Modernization "follow-on"

In response to a post last week about the linkage between START and “modernization” efforts, ACW posted a lengthy reply about the text of the Kyl et al letter and what “modernization” means.  I certainly take the point

wonks would stop using “modernize” as though it has some technical meaning. If it has any meaning, we are modernizing now, though it seems clear that is not what advocates of modernization mean by the word.

Polling nuclear experts as to what is meant by “modernization” would probably produce a variety of answers and so pointing out the at best ambiguous definition of that term has some value.  That said, it probably also calls into question the claim that

The problem is, that is not even remotely what the letter said.

The revised letter sent to the President read:

Dear President Obama: We believe that when the START treaty is submitted , you should also submit a plan, including a funding estimate for FY11 (and out years across the next decade), to enhance the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, to modernize the nuclear weapons complex (i.e. improve the safety of facilities, modernize the infrastructure, maintain the key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons workforce–the designers and the technicians), and to maintain the delivery platforms.

The M word probably has political baggage for some of the non-Kyl senators who signed the letter but with regards to the stockpile “enhancing the safety, security, and reliability” seems to connote a strong deal of support for actions at least somewhere in the “spectrum of options” ballpark.  The debate will come down to disagreements on what part of the spectrum should be employed in various cases based on cost, need, perception, etc. but it seems the overarching direction is clear despite Kerry’s language focusing on stockpile stewardship and Kyl’s remarks taking a much stronger tone:

In recent months, it has become clear that our nuclear deterrent is in need of serious attention. As high an authority as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned: At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because eventually we won’t have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have. And: To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission, which recently issued its final report, also warned that : For the indefinite future, the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent. The other NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states have put in place comprehensive programs to modernize their forces to meet new international circumstances. Yet, it is clear that the steps necessary to do that are not being taken. The administration’s fiscal year 2010 budget for the nuclear deterrent has been described by its own officials as “treading water” and a “placeholder.” The physics and chemistry that are causing our nuclear weapons to deteriorate will not wait for the next Nuclear Posture Review–NPR–though.

At the end of the day, it seems that  “enhancing the safety, security, and reliability” may not be that far off from what many would deem “modernization” efforts spare the negative political connotation of the latter.  It does appear to be the case that these type of efforts needing to be included in the START package have stronger bipartisan support than originally argued (a coalition that also includes current DC demi-god Bob “No F22 for you” Gates).