Time for a More Creative Negotiating Strategy with Iran

Iran continues to steal the headlines. There’s increasing momentum for a new round of sanctions to prevent Iran from importing refined gasoline, and U.S. and European leaders are discussing what to do next. As we mentioned before, Obama set a September deadline for progress on negotiations, and recently CNN quoted an Iranian negotiator saying they are ready to talk,

Saaed Jalili, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, said Iran would open talks and offer new proposals, according to a TV report aired on Tuesday. “The package being offered by the Islamic Republic of Iran is updated and ready to be presented,” Jalili said. “We hope [the new] round of talks will be held to help the world feel progress, justice and peace.” Jalili did not say what the new package entailed.

However, some are skeptical that Iran will make any meaningful changes in their offer. They argue that Iran has no intention of altering its nuclear program and instead is trying to appear just cooperative enough to block a new round of sanctions. This view isn’t unfounded, Iran has, in the past, taken advantage of negotiations to continue develop their nuclear program. Also, the reaction to the recent IAEA report leaves questions about Iran’s intentions,

“There remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program,” said the text of the IAEA report, as quoted by the Associated Press. It said the IAEA “does not consider that Iran has adequately addressed the substance of the issues, having focused instead on the style and form … and providing limited answers and simple denials.”

Current Negotiations Are Failing

The problem is that the debate about how to respond goes back and forth between extremes. Some argue that we should impose sanctions and consider strikes without ever participating in negotiations, while others say we should take military threats and sanctions off the table to decrease enmity and convince Iran that they don’t need nuclear weapons. What we need is a more nuanced middle ground. The fundamental problem is less that engagement or sanctions are the wrong approach, and more that neither side has proposed a solution that the other considers acceptable. The United States and Israel, so far, have been unwilling to live with Iran having access to the full fuel-cycle, while Iran is unwilling to abandon its right to peaceful enrichment. The stalemate was described quite well in a recent Time report,

”We can expect that the new Iranian package, much like the most recent Western proposals presented to Iran, will mostly be a repackaging of old positions,” says Trita Parsi, an Iran analyst and president of the National Iranian American Council. Until now, Western governments have demanded that Iran suspend its uranium-enrichment program and negotiate an agreement to relinquish it in exchange for a package of economic incentives. But Iran insists that its much-scrutinized enrichment is for peaceful purposes, which it claims as a right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its proposals to resolve the standoff have typically focused on strengthening international safeguards against the weaponization of its enrichment facilities. Parsi expects that, at best, the Iranian package will suggest ways of strengthening the international inspection regime. “That’s very valuable in itself,” he says, “but it’s short of what the U.S. has been demanding so far.” Thus far, the two sides have offered diametrically opposed solutions to the problem that uranium-enrichment capability can be adapted to develop nuclear-weapons materiel. The West has insisted that because Iran’s intentions are under a cloud of suspicion, it must forgo enriching uranium and instead agree to import its reactor fuel. The Iranians, when they’ve been in an engaging mood, have focused on reinforcing international safeguards against weaponization. But Tehran hasn’t been in an engaging mood for some time now. It showed little interest in the U.S.-backed European proposal of a “freeze-for-freeze” formula, under which Iran would desist from expanding its enrichment capacity in exchange for Western powers’ refraining from adopting new sanctions. Nor has Tehran given more than a desultory response to Obama’s offer of talks.

The same article cites critics who believe that the current negotiating posture, of insisting on a suspension of enrichment, will fail,

Some influential voices in the West have questioned the viability of demanding that Tehran give up enrichment altogether. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry said in June that it was “ridiculous” to make Tehran’s surrender of that right a condition for a diplomatic solution. “They have a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that purpose,” Kerry told the Financial Times. But there has been no change in the official U.S. position. Revulsion over the Iranian regime’s handling of its June presidential election has further narrowed Obama’s room for diplomatic engagement with Iran. And Obama is under growing pressure from key actors like Israel as well as from Capitol Hill and his Administration to ratchet up the pressure.

However, it comes short by failing to offer an alternative proposal or negotiating strategy that could be effective.

More Creative Negotiations: An International Fuel Bank?

One idea could be to go back to a proposal that was supported by the Obama administration earlier this year: an international fuel bank. Obama considered the fuel bank to be part of the agenda of “getting to zero”,

The Obama administration is specifically supporting the development of an international nuclear-fuel bank that aspiring nuclear-power states could tap to feed their reactors. Such a system, say U.S. officials, would undercut demands of countries like North Korea and Iran that they need to develop their own infrastructure to produce nuclear fuel. Such technologies can be easily shifted into producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. A senior Obama administration official disclosed Sunday that, as part of that effort, the White House has had high-level contact in recent weeks with Kazakhstan to serve as host for such a proposed fuel bank. The White House is seriously considering the offer, and transferring control of the operation to the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. Only countries that renounce nuclear weapons and the production of nuclear fuel could take part in the program, said the official. The IAEA has for years supported the idea of a nuclear fuel bank, and it’s been understood that it would help monitor the facility.

