Missile Defense Follow-Up

Yesterday, we wrote up a post analyzing the current debate over missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. These sites were originally proposed by the Bush administration and are now being reconsidered under Obama. The post examined the arguments presented in two editorials (here and here). Those editorials argued that withdrawing missile defense from Poland and the Czech Republic would undermine our ability to counter the Iranian missile threat and cause Poland and the Czech Republic to feel abandoned. Relying primarily on statements from the June 16th Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing, we argued that the so-called third site was not necessary to counter Iran's missile threat (at least in the short-term), and that while we should be mindful of assurance concerns as they relate to Poland and the Czech Republic, there are probably alternative routes to assure them.

Yesterday afternoon, a couple of blogs were critical of the post. We appreciate that they took the time to respond and expand the discussion on the issue, but don't agree with a lot of what they said.

First, a primary criticism was that we relied too much on Heritage articles in our post. According to Armchair Generalist:

I would advise PONI posters that, if they want a serious discussion, they really need to avoid making a case using the New York Post and the Heritage Foundation for any sort of statements requiring factual basis.

And, according to Cheryl Rofer at Phronesisaical:

Ah yes: the missile defense cheerleaders at Heritage. This should be enough to disqualify everything that follows, but in these days, one never knows. And PONI is trying to debunk the editorials, I think. They pose some questions, which they try to answer by quoting others. On the one hand and on the other.

Both are correct that the Heritage Foundation supports missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic (in fact they're holding an event to support it). However, a closer read of our original post will show (as Rofer alludes to in the quote above) that our post was critical of the conclusions reached by the Heritage editorials, in particular the claim that missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic were needed to counter an Iranian missile threat.

The Armchair Generalist seems to realize this in an update posted today:

In fairness, as Greg and Jonah comment, the PONI post does critically view the NY Post and Heritage claims as not particularly valid. But I think that Cheryl and I (if I may speak for her) still feel that PONI is missing the point, that arguing that the Heritage assessments are overwrought but other missile defense alternatives are possible to mitigate the "threat" from Iran and Russia is not the correct solution either. Our point is that the Iranian threat is overblown, that the European allies don't really care about Iranian or Russian missiles (but they like the US money that comes with the sites), and that the more feasible solution is to continue nonproliferation talks with both countries. That way, we can all calm down and stop thinking about missile defense as some kind of magic solution.

Furthermore, I think both blogs are too quick to dismiss Heritage. A good friend of mine likes to say "debate arguments, not people." Instead of dismissing Heritage altogether, it is more productive to examine their arguments and cite other experts to dispute their claims (which is what our original post did).

A second criticism expressed by Rofer is that Russian expansionism is a Cold War threat that is exaggerated to hide the real goal of missile defense: to protect American from non-existent missiles:

The people of the former Soviet satellites and republics, particularly the older people, are well aware of Russia’s past expansionist tendencies. Russia has stoked those tendencies by the war against Georgia and a continuing propaganda barrage against those who left the Soviet (and before that, Russian) empire. There was a rush to get into NATO and the EU in the hope that this would end Russian expansionism. And it largely has, but the fear remains, not entirely unjustified.
But the missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland would protect America, not those two countries.

Both blogs seem to agree that the Iranian missile threat is overblown and that our preferred route for nonproliferation and arms control should be negotiations. We agree with most of that. The Iranian missile threat is overblown, but it is does exist. Iran currently has at least some short- and medium-range missiles, though doesn't have long-range ICBM capabilities. In the previous post, we cited high-level military officials who agree. Therefore, from a military standpoint, the missile defense and radar sites in Poland and the Czech Republic probably aren't necessary. Iran's current missile capabilities could be countered by more temporary Patriot and Aegis capabilities (as long as Iran doesn't acquire more advanced missiles). A new Politico article reaches the same conclusion:

