Tact and Nuclear Materials Security

By John K. Warden

In Prague last April, President Obama announced “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.”

Now almost a year later, Obama’s commitment will be tested.  The FY11 budget increases for nuclear security in the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of Energy budgets.  However, there’s still more that can be done.

Kenneth Luongo, president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security, wrote a policy brief in November 2009 that included a number of good recommendations, many which have not yet been adopted.

For example:

• Provide all relevant programs with “notwithstanding authority” for 10 percent of their total yearly budgets for contingency purposes.
• Ensure that all relevant programs have the authority to receive contributions from foreign governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations for specific nonproliferation objectives.
• Allow for accelerated transfer authority among agencies to meet unforeseen challenges quickly.

Luongo also argues that the United States should extend and expand the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and, in a more recent article, proposes an agenda for a successful nuclear security summit in April.

Continued U.S. support, including adequate funding, will is essential to any effort to secure nuclear material.  However, a potentially more difficult obstacle to overcome will be securing partner country cooperation.

In a 2008 article suggesting priorities for U.S. nuclear security efforts, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School, highlights the difficulty in building relationships around securing sensitive materials:

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is a first step, which has been valuable in focusing countries’ attention on the issue of nuclear terrorism and building legal infrastructure, capacity for emergency response, law enforcement capabilities, and more—but it has not focused on rapid and substantial security upgrades for nuclear stockpiles, and demands little of countries to count as partners. A modified approach—focused on locking down all stocks of nuclear weapons, plutonium, and HEU to high standards—is likely to be necessary to create the kind of fast-paced nuclear security campaign that is needed. To succeed, such an effort must be based not just on donor-recipient relationships but on real partnerships, which integrate ideas and resources from countries where upgrades are taking place in ways that also serve their national interests. For countries like India and Pakistan, for example, it is politically untenable to accept U.S. assistance that is portrayed as necessary because they are unable to adequately control their nuclear stockpiles on their own. But joining with the major nuclear states in jointly addressing a global problem may be politically appealing.

Unfortunately, the language U.S. officials are using isn’t making their job any easier.  Obama pledged to secure all “vulnerable” nuclear materials.  As a result, countries, such as India and Pakistan, become defensive, not wanting to be seen as “vulnerable” and in need of assistance.

There are two ways the United States might be able to fix this problem.  First, the United States could try to change how countries perceive “vulnerable.”  At the April summit, Obama might emphasize that there are vulnerable materials in all countries, including the United States.  The President could reinforce this point by leading initiatives to secure materials at research reactors, located most prominently in the United States and other developed countries.  If instead, reactors and weapons in countries like India and Pakistan are identified as the “most vulnerable” cooperation will be difficult.

Second, the United States could change the language it uses to describe nuclear security.  In the same article cited above, Bunn argues that the goal for the President should be to “Achieve effective and lasting nuclear security,” including “Seek[ing] to ensure that all nuclear weapons, plutonium, and highly enriched uranium are secure.”  Language like this might better emphasize the long-term goals of these projects without alienating potential partners.