(Sanctions) Deterrence Failure

Not to beat the dead horse that is quickly becoming the Iran sanctions rhetoric, but, a follow-up to the post I made on this subject a few weeks ago seems appropriate given the developments of last week. Clearly, the proper place to begin here is with the recent quote by Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov that "threats, sanctions and threats of pressure in the current situation, we are convinced, would be counterproductive." This not only comes after Russian president Dmitri Medvedev previously stated that sanctions are sometimes inevitable, but also flies in the face of the Obama administration's attempts to present Iran with an international front united against its nuclear program. More important than the implications of this for Obama's credibility though (which is already suffering from criticism for canceling missile defense plans in Europe and now apparently not even receiving Russian cooperation on Iran), are the implications for U.S. policy moving forward in dealing with Iran.

Coming just days before talks today in Vienna over plans to ship Iran's uranium abroad for reprocessing and in the wake of China's late-September proclaimed opposition to a sanctions regime, the United States now faces what I have decided to call sanctions deterrence failure. Sanctions, especially in the case of Iran currently, are simply another foreign policy tool, just like nuclear weapons, designed to deter a state from taking undesirable actions. The stance of the Obama administration has been that diplomacy must be coupled with the threat of sanctions in order to achieve meaningful concessions from Iran - clearly conflicting with Lavrov's statement (and also making one wonder how Hillary Clinton can say that the two countries are in "full agreement" moving forward).

Sanctions are Obama's chosen weapon of big-stick diplomacy in regards to Iran, but a lack of Russian and Chinese support could very well undermine it completely. Both countries are heavily invested in Iran - Russia geopolitically and China in terms of energy - and are there thereby reluctant to take action. Garry Kasparov, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed yesterday went so far as to posit that the Russian government does not desire a quick resolution to the problem, as the uncertainty over the situation bolsters oil prices, which help Russia. Any way you want to spin it though, the U.S. is in quite a predicament here.

Return, if you will, to the previously-cited post on sanctions. The two characteristics of successful sanctions regimes are that they are multilateral and harsh. Both of these elements hinge on China and Russia. Without these countries on board, a multilateral front is impossible and even should they reluctantly agree, the probability of harsh sanctions is unlikely at best. Zero points for sanctions here. To potentially make matters worse, the U.S. Senate Thursday followed the House of Representatives in passing sanctions on Iran's fuel suppliers. While this "sends a statement" that the U.S. is serious about dealing with Iran, it goes against the conventional wisdom about successful sanctioning - that multilateral and harsh sanctions can work whereas unilateral, gradually ratcheted-up, and long-lived sanctions generally fail. This move may not only aggravate the Iranians without achieving any real effect, it also could have the unintended consequence of damaging any future sanctions.

Ultimately, in the same way that the success of nuclear deterrence depends on the credibility of the threat, sanctions (and especially the threatened use of them) rely fully on that same credibility. Admittedly, the United States is in an extremely tough position. The Obama administration favors the diplomacy and sanctions approach, yet, one cannot function effectively without the other. The Russians (and Chinese), in their desire to not put the Iranians in a corner, have effectively pushed the United States into one and crippled not only the possible effects of diplomacy, but also the potential use of sanctions in the future.