Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010 - Session Two

By Andrew St. Denis

Recently, PONI held the second seminar of its 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative. The event sought to discuss the history, prospects, and international perspectives of the global nonproliferation regime.

One of the issues that framed discussion during the day was the linkage between nuclear energy, nuclear security, and the NPT. The search for a workable international regime for nonproliferation dates back to the post-WWII Baruch Plan, which sought to internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle. Unfortunately its timing, in which international control of the fuel cycle would precede U.S. disarmament, caused the plan to flounder over Soviet objections. The plan’s Atomic Energy Agency was picked up by President Eisenhower in his Atoms for Peace, and eventually emerged as the IAEA. Throughout the following decades, safeguards agreements remained non-uniform, and the focus on declared facilities allowed Iraq to progress in its clandestine weapons program in the 1980s. Following the Gulf War and revelations about the Iraqi program, the Additional Protocol was created to guard against a similar scenario. In addition to the importance of safeguards agreements the need for safety and security of sites regarding peaceful nuclear energy use was also discussed. Attendees followed this segment with a robust discussion including the prestige and sovereignty issues that complicate discussions of many states’ nuclear programs.

Another common thread throughout the day was the link between conventional arms and arms control. The way that balances of offensive and defensive armaments interact with wider conventional-nuclear balances was a running thread in the conversation, especially as arms sales rise in the Middle East in response to the Iranian program and concerns persist over the conventional-nuclear balance between India and Pakistan.

Thinking about the NPT Review Conference later this year, of particular note are the problems of declaring states in noncompliance while guarding the process from politicization. Five states, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Romania, and Libya have been found in noncompliance, while two other states, South Korea and Egypt, have not, even though quesitonable activities or failure to report were revealed. The varying paths to a noncompliance finding have provided difficulties in the past, as varying levels of objectivity and the ability of states to walk back on their violations has lead to criticisms of the process. The issue of enrichment capabilities also arose in discussion. The international fuel cycle idea regained prominence over the Iran nuclear issue, and is likely to be a topic of dispute at the RevCon. However, enrichment and reprocessing technology is not a clear-cut issue of good or bad, since several states - including Australia, Canada, and South Korea - are seeking to keep their options open on these technologies. However, intent does play a role, and while many nuclear activities currently pursued by Iran are considered legal, how one’s efforts are perceived by the international community is important. For example, Iranian efforts on pyroprocessing will require uranium metal if they are to function, something of a concern considering the short step from metal to bomb material (links to my IAEA post). On the issue of permanent safeguards beyond the NPT and withdrawal from it, some future agreements such as a fissile materials treaty were discussed as possible venues for their discussion.

The Non-Aligned Movement will, of course, also play a significant role at the conference. NAM places a priority on balancing all three pillars of the NPT, as well as work towards a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. To the NAM, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is untouchable and unattached to the other pillars of disarmament and nonproliferation. In other words, the right to it is not necessarily part of a balance of commitments. In this formulation, the right to nuclear energy isn’t predicated on state’s ongoing abstention from developing nuclear weapons. The “trade” so-to-speak, was, in this view, between nonproliferation and disarmament. While the U.S., Russia, and the UK seem to be making great strides on the disarmament front, the framing in terms of national security instead of NPT obligations is notable to some. The U.S.-India 123 agreement may also be a sticking point for some, especially given that the U.S. did nothing to move India towards signing either the NPT or the CTBT in exchange.

Regarding Article 10 of the NPT – specifying the terms of withdrawal – the NAM view is that it must be implemented as is, and that while one can take issue with withdrawal, referring a state to the Security Council for doing so is not an option. Given recent experiences with North Korea, the U.S. and others may like to see this article strengthened or buttressed by other agreements; however, it seems as though they won’t get a lot of help on that from the NAM. Discussion among the nuclear scholars brought up many interesting points, including whether declaratory policy would be a sticking point for non-nuclear weapon states, such as the possibility of synergy between negative security assurances and no first use.

Nonetheless, there are collective interests inherent in the NPT pillar on disarmament and the importance of not just talking about it, but doing it. First off, however, there was the issue of managing expectations, especially following Obama’s election. For instance, a number of agreements and high expectations emerging from the 1995 RevCon, and yet they complicated efforts towards disarmament when they proved difficult to carry through. The role of Obama administration decisions on maintenance of the nuclear complex and missile defense issues interact with the administration’s nonproliferation efforts came to the forefront as we discussed ongoing U.S. preparation and how such moves will be received. Rather than simply rehashing Article VI, concrete plans must be designed. Irreversible and sustainable steps will be important in any disarmament scenario, including French efforts to dismantle its test sites and cease production of fissile material. In addition to proclaiming these steps, it is important that other states realize the immensity of such steps, through the use of methods such as transparency measures and on-site tours to show how sites such as testing facilities can be rendered unusable.

Late in the day, topics returned to a discussion of the U.S. preparation for the upcoming RevCon, the role of safeguards beyond NPT withdrawal, the importance of consensus is deciding the success of a review conference, and the role of the media in how the conference will be portrayed. The risk of the media latching onto a single metric, some were concerned that the possibility of consensus not being codified could disproportionately impact the nonproliferation agenda.