Missile Defense Viewpoints-Did We Just Give Russia a Freebie?
Waking up yesterday morning I was surprised by the Washington Post story that Obama has scraped missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Before going into my concerns with the administration’s approach to handling this matter I feel it is appropriate to first note that missile defense in Eastern Europe has not been “scraped” or “abandoned” as many sources are claiming. The strategy is simply moving from a fixed system meant to respond to long-range missiles threats to a hybrid land and sea-based system meant to respond to short and medium-range threats currently posed by Iran’s missile program.
While I believe the strategy laid out by the Obama administration is sound, the delivery and timing of it leaves much to be desired. Here are some of my initial concerns:
First, it seems pretty clear that few, if any, meaningful consultations were done with either Poland or the Czech Republic prior to making this decision. I think it’s fair to assume that if meaningful consultations were taking place between the United States and all countries involved, it may have occurred to someone that yesterday, September 17, was the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland that led to institutionalized executions and the deportation of over 320,000 Polish citizens to Siberia and other remote parts of Russia.
A failure to consult the Poles and Czechs on such a substantial change reduces the credibility of the United States extended deterrent and our Article V commitment with all of Eastern Europe and potentially Turkey. There is already a great deal of suspicion in Eastern European NATO countries and Turkey as to the true extent of the U.S. and Western European commitment. Without consultations to demonstrate otherwise it is inevitable that many of these countries will view the administration’s decision as an attempt to placate Russia at the expense of their security.
Second, at first glance it appears that we have just given Russia a freebie by taking missile defense off the table as a bargaining chip. Negotiating terms to the START treaty would have been difficult even with missile defense on the table as a bargaining chip. Now, the U.S. will likely have to make additional concessions in order to obtain an acceptable agreement on START. Even if missile defense is not included for leverage in START negotiations, it could have been used for later arms control agreements.
Third, it is simply wrong to assert that the strategy concerning missile defense in Eastern Europe is or even should be contemplated independent of Russia.
Robert Gibbs yesterday said that the new missile defense plans “are not about Russia.” However, it would seem that a few American politicians didn’t get the memo. John McCain stated that the Obama administration’s missile defense plan is “a victory for Putin.” McCain further argued that Obama’s decision,
“has the potential to undermine perceived American leadership in Eastern Europe” at a time when “Eastern European nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian adventurism.”
Additionally, if this decision has nothing to do with Russia, why did James Jones feel the need to personally inform the Russian ambassador of the decision at the White House? The reality is this decision has everything to do with Russia and the administration is clearly aware of it. The Obama administration’s attempt to pretend that Russia is not a factor in this situation, despite clear evidence to the contrary, will further undermine U.S. credibility in Eastern Europe particularly as it pertains to potential Russian aggression.
Fourth, the administration isn’t making their goal of acquiring international support for heightened sanctions against Iran any easier by adjusting the U.S. missile defense posture in Eastern Europe on the premise that the Iranian missile capability is overstated. U.S. attempts to impose international sanctions against Iran without unquestionably demonstrating the existence of a viable nuclear weapons program is already difficult. Now that the U.S. has conceded a revised threat assessment which demonstrates that Iran’s capabilities were overstated and reliable enough to modify the missile defense system the likelihood of garnering international support for sanctions is near impossible.
Fifth, the Obama administration maybe biting off a little more than they handle domestically by triggering another partisan battle with Congressional republicans over missile defense. The problem for the administration is that the battleground is likely to be the START and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. As Obama continues to push his global zero agenda he will need republican support. Modifying the missile defense system in Eastern Europe with almost no consultation will only degrade relationships with House and Senate republicans which will be essential to further progress on arms control.
The partisan battle likely to ensure from the Republican reaction seriously endangers any START agreement with Russia and annihilates any chance of the CTBT passing in the near future.
Although to a large extent the damage seems to be done, in order to avoid being critical for the sake of being critical I have a few recommendations to attempt to remedy the problems caused by the announcement.
• The administration should immediately engage the Czech Republic, Poland, Turkey, and NATO in order to assure our allies that this system will be sufficient and their will be no compromise in the their deterrent.
• The U.S. should sell armed Patriots to the Czech Republic and Poland which will enhance their domestic capability to deter missile attacks.
• The administration should take the public position that Russia should take into account the change in the administration’s missile defense strategy during START negotiations.
• Obama himself should continue to make statements highlighting the threat presented by an Iranian nuclear program and Iran’s attempts to acquire missile technology.
• The Obama administration should go back to the Senate and reevaluate what will be necessary to ratify the START and CTBT treaties after the modification of missile defense in Eastern Europe.
While it is possible that a backchannel deal was made with Russia, it does not appear that Russia is willing to make any concessions on Iranian sanctions or arms reductions. There is also nothing to show that Russia made any considerable concession in their negotiating position for the START treaty.
Hopefully when Medvedev meets with Obama next week he will be able to prove that he didn’t just give Russia something for nothing.
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An interesting take on this
An interesting take on this thorny issue - however, I would ask, who wins in this situation, aside from Russia? You state that you believe the Obama Administration's policy on this subject to be sound, yet I'm not really seeing much evidence. While the Polish and Czech governments certainly aren't going to spurn the U.S. over this - issues such as trust and perception matter, especially on things-nuclear - just ask the Japanese and South Koreans. Furthermore, the given rationale is that this policy shift is based on an updated understanding of the Iranian missile capability - but is this really the case? Obama's rhetoric on the Third Site has drifted from proclaiming it set in stone to abandonment several months later - with varying degrees of modification in-between. And keep in mind that this past summer featured a slew of intelligence reports on Iran - alleging a number of things: that previous reports on the state of the Iranian program were incorrect, that their programs were more advanced than previously thought, et cetera. The truth? The U.S. doesn't really know the state of Iran's nuclear and missile programs - they could be far more advanced than we know. The purpose of the Third Site, in addition to protecting Eastern Europe, was also to protect the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, which lies on the periphery of the sites in Alaska and California. Is Iran's short and medium-range missile capacity currently more advanced than their long-range capacity? Who knows, maybe...sure, why not. But will that be the case in a year...two years...five years? I'm still not seeing any benefits to this decision - sure Russia may be placated, but, who's to say they aren't going to react in the same manner when the SM-3's show up? Score on nuclear issues so far this year - Russia: 2, U.S.: 0. Unfortunately, Obama appears so intent upon the idea of disarmament (which is certainly an admirable goal, if unfeasible), that he may be viewing the situation with blinders on, oblivious to the complete picture.