Missile Defense Cuts - Bad Timing or Bad Policy?

During a recent visit to Alaska’s Fort Greely to view the country’s missile defense facilities, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, on the subject of his proposed cuts to the missile defense budget, that

“That doesn’t mean I think any less of missile defense - I told the Congress I’m a very strong supporter of missile defense - but I think we need to put the money where we can get some value out of it.”

During the same visit though, Gates made a seemingly contradictory claim, stating that

“Knowing that we have this capability and that it becomes more effective each passing day should be a source of comfort to the American people in an uncertain world.”

The proposed 2010 budget slashes $1.2 billion, or 35 percent, from the program’s budget in the previous year. Said Gates on the cuts,

“It’s not a forever decision, and if the capabilities in one of these rogue states should develop faster or in a more worrisome way than anyone anticipates, then I think the way is open in the future to add to the number of silos and interceptors up here.”

In the course of several breaths, Gates first rationalized the cuts as saving money from an ineffective program then used that same program to reassure the American people of their safety in an “uncertain world” - an uncertain world that apparently is certain enough for Gates to feel confident about cutting the missile defense budget. These various competing claims raise several interesting questions. First, if the program is indeed ineffective (see first quote), given the threats from North Korea (also Iran and potentially Pakistan), shouldn’t sufficient monies be allocated to some form of missile defense program to combat a clearly rising threat? And secondly, if the program is indeed capable of protecting the country from missile attacks (see second quote), why is its budget being decreased?

Granted, given the obstacles to successfully building and firing a missile complete with a nuclear warhead - one small enough to fit on a missile and also able to survive atmospheric flight and reentry, the timetable for a real North Korean nuclear threat may be years to a decade or more. Indeed, as argued by Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce of the Nautilus Institute,

“In short, unless they buy some other country’s design and materials, the DPRK will not be able to integrate a miniaturized nuclear warhead with an operationally effective long range missile system for another ten to fifteen years.”

The possibility of a purchase by the DPRK cannot (nor should it) be ruled out of the realm of possibilities, nor can one safely make assumptions on the presumed length of time it takes to successfully design, build, and test an ICBM. Furthermore, recent reports have stated that North Korea has positioned a long-range missile at a launch site for testing in the coming weeks.

The specter of a nuclear threat to the United States is extremely serious - not only from aspiring regimes such as the DPRK, but also, as many have argued, from terrorist groups who would not rely on a sophisticated missile, but most likely on a smuggled bomb - a scenario depicted in “The Sum of All Fears” - a 2002 movie. Funding on this front though has been drastically reduced, eliminated in some cases (see, “Securing the Cities” pilot program) from President Obama’s 2010 budget.

Ultimately, most academics and members of government agree that, however unlikely, there are still a range of potential nuclear threats facing the United States. North Korea aside, significant questions have been raised recently over the security of Pakistan’s developed nuclear arsenal. It would appear that the concern over the missile defense and other nuclear defense budget cuts is not simply driven by its timing coinciding with North Korea’s tests. Rather, especially given the moderate cost of the program compared to the hundreds of billions that have been thrown at the country’s economic problems, it appears as if these recent cuts might in fact be bad policy.