Rewarding Reintegration--Reaching out to the Taliban

Mehlaqa Samdani

As the Pakistani military begins to wind down its military operation in South Waziristan, it has made clear it will not launch any more large-scale operations for another "six months to a year" in order "to consolidate the gains in the areas taken back from the militants" (such as Swat and South Waziristan) and to "ensure safety of the returnees". The announcement came during Secretary Gates' visit to Pakistan last week and appeared to rebuff U.S calls for an expanded military operation in North Waziristan.

North Waziristan is home to the Haqqani network, considered the most dangerous and influential group of militants operating against coalition and NATO forces in Afghanistan.  The network enjoys great influence among the Pakistani militant organizations and is considered to be a strategic asset for the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies.  A few years ago, Sirajuddin Haqqani who succeeded his father Jalaluddin Haqqani, “issued a circular urging militants to continue their “jihad” against the United States and the Karzai government “till the last drop of blood.” But in the same statement he pointed out that “fighting Pakistan does not conform to Taliban policy… those who [continue to wage] an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks”

Another important Pakistani Taliban leader operating out of North Waziristan is Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a Waziri who fought against the Soviets in the 80s and with the Taliban against the northern Alliance during the 1990s.  While he also fought against Pakistani security forces during the 2005 military operation in North Waziristan, he signed a peace agreement with the Pakistani government in 2006 and agreed to
evict foreign militants, mostly Uzbeks, from North Waziristan. 

In the past, the Pakistani military has successfully exploited tribal differences within the Tehreek-e-Taliban and has sought deals with Waziri Taliban such as Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir to undermine the Mehsuds, first Baitullah and now Hakeemullah. It struck a similar deal with the "Waziri alliance" immediately before the South waziristan operation in October 2009 against Hakeemullah Mehsud. Apparently neither the Waziris nor the Haqqanis came to Hakeemullah's aid. 

Hence, reluctant to launch operations against these groups in North Waziristan, the Pakistani government has instead decided to reach out to "all levels of the Afghan Taliban" in an attempt to bring them to the negotiating table amid reintegration plans being put forth by the Karzai government, to be announced during the London Conference later this week.

Pakistan's offer to use its influence over the Afghan Taliban to augment reintegration plans has been seen "as proof in Kabul and some Western capitals that Mullah Omar, the Haqqanis and other top Taliban commanders had refuge in Pakistan and were under the influence of the Pakistani military".  However, despite Pakistan allowing the Afghan Taliban to launch attacks from its territory, it is unclear how much leverage the former has over the latter as the Pakistani military's "credibility with (the Taliban) eroded following its decision to assist the U.S. in invading Afghanistan in 2001 and removing Mulla Omar from power".  In the past, even when Pakistan was actively supporting Taliban rule in Afghanistan, "the limits of its influence" were keenly felt when "Mullah Omar...refused Pakistan's requests to deliver Osama bin Laden to the US, not to destroy the Buddhas in Bamiyan, expel wanted Pakistanis hiding in Afghanistan under Taliban refuge and not to misuse the facility of the Afghan Transit Trade"

Meanwhile, the U.S. government continues to pursue its strategy in which "the US military has to weaken the Taliban before negotiating with them". In order to achieve this the U.S is relying on a troop surge in Afghanistan, an intensified drone campaign in North Waziristan--since the beginning of the year it "has carried out 11 strikes that have killed about 90 people"-- and "a special fund of $1.5 billion to provide
incentives and other forms of support to Taliban who put down their arms".

According to veteran journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, the "latest initiative to wean away Taliban foot-soldiers and local commanders from the top leadership isn't something new". In 2005, "the National Reconciliation Commission headed by former Afghan president Sebghatullah Mojadeddi was part of a similar exercise to persuade former fighters to lay down their arms and reconcile with the state. Mojadeddi, Mr Karzai's boss during the Afghan war against the Soviet occupying forces, had thought that in his capacity as a former Mujahideen leader and spiritual figure he would be able to prevail upon the Taliban and other militants to stop fighting, but he was unable to achieve much".

The difference this time around could prove to be the massive funding behind the reintegration effort. However, here the assumption is that economic incentives, rather than ideology, are the primary factors behind the Taliban movement.

A report commissioned by DFID to understand Taliban motivations found that the two main drivers behind the movement were "the corruption of government and the presence of foreign forces” (Sarah Ladbury, "Testing Hypotheses on Radicalization in Afghanistan", August 2009)--monetary gain, as is generally believed, is not the primary motivation behind the Taliban cause.  As one local commander in Helmand said recently, "We are fighting for our independence and for our country. We believe in our cause and the Americans should stop trying to bribe us...some of us will take their money, but none of us will ever give up our fight."
Flickr photo by isafmedia used under a Creative Commons license