Third Party Persuasion

Whether through sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or a negotiated solution, Russia and China are two countries critical to the international effort to curb Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. has been lobbying both countries on the matter, and the IAEA vote censuring Iran – which both nations signed on to – was seen as a diplomatic victory for U.S. efforts to generate consensus on the issue. Recently, both countries have been more willing to address the Iran nuclear issue in their own ways.

Over the past few weeks, Russia has distanced itself from several agreements with Iran that have been the focus of international pressure. One issue is the completion of the Bushehr reactor, which due to purported technical problems has been pushed back until sometime next year. Similarly, the delivery of Russian S-300 air defenses has been in limbo for half a year. Oddly, Iranian diplomats have released statements that Russia has assured them of delivery, while other officials have seemingly dismissed the deal, claiming that Iran will soon develop its own version of the anti-aircraft/-cruise missile system. Iran is obviously troubled that Western leverage is taking its toll on its relations with Russia, but the rejection of the uranium swap deal, in which Russia was to play a critical role, is probably not an insignificant factor.

Russia has grown wearier of Iranian intransigence in recent months, with its strongest statements yet emerging after the Iranian response to the IAEA vote. According to Reuters, Russia is beginning to accept the idea of sanctions, with one official stating that Russia will join any consensus. Prime Minister Putin stated yesterday that there is no evidence that Iran is pursuing the bomb, yet he was silent on whether or not Russia would consider sanctioning Iran. Russia may not believe Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon, but it obviously isn’t inspiring the kind of confidence that Russia would like, and Russia may be unwilling to shield Iran if tensions remain high.

On the China front, concrete gains have been more elusive. With its $100 billon-plus investment in Iran’s energy sector, reliance on Iranian oil, and general distaste for sanctions, China has been reluctant to criticize Iran’s nuclear ambitions and support policies that could lead towards a strong UNSC sanctions resolution. According to John Pomfret and Joby Warrick’s piece in the Washington Post last week, China’s support for the IAEA resolution came after U.S. officials from the National Security Council visited the PRC prior to Obama’s trip to Asia:

The Chinese were told that Israel regards Iran's nuclear program as an "existential issue and that countries that have an existential issue don't listen to other countries," according to a senior administration official. The implication was clear: Israel could bomb Iran, leading to a crisis in the Persian Gulf region and almost inevitably problems over the very oil China needs to fuel its economic juggernaut, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

In the wake of the Iranian announcement of ten new enrichment facilities (which could be good news in disguise according to ACW’s Joshua Pollack), China has continued to press for a diplomatic solution to the issue, stating that it expects Iran to work with the IAEA on dialogue and negotiations. Chinese and Russian support for sanctions are by no means a given, and in China’s case are still highly unlikely at this point in time. Hopefully their individual forms of leverage will help nudge Iran back to the negotiating table before the situation escalates further.

[Photo: kremlin.ru]