NATO and the Afghan Campaign

Wednesday, October 3rd 2007

The Brookings Institute

21st Century Defense Initiative & Center on the United States and Europe

NATO and the Afghan Campaign

Currently the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) deployed by NATO has 22,000 troops in Afghanistan. They however, prefer the name “Interim” Security Assistance Forces, demonstrating their temporary status and the importance in eventually turning responsibilities over to a capable Afghanistan National Army (ANA).

Although ISAF’s main initiative remains in the military arena, they try to work under the auspices of PMESII: Political-Military-Economy-Society-Information-Infrastructure, understanding that true success occurs only when these areas are in sync with one another. The ISAF’s immediate objective is to defeat the insurgents’ strategy. Militarily they seek to clear insurgent ridden zones, utilizing the ANA to then hold these areas down. The inability of the ISAF to hold areas themselves comes with inadequate resources allocated by NATO. The ANA however, lacks efficient police coordination to keep permanent strongholds from insurgent penetration.

The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) is riddled by corruption and incompetency, acting as one of the largest obstacles to an effective military strategy in Afghanistan. The abundant poppy cultivation industry breeds and fuels corruption at all levels of the government, thereby reinforcing a weak police force and infrastructure. Consequently, the lack of public services and successful reconstruction projects yields lower incentives for professionalism within the local police forces. For solutions to redress these issues, ISAF again points to PMESII, yet slow progress begs the question of what more can be done?