Swords and Shields I - NATO's Missile Defense Offer To India

By Maschenka Braganca

Photo c/o U.S. Missile Defense Agency

NATO has offered India cooperation and sharing of technology in the field of missile defense at the beginning of September this year, emphasizing the “shared missile threat.” As India and NATO don’t really share a common threat regionally, this offer does seem surprising. India has not responded yet, but the deal seems to be a prelude to a more far-reaching strategic dialogue between NATO and India or even the beginning of a formal alliance? There are different factors to this decision that need to be observed and that India will carefully have to assess them.

India’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

India began developing an anti-ballistic missile system in late 1999, soon after the Kargil encounter. This system is clearly aimed at Pakistan and China and the missile threat stemming from those countries. India has built up an indigenous BMD capability of its own in the past decades. It is supposed to be two-tiered, consisting of two interceptors for incoming missiles at two different altitudes:  the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception.*  Intercept tests have been held since 2006 and have recently been increasingly successful (as successful as a BMD test can be). India now ranks fourth among those states that have successfully developed and tested an anti-missile system (US, Russia, Israel). The system is not completed, and even though interceptors have been tested the system can still not be considered operational.   

Missile Perceptions: NATO And India

NATO decided at the 2010 Lisbon summit to adopt a “phased adaptive approach” to implement its theater missile defense system, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, that will extend over its 28 member states. The first phase has been completed, and the second phase will most likely be finished by 2012, right in time for the Chicago Summit. Some of the problems that the NATO system is facing are questions of operation and information/intelligence sharing among allies as well as the political battle with Russia that perceives the BMD as an attempt to neutralize its own strategic deterrent.

NATO’s offer is a surprising move. NATO and India do not have any shared threats - the only common factor uniting them is that both face a missile threat and use the same technology to counter it.  There are obvious differences in their strategic environments and threat profiles: NATO states are seeking to defend against the missile threat emanating from a couple of hostile states, and are therefore developing a theater system for limited defense. India’s strategic setting is the nuclearized South Asian theater with two hostile states at its borders - China and Pakistan. Both countries have a substantial nuclear arsenal and have spent the last decade enhancing their offensive capabilities in quantitative and qualitative terms.

India’s BMD Calculus

BMD has two essential impacts: the suggested defense, as well as deterrence (by denial). However, the deployment of BMD almost always triggers some kind of tit-for-tat reaction by the countries addressed, usually in the form of augmenting offensive capabilities to maintain confidence in deterrent options. The clearest reaction to the Indian BMD to date was China’s BMD test in 2010. This upsets India’s calculus of singling out China in this particular technology. Pakistan, which cannot distinguish whether an Indian move is targeted toward China or Pakistan, also feels extremely uncomfortable with an anti-missile system at its doorstep, considering it as a means to neutralize its nuclear deterrent. Pakistan, however, at this point has not (yet) made any steps toward BMD, but is more likely to acquire additional missiles and launchers.

In conclusion, BMD has a huge potential for upsetting the nuclear dyadic relationships in South Asia. Aside from the effectiveness of MD to protect against the missile menace  and the problems MD might pose for stability, BMD, however, is an important tool for India for another reason: India sees its potential for gaining technological edge over the two adversaries, especially China, and by no means wants to fall off at the high-technology front. The competition is particularly spurred by the fact that China maintains a more advanced offensive ballistic missile program. In 2007 when China tested an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT), shooting down a weather satellite, India was particularly troubled, because it clearly exposed its lack in space capabilities. India very quickly openly expressed interest to focus more heavily on space and potentially an ASAT capability . (Victoria Samson has written an interesting piece explaining the Indian interest in ASAT and the similarities between ASAT and missile defense technology.)  All this shows that uncertainties and insecurities as well as competition will only grow at this pace.

NATO-India: Cooperation?

So what would be the added benefit of the NATO proposal? The two parties don’t share a common missile threat. Also, India has not had a history of close alliance to the US and this has only been changing in the last half decade. The NATO offer is more about the Indo-US than the NATO-Indian relationship (because US has the most advanced capabilities and is largely driving the NATO effort). India also decided on the independent track in BDM development, rejecting the US Patriot system. But one shared common and the most probable reason for this offer is the troubled perception that a rising China creates for both. In times of such regional tension and pressure, cooperation in defense might also provide a technological boost for India that it hardly would want to refuse, e.g. when it comes to acquiring high-end equipment (NATO’s promise for new technology and tracking, reconnaissance and strike systems) to keep up the edge. For the NATO side, the offer to India coincides with its globalization strategy if you consider the plans for interceptor positions in Rumania and early-warning radar in Turkey.

NATO hinted towards New Delhi to turn away from its non-alignment policy (non-bloc policy maintained during the Cold War), which NATO thinks is hard to justify in a post-Cold War era. US ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder outlined that cooperation between NATO and India is already existing in Afghanistan, in counter-terrorism and in counter-piracy missions as well as naval exercises, and if extended to BMD and perhaps cyber-security, could be mutually beneficial to both sides in tackling emerging threats.

This proposed cooperation seems to be politically driven, rather than a purely functional alliance. It is not clear what kind of configuration NATO is seeking for this cooperation and whether India would be willing to agree to come under the umbrella. This seems very unlikely because both sides want to keep their full control over operating those systems – more likely will it be operated as a technology “exchange” program. Whatever the technical details might be, however, the entire approach of NATO reaching out to India might have some symbolic implications if India decides to reciprocate. An ally like India would strengthen US policy in South Asia.

There has not been any official Indian response to this offer as yet, but its acceptance would make India the only non-NATO quasi ally, apart from Russia (and Australia), in the alliance. For India it would have two significant impacts: First, having the possibility of gaining valuable MD technology seems to be an interesting option as India faces increasing regional challenges. Bharat Gopalaswamy from the University of Illinois also comments that “if Russia with all of its Cold War baggage, can work with NATO on missile defense, there is no reason for India [with a comparably less troubled history towards the US] to ignore the offer”. Second, it might open the door for stronger ties to bolster against Chinese regional power. But beyond the strategic calculation there will be some bargaining necessary among Indian bureaucrats, who still lean towards old ideological thinking. A formal alliance does not seem very likely, but cooperation as lined out in this MD deal might benefit India in the way it thinks of China.

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* In the early stages of Indian BMD, India sought to acquire parts of the Israeli Arrow system, which it was denied by the US. Later India got an offer from the US for the PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability), that India rejected because it was considered out-dated. Together with Israel, India developed the Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar [LRTR]), which is now being used for the PAD system.