Nuclear Warming

Sentaku magazine published a translation of an article in their August issue discussing the debate about the nuclear option in Japan. The article starts by recalling former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's 2008 New Year's remarks and then a quick review of Japan's typical aversion to seeking a nuclear capability based on the 3 nonnuclear principles. From there, the article makes a number of curious statements that should be examined. First, it says:

It is quite natural for Japan, as the world's only country to be attacked with atomic bombs, to stand at the forefront of the international movement for abolishing nuclear weapons. But this issue should be handled separately from the question of whether to have a comprehensive debate on how to react to a modern-day nuclear threat. Unless we're determined to defend ourselves from another nuclear calamity, the Japanese could end up like Carthage, as Nakasone warned. [italics added]

Wow. Those are some fighting words for what is considered a pacifist country. Drawing a parallel to an ancient city that was destroyed by the Romans conjures up some strong feelings about the urgency and severity of dealing with the pending nuclear threats (and therefore quite possible a plea to endorse more radical measures). It's also interesting to note that there will inevitably be some degree of tension between calls for abolition and a robust debate about responding to a nuclear threat which likely relies either on U.S. nuclear weapons or moving towards producing their own. The call to delink the two seemingly interrelated issues is an important one for the U.S. to monitor as the debate evolves in Japan. The article goes onto discuss the secret pact allowing U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons to call at Japanese ports negotiated in the 1960's and opines

Does Japan not contradict itself if it refuses to allow the U.S. to carry nuclear weapons into Japanese territory while it continues to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Even before the secret deal was exposed, many Japanese people had suspected that a secret pact of this nature had existed subject to tacit approval. The Japanese government still denies the existence of the deal, but recent moves by former ranking government officials to release revealing statements might be a sign of their intent to cope with the changing nuclear environment in Northeast Asia.

It certainly raises an eyebrow that the article decries the tension between abolition and responding to nuclear threats but explicitly highlights the no nukes on the territory/nuclear umbrella paradox. Further moves to officially acknowledge the secret pact could be used as a precursor towards calling for two situations the United States needs try to prevent: a substantially expanded extended deterrence wish list that will be at odds with the administration's policy to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy or efforts to jump out from the umbrella and undertake constructing their own deterrent. Both could have noticeably destabilizing impacts on East Asia that need to be avoided. After noting likely election victor DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama's hints toward revisiting nonnuclear principles, the article boldly concludes:

The Japanese and U.S. governments held high-level working talks on security treaty problems last month and reached agreement to launch regular consultations concerning problems with the nuclear umbrella. What's important is that Japan determine a direction for national security policy instead of merely maneuvering out of consideration for the U.S. [italics added]

The U.S. has its work cut out for it in calibrating an effective strategy to balance Japan's fears and its own nuclear strategy, particularly given increasing fears in Tokyo about the 'fraying' of the umbrella. As the cultural aversion to nuclear weapons and larger military capabilities begins to chip away, it very well may up the ante for what the Japanese expect from us and the consequences should the security relationship crumble. To prevent such a scenario, consultation must remain a cornerstone of the alliance. That said, the U.S. needs to prevent the "consultation" from devolving into acquiescing to any demands made by the Japanese which is a tough task because the value of the guarantee depends on the view of the assured and the deterrent as opposed to the view of the United States. A strategy focused on persuading the Japanese that the United States commitment can remain just as strong despite lower number and/or capabilities is a crucial, albeit difficult, task. This will probably involve a broad toolbox that involve political and diplomatic assurances about the U.S. commitment to Japan in addition to symbolic yet practical military demonstrations that can make the Japanese sleep easier at night.