As if there wasn’t already enough on the world’s nonproliferation plate these days, suspicions have recently arisen that Myanmar could potentially be seeking a weapons capacity - aided of course, by North Korea. The reports focus on the aborted journey of the North Korean ship Kang Nam I, photographs of a massive tunnel network, and a secretly meeting that allegedly occurred between the two countries. Numerous U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, recently made statements about the military cooperation between North Korea and Myanmar and the possibility of nuclear cooperation as well. While it is still unclear exactly what, if anything, is going on (and taking consolation from the fact that everyone agrees that Myanmar, even if seeking a capacity is many years/decades away) - several interesting questions on the subject deserve attention.
One of the main questions to examine here adds a third country to the mix - Russia. In 2007, Russia signed a deal with Myanmar agreeing to provide a nuclear research center, a 10 MW light-water reactor, and training for several hundred personnel. However, the Russian atomic agency Rosatom told the AP that:
There has been no movement whatsoever on this agreement with Burma ever since.
That being said though, Andrei Nesterenko, the spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry was recently quoted in Ria Novosti saying that:
Our cooperation with Myanmar is absolutely legitimate and in full compliance with our obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty and IAEA requirements.
He further implied that Russia would stand by this agreement. Despite recent concerns over a potential nuclear program in Myanmar though, Russian officials seem unconcerned. Said Alexander Pikayev:
Even if North Korea provides assistance to Myanmar in this [nuclear] sphere, it is still at the very early stage of development, and does not pose a real threat.
On the other front, Myanmar has been under increased scrutiny from the United States in regards to its human rights violations, embodied in the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi. On the other hand, as recent news articles have shown, the horrid condition of human rights in North Korea - notably the brutal hard labor camps - have largely been ignored, thanks in large part to the focus on the DPRK’s nuclear program. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the military generals ruling Myanmar view the bomb, not just as a bargaining chip or a way to challenge the United States, but as an obvious means to basically getting the U.S. off its back on domestic issues as its focus would undoubtedly shift towards the nuclear dimension. Many still regard possession of the bomb as a fast-track to legitimacy in the world - and in all fairness, the longer the North Korean situation simmers on, the more credibility that perspective gains.
No matter what, the U.S. must tread carefully, yet firmly, here. While intel is at this point too sketcky for reaching concrete conclusions, given the difficulty of dealing with North Korea - the least desirable situation is having to deal with another North Korea - be it in two years, ten years, or any number of years. Without a clearer picture of Myanmar’s intentions, perhaps Russia should place a hold on its research reactor plans. And ultimately, given the increasing proliferation concerns (North Korea, Iran, potentially Myanmar) and lack of success in dealing with individual countries, this may be a good opportunity to search for a new global nonproliferation strategy. May I suggest starting at the 2010 NPT Review Conference?