Thawing the Frozen Sea

Jeffrey Lewis posted a robust retort to Monday's post reacting to Joe Cirincione's recent article in the Huffington Post. There's a lot of the original PONI post that is not discussed in Jeffrey's post but the debate boils down to the focus on starting points, Presidential options, and consensus (or potential lack thereof). I don't actually think we disagree nearly as much as it is made to seem but my thoughts on all three: 1. The question of "where does the NPR start from" is not a valuable way to view the discussion. The question of the NPR starting from a single source, the Strategic Posture Commission (SPC), was one raised in Cirincione's article that was not engaged by my post. Our purpose was simply to refute some of the claims about the composition, quality, and importance of the Strategic Posture Commission. The SPC should be an input into the NPR (and probably will be given the same person is principally drafting both). So should CFR Task force . So should Quartet's work. So should the Cirincione/Grotto report. The point is that these will all be inputs that will be synthesized and combined with the work going on in the building to produce the final product mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act. It will not just be a CTRL + C, CTRL + V approach based primarily on the SPC (or an "exegesis" as it was referred to). Each of the reports have strengths and weaknesses (which is obviously relative as evidenced by which side one falls on the CTBT debate). The Strategic Posture Commission did a lot more work on the infrastructure side than the CFR report. The CFR report did more on some issues like the Review Conference and best security practices. Orienting the NPR lays some valuable groundwork for the NPR process like interagency cooperation (it is worth noting the NPR background sheet spent a great deal of space addressing how they are trying to coordinate and reach out). 2. The President should have options--- we don't disagree that NPR should provide options to the President that are consistent with advancing the agenda he laid out in Prague. The quote in the original post from the NPR fact sheet states quite clearly that the Pentagon understands that agenda guides the NPR and will provide recommendations consistent with that. Those recommendations absolutely should have a range of options for the President. There was a now deleted comment that rightly pointed Gary Samore's explicit statements that the NPR will present the President with a range of options. Where the difference lies is figuring out what it means to give the President a "range of options." Jeffrey explains it as

Instead, give the President three or four real options. Not three flavors of vanilla. Not a couple of flavors like "dirt" and "cat urine" intended to make a scoop of vanilla comparatively appetizing. That, by the way, is the core of what Joe had to say: There is every reason to doubt, at this stage, that the Nuclear Posture Review will give the President real options. A set of real options would reflect, rather than obscure, the very different views about how much the details matter. One of those options ought to be one that Joe likes, while another should make the kids at PONI scream like teenagers at a Jonas Brothers concert.

My primary worry is that the scoops-for-all 31 flavors approach to incorporate seemingly vastly disparate views will produce an NPR that is too watered down to be helpful. As explained above, it almost gives the impression the NPR is supposed to produce a multiple choice test where President Obama (whose decisionmaking ability was never questioned) chooses from a list of starkly contrasting options. The problem with this strategy is that it begins to betray the fundamental mission of the NPR to determine what requirements are necessary for deterrence within the larger context of embracing the President's guidance to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Answer (E) any of the above is probably not true and also not particularly helpful. The are an astonishing numbers of factors relevant to trying to answer legal demands of the NPR posed by Congress, a task that becomes substantially more difficult if you heed the advice to "throw out the f'ing reports" which provided an important contribution to the legwork needed in the NPR process. The purpose of the NPR should be to aggregate all of the work to provide clear guidance to the President on the range of options under which the military can still assure the President they have a high degree in our deterrent and extended deterrent while simultaneously reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security. That NPR should seek to create a band from within which the President has the ability to freely maneuver. The decision margins reached by the NPR will almost inevitably disappoint the left who will want to decry the report as more of the same. For example, on the numbers question the NPR will probably come up with numbers closely in line with was what agreed to in the START follow-on joint fact sheet, particularly because the NPR and START follow-on "are closely coordinated to ensure that the U.S. negotiating positions are fully consistent with ongoing NPR analysis concerning nuclear policy, strategy, and force structure." The real question is what should get categorized as a "real option." Remember (from what I'm told): getting stuff done in government is hard. That's an important, even if not ideal, reality to keep in mind with regards to including the Joe Cirincione flavored ice cream on the NPR menu. The prospects of getting buy-in from the key players within the building, not to mention interagency, allies , etc., on how Joe would answer the questions facing the NPR will be a daunting task, to put it lightly. Is some of the unnecessary bureaucracy and turf battling? Probably. Are there also some very serious concerns and relevant obstacles about trying to take these steps? Absolutely. 3. All things consensus- As with the options debate, I agree in part and disagree in part. There's no doubt the Strategic Posture Commission did not just magically erase decades of opinions that vary a great deal on nuclear issues. Jeffrey is right in some respect that "There is no bipartisan consensus today on US nuclear weapons policy." There are obviously going to be big differences between Kyl and Levin and as stated originally Laura Holgate's additional view to the CFR report lamenting the lack an answer to the "what is the role of nukes?" question shows that there are some gaps in thinking that need to be addressed. All that aside, the idea that the SPC is a "shimmering mirage" of "idiosyncratic" commissioners who "don't remember what they had for breakfast, let along the arcane compromises they agreed to a couple of months ago" does a serious disservice to the ground the commission broke. It is actually Joe Cirincione who eloquently explained the importance:

Conservatives, who, just a few years ago, condemned treaties as the illusion of security, are now embracing agreements to reduce nuclear arms. Exhibit A is James Schlesinger, former Republican secretary of defense and energy, who just endorsed a new treaty with Russia. Quote, "The moment appears ripe for a renewal of arms control with Russia, and this bodes well for continued reductions in nuclear arsenals," said the U.S. Strategic Commission he co-chairs . . . Charlie Curtis at the Nuclear Threat Initiative describes the effect of these shifts and other changes as the thawing of frozen seas . . . I don't want to overstate this. Secretary Schlesinger is still opposed to nuclear disarmament . . . While not endorsing Obama's ultimate goal, they support several of his preliminary steps. That is enough for now.

That is the point. Getting even small bits of consensus, especially on issues as polarizing as these, is extremely tough to achieve. Schlesinger isn't going to sign on to quickly going to 1,000 any time soon but the fact that James Schlesinger is endorsing steps on the disarmament path such as arms control and reductions, regardless the size, is a very big deal, even if he still disagrees with disarmament. Lastly, speaking on behalf of PONI, I'd like to offer Brad Roberts' very well written remarks (4th and 5th paragraphs) about civilry in public disagreements given that I'm not sure that casting PONI into an ideology ("Not surprisingly, the folks over at PONI disagree"), mocking the age of the PONI team ("another should make the kids at PONI scream like teenagers at a Jonas Brothers concert"), and insinuating that folks at DoD do not have confidence in the decisionmaking of their President ("I trust him to make the right choice. So does Joe. So should the people who work for him") does much to enrich the discussion about the NPR.