Talking Japanese Nukes

The Korea Times picked up on a recent CRS report written by (former CSISer) Mary Beth Nitkin and Emma Chalett-Avery.  The report puts the conventional anti-nuclear sentiments that exist in many parts of Japan in the context of recent developments throughout East Asia such as the 2006 North Korean test.  While a rising China and an unstable Korea certainly worry Japan, it is important to note that the report finds

Japanese officials and experts remain remarkably uniform in their consensus that Japan is unlikely to move toward nuclear status in the short-to-medium term.

In all likelihood, Japan will not be making a play for nuclear weapons in the short term future.  With that statement grounding the Korea Herald's title "Japan to Go Nuclear If Unified Korea Is Nuke-Armed," it is important to note the great degree of transition required to move from the status quo to a nuclear-armed Unified Korea.  Current North Korea brinkmanship doesn't help the situation but that is a far cry from complete collapse of North Korea, a turbulent and complicated transition on the peninsula and throughout East Asia, and the rise of a Unified government that wants to hold onto nuclear weapons.  On the last subject the CRS report notes,

Such a nuclear decision would depend on a variety of factors: the political orientation of the new country, its relationship with the United States, and how a reunified government approached its historically difficult ties with Japan.

Another possible takeaway is the learning lessons Japan's case provides for other countries who might seek nuclear weapons.  A lot of attention has been focused recently on when Iran will reach the magical level of LEU considered sufficient for a breakout.  For Japan, this concern is irrelevant given they have "the potential to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons" according to the report. The extensive use of nuclear energy throughout Japan makes their civilian nuclear programs some of the most advanced in the world.   The cannot be said, however, of aspiring nuclear powers like Iran. Even if an aspiring country were able to overcome any obstacles related to production of the material itself, which is no easy task, the report lays out another series of obstacles that would have to be dealt with before joining the nuclear club:

However, the ability to develop a few nuclear weapons versus the technological, financial and manpower requirements of a full nuclear deterrent should be considered. Producing nuclear weapons would require expertise on bomb design including metallurgists and chemists; while a reliable deterrent capability may also require reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets from a first-strike, and a system for the protection of classified information