Strategic Concerns, Historical Ties Make Pakistan Unwilling to Take On Haqqani Network

By Katherine Hubbard

In a move that deeply frustrated American military officers, Pakistani officials announced last month that they are not planning any new offensives against militants, possibly for up to a year.  This is highly problematic for the U.S. because Pakistan’s willingness to eliminate militant hideouts in their territory, particularly in North Waziristan, is crucial to the success of the Obama administration’s strategy in the region.  The Pakistani army’s spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas rejected U.S. pressure to step up attacks in the area, which is the main base of operations for the Haqqani network from which it launches operations in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has consistently refused to take on the Haqqani network because they believe such an act would be contrary to their interests in Afghanistan once American troops have withdrawn.  Because Haqqani controls large areas of Afghan territory, Pakistan sees him as vital ally in what they are sure will be a battle for influence in post-American Afghanistan.  Pakistan is particularly concerned about the growing influence of India, which has given $1.2 billion in aid to Afghanistan.  Pakistan also sees Haqqani as an important player in reconciliation efforts that they would like to see get underway as soon as possible in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s ties to the Haqqani network date back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the early 1980s.  As a mujahidin leader against Soviet forces, Jalaluddin Haqqani gained a reputation for being a diehard fighter and a strong leader.  He drew the attention of the U.S. who poured millions of dollars into the insurgency by way of Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He also greatly impressed the ISI officials who were active among the mujahidin.  These officials formed close ties with Haqqani and allowed him to set up base in Pakistan.  The U.S. now considers the Haqqani network, which is affiliated with the Taliban and al Qaeda, to be one of the greatest threats to stability in the region, but Pakistan has maintained its jihad-era ties to Haqqani.  Right after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Haqqani was invited to Islamabad for talks about a post-Taliban government.  In a prisoner exchange with the Pakistani Taliban, the Pakistani government released three members of the Haqqani family in 2007.  Pakistan’s army chief was reportedly heard referring to Haqqani as a ‘strategic asset’ in 2008, and in 2009 a top ISI official reportedly met with Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin’s son who has replaced him as leader of the network.

Pakistan’s military continues to deny that the Haqqani network is even based in Pakistan, claiming late last year that the group “mainly operates from Afghanistan” despite the fact that the consensus among Western analysts is that the group is based in North Waziristan.

Pakistan has instead been focusing their offensives on South Waziristan, a region where the Pakistani Taliban represents a more serious domestic threat. In South Waziristan, the Taliban has carried out attacks on Pakistani security installations and civilian markets, while North Waziristan is primarily used as a base for attacks in Afghanistan.  In an offensive in late 2009, the Pakistani army launched aerial attacks on suspected militant hideouts in Orakzai and Khyber, the tribal territory closest to Peshawar, the regional capital.  The army’s chief target was an enclave in South Waziristan occupied by the tribe of Pakistani Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud, now believed to have died from injuries suffered in a U.S. drone strike.  

The operations were meant to eliminate the majority of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the group behind many terrorist attacks in the country, along with their Arab and Central Asian partners who are closely linked to al Qaeda.  The TTP was also the primary target of an offensive in summer 2009 which resulted in the death of previous chief Baitullah Mehsud.  Other Taliban-affiliated groups that have been targeted by Pakistan’s army include Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) and Lashkar-e-Islam.

None of the three groups identified as being ‘the greatest threats to American troops’ are based in South Waziristan and thus Pakistan’s offensives there have done little good for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.  General McChrystal has said the most dangerous insurgent groups in the region are the Quetta Shura Taliban, which is the faction of the Taliban still loyal to Mullah Omar; the Haqqani network; and Hizb-i-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  American officials have indicated that if Pakistan remains unwilling to attack these groups, they will begin to increase missile strikes from drones in the border regions.