Wednesday, in the wake of North Korea’s recent nuclear test and subsequent missile launches, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion on the unfolding crisis with North Korea featuring panelists Richard Bush, Michael O’Hanlon, and Dennis Wilder, moderated by Carlos Pascual. Link here: North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Richard Bush highlighted three critical factors that he believes to have influenced the decision of the DPRK. North Korea wants to set a favorable negotiating table with the U.S. and ultimately would like to see itself in a situation resembling that of India - possessing normalized relations with the United States while retaining its nuclear capacity. Additionally though, if it seeks to use nuclear weapons and missiles as a deterrent, it needs to gain some of the credibility it currently lacks in that dimension - practically necessitating the tests. Finally, with a political succession due in N. Korea at some point, it is possible that the tests are a move designed to aid in the transition.
It is important to remember that this issue with North Korea is not some partisan Republican or Democrat problem. Michael O’Hanlon made sure to note that a variety of strategies by numerous administrations over the years in regards to North Korea have all proved unsuccessful. Getting away from the fears of a nuclear DPRK though, O’Hanlon asserted that the biggest threat coming out of the country was actually the possibility of N. Korea selling nuclear materials to other countries, notably Syria or Libya (Libya, however, voluntarily dismantled its WMD program so Syria seems the more notable of the two mentioned).
As asserted by Dennis Wilder, the role played by China is crucial in this process due to a shared border, Chinese influence in the region, and trade between the two countries. On this last note, Wilder disputed the traditional claim that sanctions do not work, citing trade data between China and North Korea showing the DPRK’s heavy reliance on Chinese trade as evidence that sanctions would work in this situation - as a tool, not an end game. Chinese support (and follow-through) on the North Korea issue is vital to making any progress on this headache.
The discussion raises a number of interesting questions on the North Korean nuclear missile program. A main point that received little actual attention was the question of what a nuclear North Korea would mean for the world. Although several questions hinted at this, the panelists were primarily concerned with either North Korea’s selling of nuclear materials or the collapse of the North Korean regime and subsequent proliferation. This is not at all to insinuate that these issues are at all unimportant, indeed they are more likely than the successful development of a North Korean nuclear missile (the obstacles to which O’Hanlon laid out in detail). However, grave concern still exists over an actual nuclear-armed North Korea - which would have great implications, especially for South Korea and Japan. Although, as moderator Carlos Pascual summed up, the problem is arguably an Asian one, the threat of a nuclear North Korea is a world problem and must be dealt with accordingly.
I'm with mloudermilk.
I’m with mloudermilk. Being the only state with leverage is useful, but it can easily be outweighed by the downsides of having an impoverished wild card on your borders stirring up trouble with other neighbors.
The question is really whether the DPRK will actually defer to the PRC most of the time. It appears, based on recent Chinese government grumbling, that North Korea is seen as being out of line. In any event, for the moment at least China has good reason to be a status quo power. I don’t think its controversial to say that for most of the Communist party top priority, aside from staying in power and enjoying the benefits there-of, is domestic economic growth. Too much North-East Asian conflict could get in the way and the foreign policy prestige benefits would hardly be worth it.
John, I'm going to go
John, I’m going to go ahead and disagree with you here. Although I can’t verify this of course, I think you’d be incredibly hard-pressed to find any academic or member of government who would agree with your claim that a nuclear North Korea is even remotely beneficial to China. It is never in the interests of a nuclear power for another nation to also go nuclear - especially an unstable and chaotic regime on the border. Furthermore, the PRC’s rise to international power and prestige (”Chinese worldwide influence” as you call it) is hardly dependent on their being an important piece of the solution to the North Korea problem. And notwithstanding these points, by your own logic, in the same way that a disarmed DPRK would “endanger Chinese worldwide influence”, so would a nuclear-armed North Korea as, once the country becomes a nuclear power, all of the leverage of the PRC would become irrelevant.
While Wilder's
While Wilder’s assertion that sanctions would work if China participated is correct, it may be an irrelevant one. A nuclear-armed North Korea arguably is beneficial to China. Being the only state with any leverage over the DPRK, the PRC has elevated influence in the Pacific and, with the worries North Korea will sell weapons and/or technology to states hostile to the US and its allies, the rest of the world.
A disarmed North Korea would endanger Chinese worldwide influence, so for now, sanctions seem unlikely.