A joint study by two American physicists - MIT professor Theodore Postol and David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) - concluded that the rocket launched by North Korea in April “would have the capability to reach the continental United States with a payload of 1 ton or more if North Korea modified it for use as a ballistic missile.”
Postol and Wright compared the Unha-2 launcher with the Taepodong-2 missile and analyzed video footage of the launch to reach their conclusions. They find that this launch represents considerable progress and technological advancement over previous North Korean launches. With the three-stage Unha-2 designed to transport a small satellite, not a heavy warhead, the authors write that the rocket may be structurally unable to support a warhead, however, if it could, they estimate that it could fly 10,000 to 10,500 kilometers and reach half of the United States or 7,000-7,5000 kilometers with the first two stages - enabling it to reach Alaska and parts of Hawaii.
So does this mean that the U.S. is considerably more at risk than previously thought from a North Korean missile? Not necessarily. Although certainly cautioning that North Korea could conceivably reach the United States with a missile (or at least that it’s not entirely out of the realm of possibilities), Postol and Wright’s study offers some consolation as well.
On the other hand, the Unha launcher appears to be constructed from components that probably weren’t manufactured in North Korea. It’s likely that these critical rocket components were acquired from other countries, most notably Russia, although likely without the involvement of the Russian government. If these guesses are true, it could mean that North Korea’s indigenous missile capability could be significantly constrained if Pyongyang is denied further access to such components.
Their analysis points to the belief that Stage 2 of the Unha-2 rocket is of Russian origin and Stage 3 of Iranian origin. They have also most likely received significant Russian assistance on constructing and manufacturing missiles and rockets. If this proves true, as the authors claim, managing to cut off North Korean imports of weapons technology could cripple and ultimately end Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear program as the DPRK lacks domestic capability. The study notes, North Korea may be incapable of producing key rocket parts, relying instead on “combining existing components in clever ways.”
Although these points are about as comforting as possible in regards to a nuclear weapons program under the direction of the DPRK’s crazed “Dear Leader,” one must remember that ultimately, its the missile’s capability that matters, not its country of origin.