A blog post on this site earlier in the week referenced a quote from Chris Hellman of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation who was quoted in the Christian Science Monitor saying that:
Missile defense has always been an issue for a small cadre of ultraconservative, ultraparanoid people who see the threat of ballistic missiles from places like Iran as a real threat to US security interests.
The Center’s blog, Nukes of Hazard, in a polite (and fair) response, parsed the contents of the piece - which I feel the need to respectfully address.
The Nukes of Hazard (NoH) post first takes issue with the claim that it is not clear that the Russians are open for negotiations on the subject of European missile defense. They respond with Putin’s 2007 mention of possibly basing radar systems within the Russian borders as a sign of willingness for cooperation. However, NoH dismisses Russia’s current (and numerous) insinuations as just public posturing but then is willing to accept a potentially/maybe statement from Putin as a realistic sign. Furthermore (and this is pure speculation), even if Russia were to agree to placing missile defense within Russian borders - this ignores the need to gain Czech and Polish consent to this, which seems unlikely at best.
In their second point of contention, NoH disputes the statement I made that its difficult to believe that the Russians seriously think that 10 interceptor missiles are a serious threat to their deterrent. NoH contends that
Yeah, I hear this point a lot. However, technical experts have written that while missile defense interceptors based in Europe might be aimed at Iran, they would still be capable of engaging Russian ICBMs launched against the United States from Russian missile sites west of the Urals. From this perspective, missile defense in Europe becomes a slippery slope. The slated deployment might only be for 10 interceptors, but Moscow logically assumes that more will be added after the infrastructure is in place.
The “slippery slope” - that once ten are in place, more will come - must be addressed. This is a bit of a stretch - considering that the U.S. only has 30 interceptors based in the United States - and even the originally intended total was only 44 - numbers far lower than the Russian arsenal. On account of that, I feel that the original point is still valid - especially as Russia maintains its inordinately large arsenal of 4000 tactical nukes. As an addendum to that point, there are other options at Russia’s disposal that are not impacted by the missile defense plans - SLBMs come to mind as an example (part of the reason for possessing a strategic triad). On another note, it is arguable that Russia places so much emphasis on things such as missile defense and arms reductions because they enable it to maintain strategic parity with the United States, which it would otherwise be unable to do.
NoH’s final argument rests in my citing of a public opinion poll which showed that 74% of people believe that it is at least “somewhat important” that the U.S. build and deploy an effective ballistic missile defense system. This was mentioned in response to Hellman’s comment that missile defense is for a “small cadre of ultraconservative, ultraparanoid people.” NoH points out quite bluntly that “Public opinion polling is not always that useful when it comes to really complicated issues like strategic defenses.” This is not something that I am prepared to contend since I largely agree with the point, in fact, a previous post on the British Trident program similarly discounted public opinion. However, that doesn’t mean that it’s not a legitimate point in a debate. Let me explain. Hellman’s original statement essentially claimed that no one, except for some isolated group of ”ultraconservative, ultraparanoid” people care about missile defense. In this context, citing a public poll is legitimate, regardless of the public’s ignorance on the subject because the poll shows that a large group of people do care. Whether or not they have the information to build an erudite opinion is a different horse entirely. It is simply unfair to make a claim (that only a small group cares about missile defense) and then discount any of the available measuring tools as poor or inadequate. If you do, you then also leave yourself without a leg to stand on to support the initial claim. And additionally, successive U.S. administrations have advocated and budgeted for missile defense - and since government runs on majority rule, certainly this is no small cadre either. Point being, clearly a large number of people somewhere care about missile defense - that, or some so-called “small cadre” is incredibly effective at manipulating the overwhelming majority.
Ultimately, as noted in the original post commented on by NoH, the debate over missile defense has to revolve around the question of whether or not there is a real threat to the U.S. - not over concerns about Russian relations or political debates at home. If there is a threat (however small), is it not the duty of the government to do everything in its power to effectively be prepared to deal with that threat?