum of threats. These include cross-border terrorist attacks, possibly with WMD, but also missiles armed with conventional or nuclear warheads.

Podvig is right that missile defense cannot provide these countries absolute security against a nuclear attack.  However, together with other U.S. guarantees, missile defense can help make countries like Israel and Japan feel more secure and prevent them from taking more drastic steps to fend for their own security.

The second problem with Podvig's argument is that he underestimates the technical capacity of missile defense.  General Cartwright has said that he thinks current ground-based missile defense sites could knock down long-range missiles launched by Iran or North Korea with ninety percent accuracy.  Additionally, in previous posts we mentioned advancements that are being made in Aegis and other technologies.  According to the IFPA report cited above, the effectiveness of missile defense in testing is increasing:

On the positive side, the test record for missile defense radars and interceptors has improved significantly (32 of 42 hit-to-kill intercepts since 2001, and 26 or 27 since September 2005), and the initial missile defense capability called for in 2002 is now operational.

And even if there are problems with current capabilities, effective alternatives are possible.  For example, Theodore Postol, a professor of science, technology and national security policy at M.I.T., argues for a defense system that could hit missiles just as they were being launched:

This is a proposal I’ve developed and analyzed with a variety of American and Russian experts and the idea itself is simple. The defense system would shoot down Iranian or North Korean long-range missiles as they slowly accelerate from their launching sites...this alternative defense would be technologically feasible, and could be developed, built and deployed near the areas of concern in a relatively short time...This system would provide an extremely intimidating and highly effective defense against Iran and North Korea, but would pose no threat to Russia or China.

In the quote at the beginning of this article, Podvig acknowledges that advanced sensors and interceptors will someday be able to deal with missiles and decoys with a high probability of success.  Later he says:

Missile defense eventually might be able to reduce that chance, maybe even considerably, but it will never reduce it to zero.

Podvig is clear that he doesn't think missile defense will ever be 100% accurate, but he seems to admit that it could at least be useful.  However, the end of the article is perplexing.  Podvig says:

If a real confrontation ever comes about (and let's hope it never happens), we quickly would find out that missile defense offers no meaningful protection whatsoever.

If missile defense could be highly effective, why wouldn't it be useful in a real confrontation?  Podvig is right that the U.S. could not be certain that all missiles would be shot down, which would prevent the U.S. from being overly aggressive and provocative.  However, if deterrence broke down, and North Korea or Iran launched nuclear missiles at the U.S. or our allies, missile defense could play an important role in limiting damage and casualties.

The point is that while the strategic importance and technical capabilities of missile defense are often exaggerated by proponents, it is not completely useless.  Podvig’s article raises some interesting questions:  Considering that we can never be certain that we can shoot down a nuclear missile, is missile defense worth the money?  Would missile defense actually change our strategic calculus in a military situation that involved nuclear weapons?  But, it goes too far in stating that missile defense would offer “no meaningful protection whatsoever”.