Regime on the Brink

There has been quite a news deluge out of the nuclear world lately, which, while beneficial for blogs dedicated to the analysis of things-nuclear, is certainly rather problematic for the United States and the nonproliferation world. Although the stories concerning North Korea and Iran appear to be running on repeat, with little apparent progress in either direction, the nonproliferation regime as a whole seems to be inching ever closer to the brink. This, of course, is not an attempt to write the post-to-end-all-posts, but the nuclear developments (or lack thereof) during these latter months of 2009 are troublesome and merit consideration as part of the bigger picture – that is, examining the larger spectrum of nuclear issues and not just the isolated ones.

Exhibit A in this gallery is the forgotten nuclear problem child – Pakistan. Experts have stated that the country’s nuclear forces are safe, but this is scarcely reassuring. The increasing sophistication of militant attacks and apparent insider information (see motorcycle drive-by shooting in Islamabad) coupled with the inability (or unwillingness) of the Pakistani army to deal with the threat mean that this scenario could change in the foreseeable future – as pointed out by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker recently. The problem for the United States is twofold. First, Pakistan views the weapons both as an issue of national pride and as the only defense against a hostile (and conventionally superior) India. Second, the issue of Pakistan’s stability is inexorably tied to U.S. policy and success in Afghanistan – abandonment here could lead to an increased Taliban focus on Pakistan and signal American unwillingness to aid the Pakistani government in its own fight. Oh, and don’t forget to toss in the continued difficulty of U.S. balancing between India and Pakistan (the “tilt” is still around – especially in the eyes of many in Pakistan).

Moving on, Exhibit B contains the ever-defiant North Korea – still led by the now-aggressive-now-conciliatory Kim Jong-Il. Progress here has been nonexistent since the nuclear test and subsequent sanctions (since unheard of) earlier this year. President Obama finally decided to send Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang for direct talks in hopes of breaking the impasse. The problem though, acknowledged in a Wall Street Journal article last week, is that the entire gamut of options – both carrots and sticks of numerous varieties – have been tried and consistently proven unsuccessful. While the problem is currently stalemated and (hopefully) not worsening, the lack of resolution on the North Korean front still leaves the U.S. with a double-edged sword – facing the very real possibility of a rogue nuclear nation, which in turn impedes progress in other areas (read: Iran).

Naturally, this leads smoothly into Exhibit C – Iran, the newest addition to the nuclear problems gallery. Just a few short weeks ago, it appeared as if a breakthrough agreement to ship Iran’s uranium abroad for enrichment into fuel rods would buy the U.S. and other countries valuable time in dealing with Iran while salvaging hope to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, this has all but fallen through, with Iran reluctant to surrender control of its precious stockpile – instead offering its own counterproposals which will assuredly be summarily rejected by the United States. While Iran’s affliction with North Korea’s no-yes-no syndrome caused Russia to suggest that it may support sanctions, its dedicated support is about as likely as China getting in line with the U.S. on North Korea.

The list of exhibits could continue – including Israel, India, the P-5, and the challenges of disarmament, but, the three examples above serve well to illustrate the point that the nonproliferation regime is in dangerous territory. They also all share one crucial and incredibly problematic characteristic in common: variables outside the control of the United States. Although the U.S. is forced to deal with each of these difficult situations, it does so at a severe disadvantage and with an almost unwinnable hand. U.S. policies have not failed because they are necessarily flawed policies, but rather, because the factors motivating the other side are beyond U.S. control. Look at North Korea, where every policy conceivable has been attempted over the years from carrots such as food and aid money for its impoverished and starving people, direct talks with the U.S., the Six-Party Talks, removal from the state sponsors of terror list, and acclamation into the international community to sticks taking the form of sanctions and international condemnation. Yet, the DPRK remains largely undeterred because, in the mind of Kim Jong-Il, a nuclear program provides something greater and more worthwhile: protection from what he perceives to be the hostile intentions of South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Clearly, the problem is not that the U.S. just has not discovered the proper method of dealing with the North Koreans. Absent rationality on both sides, a resolution cannot be reached.

The same logic holds true in Pakistan, which, even ignoring the country’s instability, views its nuclear weapons as the sole protector from India. For the Pakistanis, nuclear weapons bring both peace and strategic parity with the Indians – factors which are unlikely to change no matter what actions the United States takes. Finally Iran (this also holds true for North Korea and Pakistan) holds strongly to the principle that a nuclear program is an issue of national pride and a symbol of development. So, unless the U.S. can convince Iran that this is, in fact, not the case, progress on this front, outside of short-term fixes (such as the enrichment deal), seems unlikely at best.

Ultimately, a refocusing of U.S. priorities and goals is needed. While efforts to diplomatically engage these (and other) problem countries must continue, in order to combat widespread proliferation and the collapsing of the delicately-constructed nonproliferation regime, the focus must also be global. The U.S. can use the START successor negotiations (which, in a moment of good news, seem to be progressing) and the upcoming NPT review conference to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, which, in the last decade has seen three countries go nuclear with a fourth sitting on the edge. Given the slew of problems in dealing with current aspiring nuclear countries, a strengthened regime is imperative to preventing additional countries from pursuing a capability. Finally, countries around the world must be reminded that nonproliferation is not simply a U.S. problem – rather, it demands global attention. Of course, while these suggestions may prove just as unsuccessful as the current course, they could very well bring the nonproliferation regime back from the brink.