Nuclear Policy in the QDR: Important Changes from Draft to Final

By John K. Warden

Last week, I used the leaked draft of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to predict the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  This week, the final draft of the QDR was released on the DoD website.

The final document is, in many ways, similar to the draft.  It follows the same outline and, in some places, the paragraphs are unchanged.  However, in others, including many of the sections that discuss nuclear weapons, the document includes new language and ideas.

Sometimes, these changes appear cosmetic.  For example, while the final document does not include the sentence that explicitly connected the QDR and the NPR, it includes a footnote that serves the same purpose:

By congressional direction, DoD has conducted reviews of U.S. nuclear strategy and forces, ballistic missile defense, and space assets and operations in addition to the QDR. The findings of these reviews are being reported separately, but key insights were drawn on for this report.

There are other minor changes.  The first sentence of the paragraph that identifies nuclear proliferation as a key trend changed from:  “Of grave concern, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) undermines global security, further complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races.” to “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to undermine global security, complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races.”  Although “of grave concern” was removed, it would be reading too much into this change to conclude that the final document somehow deemphasizes nuclear proliferation.

However, in other areas the changes between the draft and the final QDR seem more important.  The section that highlights the importance of deterrence and ways the United States should continue to strengthen it includes significant changes.  Here’s the text from the draft:

The United States is postured to deter a wide range of attacks or coercion against the United States and its allies with capabilities across domains. Deterrence is predicated largely on land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in anti-access environments, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enhanced by emerging U.S. capabilities to deny adversary objectives through ballistic missile defense, early warning and intelligence collection, resilient infrastructure, including command and control systems, and global basing and posture. Until such time as the President's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities to respond will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense, with a safe, reliable, and effective stockpile and forces sufficient to defend the United States, U.S. interests and forces abroad, and to continue to meet extended deterrence commitments to allies.
The United States is strengthening its approach to deterrence in multiple ways.
• The Department of Defense continues to improve its ability to attribute WMD, space and cyberspace attacks so that it can continue to hold aggressors responsible and deny them the obfuscation of new domains or the use of proxies.
• The United States will not and does not distinguish between those who employ weapons of mass destruction and those who may transfer those weapons or enabling materials for use. Any regime considering the transfer of such materials should have no doubt that it will be held responsible for the consequences.
• To reinforce U.S. commitments to extended deterrence, we will consult closely with allies and partners to build our capabilities to work together in the context of new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that take advantage of our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extending our nuclear deterrent to allies.
• The United States has and continues to strengthen its resiliency: the ability to recover quickly from attacks in any domain and to fight through catastrophic events and effectively recover. The U.S. Government is also expanding its capabilities to assist allies in responding to such events.
• The United States will work with like-minded nations to foster regimes and norms regarding behavior in the global commons—especially space and cyberspace. These are shared resources in which an attack on one nation has consequences for all.

And here’s the text from the final QDR:

The United States is positioned with capabilities across all domains to deter a wide range of attacks or forms of coercion against the United States and its allies. Until such time as the Administration’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners. Deterrence also depends on land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enabled by cyberspace and space capabilities, and enhanced by U.S. capabilities to deny adversaries’ objectives through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD, resilient infrastructure (including command and control systems), and global basing and posture. The United States is strengthening its approach to deterrence in multiple ways.
• The Department of Defense continues to improve its ability to attribute WMD, space, and cyberspace attacks in order to hold aggressors responsible and deny them the ability to evade detection in new domains or use proxies.
• To reinforce U.S. commitments to our allies and partners, we will consult closely with them on new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent. These regional architectures and new capabilities, as detailed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.
• America’s resilience—robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery—is an important dimension of our deterrent posture. So too is America’s ability to assist allies in responding to both attacks and natural disasters.
• The United States will work with like-minded nations to foster norms regarding behavior in domains where an attack on one nation has consequences for all—especially in space and cyberspace.

One key difference is the ordering of the introductory paragraph.  Both versions highlight conventional and nuclear deterrence and acknowledge that the United States will rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence as long as they exist.  However, changes to the structure of the paragraph change how it reads. In the draft, nuclear deterrence seems like an afterthought – something that must retain as long as nuclear weapons exist, but not as important as other conventional capabilities.  In the final QDR, nuclear weapons appear more prominently at the beginning of the paragraph.

While the paragraph highlights nuclear deterrence, an added line in the bullets signals that the drafters believe that new conventional capabilities, including missile defenses, will “make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”  The bullet even hints that the forthcoming NPR will come to the same conclusion.

Another important difference is the absence of the bullet about deterring nuclear terrorism.  The draft says that the United States will respond to terrorist organizations that use WMDs and states that transfer WMDs for use.  However, the draft does not include retaliation against those that neglect their responsibilities in safeguarding WMDs.  As I wrote before, “If this exclusion is intentional, it could signal a reversal of the so-called ‘negligence doctrine.’”  Were the drafters afraid they might be reversing the ‘negligence doctrine’?  Did they simply not want to comment on deterring WMD terrorism?