But during a recent Space and Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, Ala., the new powers-that-be at the Pentagon — including Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency — didn’t mention European missile defense. Not once.
“For those generals not to mention it, when they have every year for the last five or six years — they’re not going there,” said Riki Ellison, chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, who attended the conference.
And even champions on Capitol Hill, such as Sens. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) and Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), have gone quiet, a defense lobbyist pointed out.
• Instead of continuing discussions about Bush’s plans for European missile defense, Pentagon officials are focusing on other options for defending Europe against missile attacks, such as combining sea-based Aegis destroyers with land-based missiles under development.
In the past year, the Navy has wholeheartedly embraced sea-based missile defense, setting up a new Air and Missile Defense Command in Dahlgren, Va., and adjusting its weapons investments accordingly.
Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, laid the groundwork last year when he opted to stop making a next-generation destroyer in favor of outfitting an older model with a missile defense capability: the DDG-51. This year, the Navy is stepping up that effort, and Roughead has said the Navy could retrofit the entire fleet of Arleigh Burke destroyers with missile defense systems.

We also agree that missile defense should not be seen as a replacement for negotiations. The US should pursue negotiations with Iran over their nuclear program with a real commitment to find a compromise (which we thoroughly defended here). We also agree that there could be benefits to a new START treaty with Russia. However, we think that both blog posts go too far in downplaying the concern that "new-NATO" allies (whether you think they're in East or Central Europe) could feel abandoned. That fear was reiterated by A. Wess Mitchell and Jamie M. Fly in a Foreign Policy article. Mitchell and Fly argue that reneging on installations in Poland and the Czech Republic could cause more internal divisions in NATO and embolden Russia. They also express the same fear about extended deterrence:

4. Cheapened alliances. Perhaps the severest long-term cost of the new plan will be its effect on America's alliances. On a per capita basis, the Poles and Czechs have provided greater material and political support for U.S. policies than most U.S. allies twice their size, giving the lie to the old argument that NATO's newest members would become free riders on U.S. security. Leaving pro-shield politicians holding the bag could lead other Atlanticist leaders to think twice before taking political risks on America's behalf -- not only in Central Europe, but in other small and mid-size states, including those threatened by rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea.

We previously discussed the difference between extended deterrence and assurance. While Rofer is correct that the Cold War has ended, our "new NATO" allies still have fears about Russian bullying either militarily or less overtly through energy access, etc. Assurance of Poland and the Czech Republic can only be effective if they believe that our commitment to their security is credible. What matters isn't actual threats faced by Poland and the Czech Republic, but how the countries perceive threats. "New-NATO" allies have developed an inferiority complex that has made them skeptical of the alliance's commitment to defend their territory.

One important factor in credibility is visibility. Polish leaders, who have supported the US in the past, want installations on their soil to demonstrate that the US, and NATO, are committed to defend their territory. In fact, one of the main reasons they want missile defense is that it would come with accompanying US troops. An articles that we reference yesterday from David Yost is worth citing again:

It is noteworthy in this regard that new allies in Eastern and Central Europe have expressed a willingness to host US and NATO facilities. One of the main reasons given by Czech and Polish supporters of the deployment of US missile defence system elements has been to gain the presence of US troops on their soil. Whatever happens with the missile defence plans under the new US administration, these countries remain interested in hosting US or NATO facilities. Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, declared in November 2008 that, although Poland joined the alliance in 1999, it had so far received only a promise of a NATO conference centre. ‘Everyone agrees’, he added, ‘that countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.’36

As this quote (and others) makes clear, there are other ways the US can demonstrate our commitment to allies, like Poland and the Czech Republic, besides permanent missile defense facilities. However, if the Obama administration decides to shift our missile defense priorities (based on a more realistic assessment of Iranian missile capabilities and the need to cooperate with Russia), they should do so in a way that continues to show Poland and the Czech Republic that we are committed to their security (whether that's temporary missile defense, NATO facilities, a small US troop presence, or something else).