Questioning Leadership in Iraq

It has been over four years since the U.S. offensive began in Iraq and still the challenges continue. Despite a constant American presence in the country and dramatic changes in military leadership (Franks, Abizaid, Sanchez, Casey, and now Patraeus), progress remains sluggish. At home, mounting disapproval of the war and rising pressure on U.S. politicians have signaled a need to outline a new strategy in Iraq. At the same time, many are hesitant to criticize the role of General David Patraeus in the ongoing conflict, especially the Bush administration. He has been both glorified and over-hyped by his peers and the media alike, perhaps because he has effectively regained control of the northern part of the country and is aiming at quelling violence in the south. However, a selected few have disagreed with the mainstream. They have asked if Patraeus is the best solution to the war. One of these individuals is Andrew Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University. In a recent article published in The New Republic, Bacevich highlights that while Petraeus may appear to bring definition to Operation Iraqi Freedom, his current strategy remains flawed. Bacevich notes the conflicting nature of Patraeus’ methods. One example embraced by the general is the impossible process of reconciliation in which the U.S. supports various factions in Iraq - Bacevich calls this agenda a formula for disaster akin to arming the Crips against their notorious gang enemy the Bloods. The article suggests that his timeline for the conflict may have skewed his ability to connect Washington. Ultimately, Bacevich explores Patraeus and his game plan in Iraq and questions the strategy of a leader in whom many have put their hopes.

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On that topic, Marc Lynch argues that “Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus are actually working at cross-purposes. Petraeus’s military ’successes’ and local initiatives come at the expense of the national political track, not in support of it. ”

His signature initiative to date, the arming and tactical alignment with Sunni tribes and former insurgents, largely ignores the Iraqi state. The Anbar Salvation Council and the other ‘Awakenings”, the “rent-a-shaykh” and “rent-a-fighter” policies, and so forth all take place not just at the local level but outside the institutions of the state. They may improve the local security situation but do not encourage the integration into an Iraqi state which most Sunnis - by all available evidence - still see as monopolized by the Shia and controlled by Iran. The former insurgents fighting alongside the Americans against al-Qaeda don’t report to Nuri al-Maliki… they report to David Petraeus. Meanwhile, on the Shia side American forces strike the Sadrists, but don’t seem to care much about SCIRI SIIC ISCI penetration of the Iraqi military or security forces - once again suggesting that national state institutions just don’t enter into the equation.

On the other hand, General Petraeus may not actually be trying to buy time for an unlikely political solution. By giving up on achieving an effective fairly centralized Iraq, he may be able to achieve other goals, perhaps a soft-partition, substantial damage to AQI or the like. That said, going with a mystery strategy would be an odd way to run the war.

I saw the link via Kevin Drum.

On that topic, Marc Lynch

On that topic, Marc Lynch argues that "Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus are actually working at cross-purposes. Petraeus's military 'successes' and local initiatives come at the expense of the national political track, not in support of it. "

His signature initiative to date, the arming and tactical alignment with Sunni tribes and former insurgents, largely ignores the Iraqi state. The Anbar Salvation Council and the other 'Awakenings", the "rent-a-shaykh" and "rent-a-fighter" policies, and so forth all take place not just at the local level but outside the institutions of the state. They may improve the local security situation but do not encourage the integration into an Iraqi state which most Sunnis - by all available evidence - still see as monopolized by the Shia and controlled by Iran. The former insurgents fighting alongside the Americans against al-Qaeda don't report to Nuri al-Maliki... they report to David Petraeus. Meanwhile, on the Shia side American forces strike the Sadrists, but don't seem to care much about SCIRI SIIC ISCI penetration of the Iraqi military or security forces - once again suggesting that national state institutions just don't enter into the equation.

On the other hand, General Petraeus may not actually be trying to buy time for an unlikely political solution. By giving up on achieving an effective fairly centralized Iraq, he may be able to achieve other goals, perhaps a soft-partition, substantial damage to AQI or the like. That said, going with a mystery strategy would be an odd way to run the war.

I saw the link via Kevin Drum.