Takeaways from Secretary Clinton’s Speech

Yesterday, Secretary Clinton gave pretty comprehensive remarks regarding non-proliferation at the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Dean Acheson lecture.

After summarizing our current state of affairs and reminding everyone of the long road towards a world free of nuclear weapons Secretary Clinton provides a blueprint for moving forward:
 

The Administration’s blueprint for our efforts is based on the hard, day-to-day work of active diplomacy – confronting proliferators, strengthening the capabilities of the IAEA and ensuring that all nations abide by the rights and obligations of the nonproliferation regime, negotiating a new treaty with Russia to reduce our nuclear arsenal, seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prompt negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, undertaking a review of the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’s defense strategy, and supporting budgetary priorities that guarantee the safety and effectiveness of our deterrent.
 

Clinton continues to note that international cooperation is required to make this blueprint happen:

The reality is that the nuclear threat cannot be checked by us acting alone. Whether we seek to prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear materials, establish a new international framework for civil nuclear energy cooperation, increase the IAEA’s budget, or persuade governments with nuclear weapons ambitions to abandon their quest, we can only achieve our goals through cooperation with others. In recent years, however, polarization within the international community on proliferation issues between states with nuclear weapons and those without have created obstacles to the cooperation that is needed.
 

Here are some more highlights from Clinton’s remarks:

•    Clinton reiterates the policy of engagement towards Iran and the U.S. refusal to have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea

•    Enhancing the capabilities of the IAEA

…The IAEA’s additional protocol, which allows for more aggressive, short-notice inspections should be made universal, through concerted efforts to persuade key holdout states to join.

Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. That is certainly not the case today… We should consider adopting automatic penalties for violation of safeguards agreements; for example, suspending all international nuclear cooperation, or IAEA technical cooperation projects until compliance has been restored.

•    Attempting to strengthen financial and legal tools like the Nuclear Supplies Group which are used to disrupt proliferation networks
 

This will mean tightening controls on transshipment, a key source of illicit trade, and strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. A reinvigorated nonproliferation regime should enable countries, especially developing countries, to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, while providing incentives for them not to build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities.

•    The challenge of reducing nuclear arsenals
•    Beginning negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
 

For the same reason, the United States seeks to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with appropriate monitoring and verification provisions. A universal FMCT will halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, capping the size of existing arsenals, and reducing the risk that terrorist groups will one day gain access to stockpiles of fissile materials.

•    Supporting a new Stockpile Management Program
 

So in addition to supporting a robust nuclear complex budget in 2011, we will also support a new Stockpile Management Program that would focus on sustaining capabilities. General Chilton, Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, has said repeatedly that he doesn’t need new nuclear weapons capabilities – but he must be confident in the capabilities that we have.
 

•    Supporting and advocating for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

So we are already honoring the fundamental obligation of the treaty. A test ban treaty that has entered into force will allow the United States and others to challenge states engaged in suspicious testing activities – including the option of calling on-site inspections to be sure that no testing occurs anywhere. CTBT ratification would also encourage the international community to move forward with other essential nonproliferation steps. And make no mistake, other states – rightly or wrongly – view American ratification of the CTBT as a sign of our commitment to the nonproliferation consensus.

The question and answer period also had a few interesting questions.

Although Clinton’s remarks were informative and helped convey the position of the administration that is not what was needed. What Clinton needed to deliver yesterday, and what the Obama Administration desperately needs, is a call to action that will increase the likelihood of the administration achieving success on some of their non-proliferation initiative. Senator Kyl’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal yesterday is likely the start of what will be the a strong pushback against a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, A Fissile Treaty, and potentially increased funding and autonomy for an IAEA who is in disfavor among conservatives after the handling of Iran.

While the speech does reinforce the U.S. non-proliferation policy and provide some insight into where the administration is headed, it would seem that Secretary Clinton did not fully capitalize on the opportunity presented by such a highly anticipated speech.

Hopefully this speech is only the State Department’s first step toward taking a more aggressive posture to galvanize support for the Administration’s goals.