PONI Debates the Issues: 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Debate Recap

By John K. Warden

At PONI’s 7th Live Debate, Ivan Oelrich, Vice President for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists; Clark Murdock, PONI Director and Senior Advisor at CSIS; and Doug Feith, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, expressed their opinions on 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  While it was designed as a more traditional panel, the discussion turned into one of the more lively debates of the series.

Ivan Oelrich spoke first, offering reserved support for the NPR.  He praised the Administration for releasing an entirely unclassified report and the Pentagon for a well-written document that is a clear statement of U.S. policy (he joked that the Pentagon is “not always known for its golden prose”).  On the other hand, Oelrich felt that, in many areas, the document didn’t go far enough.

Discussing declaratory policy, he noted that the statement about the “fundamental purpose” of nuclear weapons is weak—a far reach from a sole purpose declaration and even further from a no-first-use pledge.  He also said that changes in the negative security assurance (NSA) are “quite minor in theory” and, looking at it country-by-country, “it’s not clear what the differences are.”

Oelrich was most critical of the NPR’s language on modernization.  He had two main criticisms: 1) that the NPR would allow for the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) design, which relies on components that aren’t deployed, but have previously been tested; and 2) that the NPR supports the mythology that nuclear weapons need constant attention and therefore a massive budgetary investment.

Responding to questions, Oelrich tried to debunk the argument that modernization by Russia and China requires U.S. modernization.  He noted that the things that Russia and China are doing—that Americans call modernization—wouldn’t count as modernization under the NPR's definition of a “new” warhead.  He went further, arguing that even if Russia and China were modernizing, it wouldn’t necessitate U.S. modernization.  Oelrich pointed out that “nuclear weapons don’t fight other nuclear weapons;” instead, they target bunkers, silos, and other military and industrial facilities.  If the United States is worried about the effectiveness of its nuclear weapons against an ICBM buried in a silo, “a better measure [of the need for U.S. modernization] would be if they’re modernizing their concrete.”

Despite his criticisms, Oelrich acknowledged that in every dimension—while not going as far as he hoped—the NPR moved in the right direction.  Recognizing that the NPR hoped to generate bipartisan consensus to get New START and the CTBT ratified, Oelrich said that the NPR might have gone as far as it could.

The second speaker was Clark Murdock, who offered a strong defense of the NPR.  He started by explaining that the NPR is not just the report, but instead a “stream of activity” that extends from the New START negotiating positions and the Prague speech to the release of the NPR report and signing of the New START.

Like Oelrich, Murdock said the NPR was both surprisingly well written and carefully nuanced.  He argued that the report is part of an Administration effort to form a national consensus in favor of an integrated approach to nuclear issues.  As an example, he cited the change in declaratory policy and the balance it struck between the “fundamental role” and “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons.  The NPR says:

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

A couple paragraphs later, it clarifies what role nuclear weapons against those states not covered by the U.S. NSA and discusses a “sole purpose” policy:

In the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and partners, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.

Murdock argued that the commitment not to produce new nuclear weapons was similarly nuanced—refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of the “physics package” of the weapons are all still on the table, but specific authorization is required for replacement.  In this and other areas, he believes the compromise reached in the NPR is (like Goldilocks) “just right.”

Doug Feith spoke last and was, unsurprisingly, the most critical of the NPR.  Feith agreed with some of the concepts in the NPR:  proliferation is a paramount concern; the U.S. nuclear infrastructure requires modernization; conventional capabilities (missile defense and prompt global strike) are needed.  He also felt that the NPR rejected a number of bad ideas such as a no-first-use pledge or de-alerting.  However, in most areas, he argued that the “pieces don’t fit together,” or in other words, “the Administration’s policies are at odds with U.S. interests as defined by the Administration itself.”

Feith agreed with the need for extended deterrence, but felt that the Administration’s policies—pursuing CTBT ratification, underfunding nuclear infrastructure, and talking of a world free of nuclear weapons—are causing allies to doubt the seriousness of America’s commitment to their defense.  Similarly, he applauded the Administration for elevating the importance of proliferation, but argued that the Administration is actually encouraging Iranian proliferation by pursing engagement and downplaying military options against Iran (Clark Murdock was quick to point out that the previous Administration had even less success).

Feith lodged a number of additional complaints about the NPR.  Most prominently, he argued that the administration made a mistake in saying that disarmament is an obligation of the NPT.  According to Feith, the history of NPT negotiations shows that general and complete disarmament is a secondary provision that is not part of the “essential bargain” of the NPT.

Therefore, Feith argued that the administration’s focus on U.S. disarmament is a “red herring” that distracts from the real problem—enforcing noncompliance. Feith made clear that he was not referring to stronger enforcement within the NPT, such as the Additional Protocol.  Instead, he argued that the United States, along with likeminded states, should use means at their disposal—such as sanctions and a credible threat of force—to enforce NPT noncompliance.

Following Feith’s presentation, there was an extensive and entertaining question-and-answer period that showcased a range of viewpoints.  Audio and video are available online.