Nuclear News Bits from Japan

Nuclear issues have been big in Japan over the past week. First, Prime Minister Taro Aso announced to a meeting of lawmakers that he intends to send a letter to President Obama expressing his interest in working with the U.S. towards the President’s goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Then, Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone expressed his intent to appeal to China directly to reduce its nuclear arsenal and to ratify the CTBT during a speech scheduled for April 27. Although it is common for Japan to call on nuclear powers to drawdown their numbers – the article on Hirofumi’s intentions notes that they do it every year in a draft resolution sent to the UN – sources for the article note that it “would be unusual for a Cabinet minister to file such a request with China in an unequivocal fashion.” Maybe so, but how many (if any) eyebrows he raises in China, or what difference it makes, remains to be seen. Likewise, it’s unlikely that Japan’s Prime Minister would go on-record with anything but support for the U.S. president’s nuclear agenda, so Aso’s comments on nuclear disarmament are fairly predictable, even if behind closed doors the Japanese continue to stress the continuing importance of U.S. nuclear weapons to ensuring regional stability. The $64,000 question is what exactly Aso’s letter will say. The Prime Minister declined to comment when asked for details. It is by no means contradictory for Japan to be supportive of a credible extended nuclear deterrent and endorse a goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons at the same time, but it is a bit complicating. In any case, one conservative Japanese politician has seized the opportunity to table an alternative approach: Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. Shoichi Nakagawa predicated his case for acquiring nuclear weapons on the need to deter an attack from North Korea, stating that “It is common sense worldwide that in a purely military sense it is nuclear that can counteract nuclear.” Enter U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. On cue, in an op-ed article in Sunday’s Japan Times, James Przystup argues that, with North Korea continuing to rattle nerves with missile tests and threatened resumption of its nuclear weapons program, now is the time for the U.S. to “publicly make clear its commitment to extended deterrence to both Seoul and Tokyo.” Possibly Aso’s communiqué with Obama will provide a little more guidance on what the nuclear, conventional, and political elements of this commitment ought to consist of, but there is a reminder here to think about what the requirements of the U.S. are for keeping Japan at ease and obviating any possible (however seemingly improbable) acquisition of nuclear weapons on their part. In the absence of a severe falling out between the U.S. and Japan, it’s hard to imagine a scenario in which someone like Nakagawa and his fellow hawks would gain a lot of political traction with an argument that Japan, owing to some perceived faintheartedness in the U.S. security guarantee, needs to make a 180 degree turn on nuclear weapons by revising its constitution and launching a project to acquire nuclear weapons and requisite delivery systems, which would not be easy. (See Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitn’s CRS Report for a closer look at Japan's technical hurdles). Nonetheless, with two nuclear powers on its doorstep, relatively limited conventional military strength, and tons fissile material and scientific expertise at its disposal, Japan is a unique case among those that rely on U.S. security guarantees. It is probably unlikely that Nakagawa’s remarks will be enough to spark any serious debate on Japan’s nuclear options over the short term; but it is also probably unwise to presuppose that Japan’s “fading nuclear allergy” is completely insignificant, especially if China comes across as belligerent in ignoring appeals from guys like Hirofumi and if North Korea continues its policy of ignoring everybody.