Quid Pro Faux

 There has been a flurry of press in the past couple of days in response to story reported by the New York Times that Obama sent Medvedev a secret letter a few weeks ago essentially arguing that the U.S. would be willing to scrap its missile defense plans in Eastern Europe should Russia cooperate on Iran.  Both sides downplayed the rhetoric and were quick to argue that the proposal is not a linked quid pro quo.  While an explicit quid pro quo does carry its own risks, it is still useful to consider what an informal exchange of this nature would look like even if it's simply part of a broader warming of relations.  The primary question is what specific steps will be taken by the Russians. Brent Scowcroft has highlighted Russia's importance to solving the Iran problem but the question remains how and to what degree will Russia use its unique leverage over Iran?   This is particularly true given the problems some see ahead for the Russian defense industry in the wake of the economic downturn.  Will they cutoff helping with Bushehr?  Is cutting off sales of other types of military equipment to Iran on the table?  If Russia is unwilling to exert the degree of pressure needed or it proves insufficient, the option of a joint missile defense in Russian territory also has its skeptics, even if the United States were to agree.  The U.S. should work to figure out what exactly Russia is willing to bring to the table in this quid pro faux.