Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2011: Meeting 5

By Kelley Sayler

On May 20, PONI hosted the fifth meeting of the 2011 Nuclear Scholars Initiative.  Titled “Nuclear Security:  A New Paradigm,” the meeting covered topics ranging from the safety of nuclear energy to the role of multilateral forums in strengthening nuclear surety.

The meeting began with a discussion of the structural contributors to the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi.  In particular, the panelist noted long-standing concerns, raised as early as 1972, regarding the safety of the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I design.  This design, present in five of the six units at Fukushima Daiichi, as well as in 23 US units, includes a low-volume primary containment structure that allows for the limited accumulation of steam.  As pressure inside the containment structure builds, steam is transferred to the torus, where it can then be absorbed. 

But at Fukushima, the tori quickly reached saturation, requiring that excess steam be released into the atmosphere via an emergency venting system.  It was the failure of this system - which did not have the upgrades mandated for US reactors and, perhaps more importantly, suffered from TEPCO’s pervasive falsification of safety records – that, in turn, led to pressure-induced hydrogen explosions and the release of radioactive steam. 

In addition to safety deficiencies, the panelist noted, there are a number of other considerations that will affect the future of nuclear energy security, including the cost of enhanced safety measures, the vulnerability of reactors to natural disasters, the prevalence of plutonium-based fuel, and the configuration of spent nuclear fuel storage sites.

The second panelist then offered an overview of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, stating that the conference provided a significant opportunity to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime and to restore confidence in the regime’s objectives.  She highlighted the desirability of achieving universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, given the inadequacy of existing safeguards, and emphasized the need to improve the technical and institutional capacity of those countries that ratify it.  The panelist concluded with a discussion of IAEA finances, underscoring the importance of not only funding the IAEA fully but also augmenting support for nuclear forensics and monitoring and verification technologies.    

This was followed by a discussion of nuclear smuggling and supply-side control mechanisms.  The most recent collection of nuclear aspirants has been heavily dependent on foreign supply to meet program requirements, the panelist noted.  As a result, increasingly sophisticated state-sponsored smuggling networks have emerged that threaten to substantially undermine the nonproliferation regime.  For example, Iranian smuggling networks have utilized foreign agents and front companies to obtain restricted materials, including the maraging steel used in centrifuge bellows and the pressure transducers used in cascades, thereby circumventing export controls and evading end-use verifications. 

And in addition to their immediate threat to the nonproliferation regime, smuggling networks pose a long-term proliferation risk via their potential use as future export platforms.  This risk is likely to accelerate in the years to come, as both Iran and North Korea expand indigenous manufacturing capacity.  For this reason, the panelist argued, the international community must implement security resolutions and undertake additional efforts to stigmatize such behavior.

The meeting concluded with a review of the progress on the national commitments secured by the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit – according to the Arms Control Association, 60% of the commitments have been executed – as well as  a discussion of the likely agenda of the 2012 Summit.

Given the emotional salience of the Fukushima crisis, the panelist anticipated a strong emphasis on nuclear safety concerns, but noted that the manner and extent to which these concerns will be incorporated have yet to be determined.   The agenda is also likely to include topics related to nuclear terrorism, nonproliferation and illicit trade, the security of nuclear plants, and the implementation of UNSCRs.  The success of these discussions will ultimately hinge on the ability of the participants to reconcile disparate interests and threat perceptions, and subsequently, to formulate mutually agreeable commitments.