Moving the Ball Forward

By Chris Jones

As the Review Conference fever starts to heat up with six weeks before proceedings begin, there’s optimism running high that 2010 can do big things. For example, ISIS’ piece from 4 March argues:

The Review Conference has a historic opportunity to adopt in the Conference document additional measures to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the treaty, including securing commitments from all states to implement the Additional Protocol, making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult in cases where countries have been found recently in noncompliance with safeguards obligations, and taking steps to prevent illicit nuclear trade.

Not so fast. Egypt's ambassador to the UN in Geneva and the CD, Hisham Badr, made clear where Egypt, current chair of the NAM, and other Middle East countries stand on the Review Conference and the NPT:

Middle Eastern countries feel tricked by the 40-year-old nuclear non proliferation treaty. . . Egypt's ambassador to the UN in Geneva and the conference on disarmament, Hisham Badr, said there was widespread resentment towards the NPT, which forms the cornerstone of efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. . .Badr suggested the nuclear powers had failed to hold their side of the bargain, while attempts to secure a nuclear weapons free Middle East at the NPT have constantly been postponed. . . ."We in the Middle East feel we have, short of better word, been tricked into giving concessions for promises that never materialised," Badr said at an event in the Swiss city to mark the 40th anniversary of the NPT. He warned that a Middle East resolution would be "pivotal" to the success of the review conference and the future of the arms control treaty. "There is widespread resentment in the region towards the NPT and what it seeks to achieve, its double standards and lack of political will." . . . Badr said it was "puzzling" that in the runup to the New York conference efforts were focused on strengthening the obligations on non-nuclear weapons states

Both of these statements have kernels of truth in them but probably overstate their case. The ISIS piece is right that this Review Conference could have an opportunity to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar (in addition to the other two pillars) but assuming the Review Conference will adopt measures like universal commitments to the Additional Protocol is overambitious as evidence by Badr’s comment about “puzzling.” Badr’s remarks about the lack of a NWFZ in the Middle East and other promises that haven’t materialized (e.g, CTBT) are entirely fair but seem to cast an ominous shadow over all things Review Conference. A healthy degree of skepticism should inform what tangible results at the Review Conference should be expected but that doesn’t the Review Conference should be dismissed. Arms Control Today conducted a must-read interview with Ambassador Susan Burk, the lead of the US NPT delegation, about the Review Conference. As a government official, she can only say so much but her framing of the big issues facing the Review Conference and the United States in particular are phrased quite well. Some of the highlights based on issues discussed above include:

The Additional Protocol:

Burk: There are lots of different views on the [Model] Additional Protocol, so I don’t want to speculate about what the review conference may or may not agree specifically on it. But it has become an important point for us to raise in consultations because we have ratified the Additional Protocol now and we do believe that it should become the new verification standard. But the more important point is the fact that [Mohamed ElBaradei,] the former director-general of the IAEA, before he retired, made a very strong statement, which I quote frequently, that without the Additional Protocol the IAEA has no capability to verify undeclared facilities. Our experience over the past years and discovery of clandestine nuclear facilities led to the negotiation of the Additional Protocol. We learn from our mistakes. It is very clear that we need to look forward on the Additional Protocol. There are well over 100 countries that have had additional protocols accepted by the IAEA and 90-some countries that have brought it into force. This is a critical mass of states that have adopted the Additional Protocol. We will continue to discuss with our partners how we can make it universal, invoking the words of the IAEA leadership on what they need in order to do their job, and we expect that there will be a strong statement of support for the Additional Protocol at the review conference in May.

