The Tale of Two

SECDEF Gates and CJCS Mullen both conducted interviews yesterday that resulted in seemingly opposing statements regarding Iran's nuclear capabilities.  On CNN's "State of the Union," Mullen answered the question, "Does Iran have enough fissile material to make a bomb?" by saying

We think they do, quite frankly

Gates, however, had the following interaction on Meet the Press

Q: Iran has been able to progress with a nuclear capability short of nuclear bomb but with kind of a virtual bomb which is just being on the brink of having an actual weapons stockpile.  The question is: Is it possible to get Iran to abandon its weapons program short of some kind of grand bargain, in other words, bigger carrots and bigger sticks? Gates: I think there has been a continuing focus on how do you get the Iranians to walk away from a nuclear weapons program. They are not close to a stockpile. They are not close to a weapon at this point and so there is some time.

What gives?  There are a couple of items to consider: 1. The specific wording and context of the question.  Mullen was asked directly about the quantity of fissile material to which he seemed to largely agree with recent IAEA findings.  His spokesperson's clarification that he was referring to LEU as distinct from HEU highlights the specificity with which he viewed the question (or least how he wants the answer perceived).  The question posed to Gates, however, was couched in much broader terms about the Iranian program in general. Gates reference to a "nuclear weapons program," in and of itself perhaps an important rhetorical recognition, seems to be referring to more than just kilograms of LEU.  Does it require enough LEU (or HEU) for multiple bombs?  A workable ICBM to attach and deliver the bomb? 2.  The impact of a "virtual breakout" capability.  The idea behind this concept is that given that Iran could (somewhat) quickly develop a nuclear weapon, people should treat them as if they are a nuclear power.  Buzzwords like "gamechanger" get thrown around in describing this hypothetical world where it is determined Iran could get a bomb and therefore is treated as if it has one.  It is important, however, to analyze the transition from "virtual breakout" capability to actual nuclear power.  Even the basic step of enriching LEU to HEU will take some time.  It would take 2-3 months under optimal conditions (a large assumption "fraught with uncertainties") according to David Albright and Jacqueline Shire's 2007 article for Arms Control Association. Even when that occurs, the technology needed to effectively deliver that weapon is no easy task, as evidenced by the difficulties the North Koreans have had (which is not to say the cases are parallel).  That being said, the difficulty in slowing the Iranian program shows that even if the full threat is a few years out the Obama administration needs to quickly work to determine what their strategy will be.