The Power of the People?

By Chris Jones

With the United States and South Korea preparing for the first high-level meeting of the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) next week in Hawaii, the Asan institute just released a survey that may draw some attention. According to the China Post,

A majority of South Koreans support the idea of developing nuclear weapons or redeploying U.S. atomic bombs to cope with the threat from North Korea, according to a survey published on Wednesday.
The survey, conducted by the private Asan Institute for Policy Studies, found that 68.6 percent said South Korea needs atomic bombs, while 28.9 percent replied negatively.
Some 67.3 percent supported the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea while 30.1 percent opposed it, the institute said in a telephone poll of 1,000 people.

While the survey identifies a pretty disproportionate view, which is essentially the reverse of public opinion in Europe about TNW’s deployed there, the news should not be seen as a bolt out of the blue. After all, South Korean public polling in October 2006, right after the North Korean test, also found “65 percent said South Korea should develop nuclear weapons to protect itself.” Nonetheless, it does provide another data point to suggest the re-emergence of the nuclear debate within South Korea.  Robert Einhorn and Cheong Wa Dae have been clear re-introduction of TNW’s is not in the cards, which is probably the right call, but the EDPC certain has its work cut out for it.  When the committee was formed, Jeffrey Lewis observed: 

So, what can Washington talk about with Tokyo and Seoul, if not the operational use of nuclear weapons? Is it even possible to have a meaningful dialogue without nuclear sharing or some other operational entanglement? Without nitty-gritty questions, aren’t you just really having yet another seminar on nuclear deterrence? One answer, suggested by the National Institute for Defense Studies’s Michito Tsuruoka in a very interesting monograph for the German Marshall Fund (Why the NATO Nuclear Debate Is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa) is that conversations about missile defenses and conventional capabilities can provide a basis for real, detailed operational discussions that place nuclear capabilities in their proper context

The EDPC would be well served to discuss conventional weapons and missile defense, which can start to get into operational details, but the growing support, or at least debate, in South Korea about nuclear weapons, bolstered by Gary Samore’s recent “yes” comment, has to be a central agenda item for the EPDC. The US and ROK governments need to have a frank discussion about the best way for the United States to reassure its ally across the spectrum of threats, including nuclear.  The EPDC provides a chance to ensure the countries have a clear understanding of the respective viewpoints on critical topics such as the benefits reintroduction of TNW's may or may not have.  As progress continues to be made on these issues behind closed doors, the EPDC can also allow the governments to better craft their public messaging, which could in turn help allay public anxities.