Graham Allison published an op-ed in today’s Washington Post about Iran having “lost its nuclear virginity,” i.e. gaining enough enrichment know-how and capability to produce a bomb. We knew this already. More interestingly, Allison makes an estimation of the likelihood that the fissile material used in a future Iranian nuclear weapon test will come from a declared facility, a probability that he puts at less than 10%. Allison therefore likens the emphasis on Iran’s declared facilities to “the story of the drunk looking for his car keys under the lamppost, even though he knows he dropped them a hundred yards away, because that is where the light is.” Assuming, probably correctly, that we’re in no good position to be able to physically prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, Allison tries to sober up the drunk man.
The central policy question becomes: What combination of arrangements, inside and outside Iran, has the best chance of persuading it to stop short of a nuclear bomb? More important than how many centrifuges Iran continues operating at Natanz is how transparent it will be about all of its nuclear activities, including the manufacture of centrifuges . . . The best hope for defining a meaningful red line is to enshrine the Iranian supreme leader’s affirmations that Iran will never acquire nuclear weapons in a solemn international agreement that commits Russia and China to join the United States in specific, devastating penalties for violation of that pledge.
Provocative stuff. But is this prescription a cup of coffee or just more whiskey for the drunkard?
To begin with, treating Iran as a special case (read: rogue) has not been terribly successful. True, if a country walks, talks and acts like a rogue, then it is not wrong to think of it as such. Iran certainly plays the part, but the designation hasn’t been terribly helpful so far. And so taking it the next step by suggesting that Iran sign a special pact with the U.S., Russia and China that forces the former to accept “devastating” repercussions for developing a nuclear weapon – presumably far more devastating than those for any other NPT signatory – seems to expect Iran to accept permanent rogue status and with the ongoing threat of devastation to boot. Besides, if the situation is so bad that such a lopsided agreement is deemed necessary, then it seems logical to assume that we’re not at the point at which written agreements are going to help at all.
Convincing Iran to stop short of building a nuclear weapon is maybe a tough sell, but it shouldn’t be that tough. After all, if security and prestige is what Iran’s after, then having a known breakout capability might suffice – and might even be appealing – so long as the threat of denuclearization by force, or other military adventures into Iran, are off the table, at least publically (though the U.S. has not moved in this direction). This also means living with Iranian enrichment, upsetting as that may be. These aren’t popular options, and for some good reasons; but credibility problems come to mind when thinking about the “new red line” strategy. Thus far passing resolutions and imposing sanctions have hurt Iran economically while at the same time feeding the narrative in-country that the U.S. is out to get them and is making up the rules as it goes. Needless to say, the net effect has left a lot to be desired.
It certainly needs to be made clear that there is a consequence for nuclear weapons pursuits, especially those occurring in violation of the NPT. And having the U.S., Russia and China jointly committing to something would no doubt help. However, drawing red lines, absent either the ability or willingness to impose costs commensurate with the supposed severity of the offense, has thus far done nothing good for the credibility of anyone, least of all the UN or IAEA. Upping the ante by putting the credibility of Russia and China on the line is an intriguing thought, but it seems unlikely that they’ll enter into anything that requires them to impose devastation on a presumably nuclear-armed country.
Allison makes a great point about sobering up on how Iran will produce a weapon and that we should redouble our efforts accordingly. But we have already tried red lines with before and they haven’t worked. Maybe the answer is drawing a bigger, brighter, more brilliant red line in cooperation with Russia and China and then formalizing it in some sort of special pact. But, in a world of least bad options, maybe drawing red lines just don’t work and we should therefore sober up on this point, too.