Strengthening the Withdrawal Clause:
 

ACT: You mentioned earlier that North Korea was an outstanding issue, that they declared they had withdrawn from the treaty. Since that declaration, NPT states-parties have been trying to find a way to deal with the potential for additional withdrawals. How would the United States like the review conference to address that question?
Burk: First, it is important to state up front, because there is frequently a misunderstanding, that the United States is not seeking any changes to the withdrawal provision of the NPT.[9] We believe that states should have the right to withdraw and to decide what conditions require them to take such a significant step. But what we have been looking at is the issue of potential abuse of the withdrawal clause. When I first came on board, I was reading about what had been done in 2005. Articles have been written by folks outside of government on this issue, and NPT parties, including the United States, have tabled papers at past PrepComs [Preparatory Committee meetings] on this issue. The concerns seem to be, in the first instance, a situation where a country violates the treaty and then withdraws as a way to escape the violations. I have not encountered anyone in my contacts who believes that a state should not be held accountable for those violations even if it decides to withdraw. So our effort has been to try to identify some specific points or specific measures that the NPT parties might agree that they would be prepared to take, one, in the event a state announced it was withdrawing, to determine whether or not it was in violation, and two, if it were, to remedy that violation. I think the North Korea case is the one that most people are familiar with.
ACT: That discussion has been going on for some time. Do you believe that the states-parties at this conference are close to an agreement as to what the collective response should be?
Burk: At this moment?
ACT: Is this a particular goal of the United States at this conference at this time?
Burk: It is one of our goals. We would like to see the conference address this issue and ideally agree on some steps. But at this moment in time, are we close to agreement on that? No. We are still talking about it and expanding the circle of countries that we are sharing specific ideas with.

Middle East NWFZ:
 

ACT: Even if you manage to find agreement on all those issues at the review conference, another outstanding issue that many observers believe might need to be addressed, if there is going to be an overall agreement, is the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which calls for the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone and for all states in the region to join the NPT. At last year’s Preparatory Committee, key states, including Egypt, had issued specific ideas for advancing the goals of the resolution. What is the possibility at the review conference for getting agreement on either those proposals or other ideas for advancing progress on the resolution?
Burk: I’m not into predicting possibilities for agreement at this point on things. What’s important is that we are making very clear that we support fully the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution. To the extent there was any question about that in the past, we are trying to set that straight: We support it. We support the achievement of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. I can’t speak to specific proposals on this. We are very aware of the proposals that are out there and understand the importance of this issue to this review conference.
ACT: But if I could just follow up: The 1995 resolution was widely supported. Since then, it has been widely supported. Yet there has been, by all measures, very little progress toward that goal, and one of the key points of friction at the last review conference was the apparent lack of progress on this goal. What ideas is the United States prepared to support to help advance that goal even in modest ways? If there is not a possibility of agreement at this review conference on this subject, how likely is it that the conference as a whole might agree to a set of benchmarks and standards to strengthen all three pillars of the regime?
Burk: It is important to remember that the situation on the ground in 1995 was very different than the situation on the ground in 2010. In 1995 there was one country [in the Middle East] outside the treaty. In 2010 I need not elaborate on the additional complicating factors that have developed. So all of these developments in that region on the nonproliferation front have just added new complicating factors into any solution. That said, I think there is a good-faith effort to see if there is a way forward on this issue. It will require the goodwill, creativity, and constructive energy of more than one country. We will hope for the best, but I don’t want to predict what the outcome would be. In terms of progress on the three pillars, again, I don’t want to speculate. There is an awful lot to be gained at this review conference on all three pillars. I think we have to see where we are in May on the three pillars and on the Middle East resolution and on what there is broad, near consensus.

2010 Expectations:
 

Burk: I would say your question goes directly to a point that I have been making in my meetings with other treaty parties, which is that the NPT review conference is a very important event in the life of the treaty, a critical event, but it is not an end in and of itself. The goal here is to renew and reinvigorate the treaty and agree on some specific steps that the international community is prepared to take in all three pillars to move forward. But very importantly, a constructive, positive review conference will give important momentum to our efforts in Vienna at the IAEA, in Geneva at the CD [Conference on Disarmament], in New York at the UN, to deal with all the issues, because that is where the work will continue to be carried out. This includes negotiations on the FMCT at the CD and dealing with issues of noncompliance at the UN, strengthening safeguards at the IAEA. So we think that the review conference can give a real boost to these efforts. You will see the United States continue to support, aggressively support, progress in all three treaty pillars, consistent with the president’s agenda.

Well said, Ambassador Burk.