(Non-)Proliferation Peace Prize Part 1: Russia and Iran

President Obama recently roped in the Nobel Peace Prize, in part because the committee "attached special importance to Obama's vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons." Whether Obama should have received the Nobel Peace Prize and the implications of receiving the award is beyond the PONI purview but it raises an interesting question of how Obama's "extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and co-operation between peoples" plays out in nuclear nonproliferation land. James Kitfield at GSN had a good read about some of the obstacles the Obama administration will face on its nuclear agenda. His analysis of the domestic political scene was pretty spot on but I differ a bit with some of the international section of the piece. On Iran he argues,

The administration's first gambit was last month's decision to scrap a proposed missile defense system in Eastern Europe, a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. Resetting that relationship was important not only in paving the way for a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in December but also in persuading veto-wielding Moscow to accept tougher U.N. sanctions on Iran for its clandestine nuclear weapons program. If Iran is able to shake off weak sanctions and thumb its nose at the Security Council by acquiring and eventually testing a nuclear weapon, it could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and scuttle any chances for Senate ratification of the test-ban treaty, dooming the administration's nonproliferation agenda.

There's three assertions here that I would question: the missile defense decision was aimed at getting Russian cooperation on Iran, we can get successful Russian cooperation to solve Iran, and that Iran would thumb its nose at the UNSC by testing a weapon (thereby triggering a regional arms race).  Assistant Secretary of State Tauscher was pretty clear speaking at a missile defense event recently when she noted: 

Finally, there was no attempt to curry favor with the Russian government, or to secure some kind of tradeoff in negotiations for a START follow-on treaty. There is absolutely no truth to that one either. This was a decision about the nature of the threat and the optimal system to defend against it, period.

The fact that the missile defense decision was made on the fly due to a leak also calls into question the hypothesis the U.S. was seeking to gain favor with the Russians.  Second, the U.S. is still going to have a tough time getting Russia to buy-in to meaningful UNSC sanctions on Iran.  As the U.S. met with 10 allies last week to discuss sanctions, the Russians (and Chinese) were noticeably absent.  Iran's concessions at the UN meeting, including the reactor proposal the Russians think is a "great idea," will only further solidify  Russian recalcitrance on self-imposing trade opportunities with a $3 million/year trading partner.  While Clinton sought to ask

what specific forms of pressure Russia would be prepared to join us and our other allies in if Iran fails to live up to its obligations

BBC reports the result of that effort: 

Pressuring Iran and threatening further sanctions over its nuclear programme would be counter-productive, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says.
Speaking after talks in Moscow with US counterpart Hillary Clinton, Mr Lavrov said every effort should be made to continue negotiations.
His comments appeared to fall short of the tougher commitment sought by Washington towards Iran.

Needless to say, it seems Iran continues to tactfully use the strategy of giving just enough to prevent Russia from seriously considering enacting additional sanctions.

Thirdly, the idea that Iran will seek to "shake off weak sanctions and thumb its nose at the Security Council by acquiring and eventually testing a nuclear weapon" should be given some pause.  There's a strong argument to be had that Iran will opt for a breakout capability rather than go through the entire headache acquiring and testing a nuclear weapon.  On the "breakout spectrum," they might seek to target a spot somewhere between, for example, Japan and North Korea.  The former retains a very advanced civilian nuclear program and sufficiently robust economic power to be able to develop nuclear weapons fairly quickly, should the leadership decide that to be the case.  That said, Japan also remains in the good graces of the IAEA and has not aroused much international suspicion.  North Korea, meanwhile, has made little attempt to play by the rules and thereby invited upon itself a great deal of international pressure.  Iran's efforts to at least try to claim they are generally within their IAEA obligations serves to suggest perhaps they are seeking a strategy somewhere between the two.  The will look to push the boundaries of what they can get away with, recoil when they are found in the wrong a la the Qom situation, and continue to push the envelope of having all the ingredients for a nuclear weapons should it come to that.   As Juan Cole argued last week,

The answer I propose, which explains all the anomalies elegantly and concisely, is that Iran is seeking nuclear latency . . . The reason for the construction of the Qom facility, in this reading, would be that the Natanz facility is too easily bombed or struck with missiles. Moreover, the Israelis and some Americans have repeatedly threatened to strike it. A nuclear enrichment program such as that at Natanz, which is subject to being wiped out by a military strike, cannot truly provide nuclear latency. The Qom facility was necessary in the regime's eyes if the latency strategy was to be preserved.  The regime has every reason to maintain latency and no reasons to go further and construct a nuclear device. The latter step would attract severe international sanctions . . .Khamenei seems to me to have decided some time ago on a policy of nuclear latency, for two reasons. Nuclear reactors lend Iran a hope of energy independence. Iran produces 3.8 million barrels per day of petroleum and uses about 2 mn. b/d itself. It is likely that soon Iran will use up all of its daily petroleum production, leaving it without the petroleum income windfall upon which its government depends. At that point, Khamenei fears, Iran would be dragooned back into the neo-liberal, America-centric order that had dominated Iran under the shah. Second, nuclear latency would help fend off aggressive attempts at regime change by the Western powers or Israel.  Nuclear latency has all the advantages of actual possession of a bomb without any of the unpleasant consequences, of the sort North Korea is suffering.

Which leads to the ever interesting questions: can the U.S. live with a nuclear capable Iran?  Given the difficulty of getting the P5 on board for a unified front, we may not have a choice.