Much has been written about the security environment in Pakistan and its effect on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. These factors certainly complicate U.S. national security. But even without this dangerous environment (one that includes a major foe to the south, an Islamist insurgency, a terrible economy, proliferation, etc.), Pakistan’s program presents problems. This entry briefly outlines the problems inherent in the structure of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program can be characterized as capable and growing, especially in terms of the warheads and delivery systems. At the same time, Pakistan’s program evidences a number of weaknesses that heighten the risk of undesired use of nuclear weapons during a crisis. The program has an underdeveloped command and control (C&C) system and a doctrine that encourages rather than discourages use.
PROGRAM
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has a number of characteristics that should concern the United States. First, the program is dramatically increasing its plutonium production capabilities with new heavy water reactors at Khushab. Similarly, a new reprocessing facility appears to be nearing completion at Chashma. Pakistan’s plutonium production capabilities probably will more than double. Additional plutonium allows Pakistan to build smaller and/or more powerful nuclear weapons.
Pakistan’s arsenal size is widely estimated in the open literature to be between 60-70 HEU warheads. My own estimate is that Pakistan currently has enough HEU for perhaps 90 warheads and enough plutonium for 30 warheads. Of course, the HEU and plutonium may be combined in a single warhead. The weapons are thought to be stored separately from their delivery systems, with the triggering mechanisms removed.
Pakistan is expected to move increasingly toward missile delivered weapons, though it can also be expected to retain its F-16 delivery system so as to maintain flexibility. Though Pakistan maintains a variety of missile options, the missile of the future is probably the Shaheen-II. The Shaheen II is road mobile, solid fueled, and has a range of between 2,000 and 2,500 km. It may have GPS guidance.
Though Pakistan’s arsenal is formidable, its C&C capabilities have not kept pace. This presents potential stability issues. Procedurally, the military probably retains significant if not total control over the decision to use Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. If this is the case, one can surmise that use takes precedence over safety. Technically, Pakistan claims to have developed indigenous PALs, though the quality of these devices is unclear. It appears Pakistan’s C&C systems piggy-back on conventional C&C systems, raising concerns about attrition during conventional hostilities, leaving Pakistan unable to control its nuclear forces or possibly forcing Pakistan to devolve launch authority. Thus during a crisis Pakistan’s weak C&C capabilities may lead to unauthorized, unintended, or accidental use. This is particularly disturbing given Pakistan’s hostile relationship with India, its willingness to “rattle the nuclear saber” during crisis, and its inability to control nonstate actors who might precipitate a serious crisis with India. While it would behoove the United States to help improve Pakistan’s nuclear C&C, the U.S. is precluded from doing so by both domestic and international law. The U.S. should find a way to circumvent these laws.
The weapons, delivery systems, and C&C all serve Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Although Pakistan has not officially released its doctrine, it is possible to discern the doctrine’s broad outlines. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine advocates first use, but is ambiguous about where the actual nuclear threshold is. Pakistan’s doctrine calls for “minimum credible deterrence” whereby the number of weapons necessary to provide minimum deterrence depends on the size of a potential opponent’s arsenal (e.g., India’s). Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine therefore seems designed to discourage India from threatening Pakistan in any significant way, including by conventional means.
Pakistan’s security situation is without a doubt among the most stressed in the world. Whether it be ungovernable tribal areas, a virulent Islamist insurgency, a perceived threat from a massive power on its southern borders, or a dysfunctional state and economy, Pakistan faces an incredibly challenging security environment. What is less clear, but no less important, is that the structure of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program complicates this already dire situation. Pakistan has indigenous production capabilities, a large and growing number of warheads, as well as an increasingly effect set of delivery systems. Yet these elements of the program are supported by archaic C&C as well as a doctrine that advocates first use. Together, these two elements are likely to lead to early use due to breakdown of C&C, pre-delegation of launch authority in order to hedge against failed C&C, or devolution of launch authority in the face of degraded C&C. So not only is the security environment highly challenging; the arsenal has not been developed to moderate threats - rather, it has developed in such a way that there will be strong incentives to use the weapons early in a crisis. The synergies of the challenging security environment and the ill-designed system leave little room for optimism.