Priorities for Implementing the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference in Southeast Asia

By John K. Warden

Just achieving agreement on a Final Document at the 2010 NPT Review Conference was considered a remarkable success after the disastrous failure in 2005. However, the real challenge will be following through on the lofty commitments—moving from words to concrete results. Over the last two years, there has been rejuvenated interest in nuclear issues, driven prominently by President Obama’s Prague speech and commitment to pursue a world without nuclear weapons as well as the negotiation and eventual ratification of New START. Going forward, it may be difficult to sustain this momentum and continue to make meaningful progress on nuclear nonproliferation. Success will require like-minded states to focus their energies on realistic next steps.

Countries in the Asia Pacific—possibly working through the channels of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—could make a unique contribution to the implementation of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Too often, countries in this region feel that the greatest contribution they can make to nonproliferation and disarmament is criticizing weapons states. Such political pressure is likely to have little practical impact. Instead, these countries should focus on the action items that can be most effectively implemented in the region.

Many of the action items in the most recent Final Document are repetitive, while others are vague. However, some offer useful guidance. In particular:

• Action 35: The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated…
• Action 37: The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.
• Action 40: The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.
• Action 57: Ensure that…the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.
• Action 58: Continue to discuss…under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle…

These initiatives have particular applicability in Southeast Asia, where the majority of states do not have nuclear weapons, but many are actively seeking nuclear power. ASEAN has a particular opportunity to influence the future of the NPT.

In many ways, the norms and practices associated with nuclear energy are still being developed. As ASEAN countries develop their own nuclear energy programs and even consider exporting sensitive technology, ASEAN could establish standards for export controls or the enforcement of laws against nuclear smuggling. Going further than the United States or the Nuclear Suppliers Group, ASEAN countries could insist that countries adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol as a condition of supply.

Countries in the region could also work to create multilateral fuel cycle facilities. Such an arrangement would make economic sense and might also provide a model for similar arrangements in other regions. Under one possible arrangement, positive and negative aspects of the fuel cycle could be linked—whichever country agrees to host a multilateral waste repository will get the privilege of hosting a multilateral enrichment facility as well.

By achieving significant progress on a select set of initiatives Southeast Asian countries could lay the groundwork for future efforts, which would do far more for regional and global nonproliferation, disarmament, peaceful use, and nuclear security than a broad, shallow approach.

(Originally written for the CSIS Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program in response to the following prompt: "Evaluate the 64 follow-on actions recommended in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and identify/prioritize the top 5 items that can be most effectively implemented in the Asia Pacific and why.")