The fuel bank is not a new proposal and has, in the past, been opposed by both nuclear and non-nuclear states,

The idea is not new. The 1946 “Baruch plan” proposed by the United States sought to establish such a global fuel bank. More recently, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, has endorsed a similar concept. The fuel bank idea is gradually gaining international support but has yet to materialize. To work, an international fuel bank would have to be a failsafe, incentive-based consortium under which countries would be 100 percent certain to gain unlimited access to reactor fuel in exchange for forgoing indigenous enrichment and reprocessing facilities and adopting stringent safeguard measures. The devil is in the details, however, and it is not yet clear who will supply the fuel bank and surrender their national right to determine the end user of its contributed fuel. For their part, non-nuclear-weapon states are understandably reticent to surrender additional rights in a world where nuclear disarmament remains an uncertain prospect. Thus any attempt at creating an international fuel bank will encounter stiff resistance, as it will essentially call for revisiting the agreements set out in the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. But nuclear-weapon states will have to be prepared to compromise if they wish to enlist support for the initiative. To be viable, more tangible steps by today’s nuclear powers must be made toward verifiable nuclear disarmament, complimented with a new push to implement the stalled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiations on an agreement banning further production of fissile material.

However, despite opposition, the fuel bank has promise because there has been preliminary support in the U.S., Russia, and some European countries, but also in Iran. In response to Obama’s proposal, Iran seemed interested in the idea,

Iran welcomed on Monday a proposal to set up a global nuclear fuel repository, part of a U.S.-backed plan to put all uranium enrichment under strict international control. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in Kazakhstan on a visit, said he supported a proposal to host the nuclear bank in the fellow Caspian nation, which is accessible from Iran by sea. “We think that (Kazakh President) Nursultan Nazarbayev’s idea to host a nuclear fuel bank is a very good proposal,” he told reporters after talks with the Kazakh leader. Iran’s support for the idea comes as U.S. President Barack Obama pushes for a “new beginning” in bilateral ties, and could play a role in mending bridges after decades of mistrust. Iran has said before that it would consider stopping sensitive uranium enrichment if guaranteed a supply of nuclear fuel from abroad. However, it has also frequently insisted on its right to master the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enriching uranium, for peaceful purposes.

There was also support from Larijani,

The former secretary of Iran’s supreme national security council Ali Larijani announced, “we back the idea of establishing an international nuclear fuel bank.”

Theoretical Benefits of a Fuel Bank

While some version of a fuel bank has been proposed on numerous occasions, the details have never been worked out. In recent proposals, the fuel bank would be hosted in either Russia or Kazakhstan, be run by the IAEA, and sell nuclear fuel to any countries that wanted it. Nonproliferation advocates see a lot of promise in the fuel bank. They argue that the spread of nuclear power makes it too easy for country to convert peaceful nuclear power programs to nuclear weapons programs. A fuel bank would solve this concern because countries would not need to develop their own nuclear program to have access to nuclear energy. Therefore, the fuel bank could be a “litmus test” for proliferation. If a country wanted to develop a nuclear power program, and claimed they were doing so because of energy needs, their motivations would be suspect if a stable supply of nuclear fuel was available from a fuel bank. Joe Cirincione, an advocate of the fuel bank, who sees it as a potential solution to the deadlock with Iran, describes its benefits,

First, it has the potential to address Iran’s concerns about security of fuel supply. An international fuel bank that is country-neutral, durable, and governed by objective criteria is more likely to attract Iranian support than a sui generis mechanism created specifically to deal with Iran. Second, a fuel-bank push would head off the regional proliferation consequences of Iran suddenly announcing its nuclear- or near-nuclear capability. At the very least, the existence of a credible nuclear fuel bank would make it harder for Iran’s Sunni Arab neighbors to pursue any nuclear weapons ambitions under the guise of nuclear energy development. Third, a nuclear fuel bank could serve as a first step towards more ambitious, global efforts to prevent the abuse of nuclear-fuel-cycle technology. That’s why the United States should press ahead with the fuel bank proposal with or without Iran’s support. This initiative would reduce the chances of a “virtual” arms race in the region by controlling the most sensitive component of the nuclear fuel cycle, uranium enrichment. The possibility that Iran may be left out of such an important initiative may also serve as an added inducement for Iran to forego uranium enrichment.

It is clear from his description that Cirincione is proposing a fuel bank that is located outside of Iran’s soil, but which Iran would have access to. While this solution would provide a high level of confidence for Europe, the United States, and Israel, it might not be acceptable to Iran.

The Way Forward: Staged Negotiations

The main problem with the U.S. negotiating strategy is that we are not showing any flexibility. Both Bush and Obama insisted that Iran suspend enrichment as a precondition for negotiations. This rigid approach prevents either side from work out a compromise. A better approach would be a more staged negotiation strategy. Iran has prepared a new offer (which admittedly won’t be very different) and has shown a willingness to negotiate. The United States could use this as an opportunity to show flexibility and test whether Iran is serious about negotiating. Iran’s proposal will likely focus on increased IAEA access and inspections. The United States should build on this offer by again bringing up the fuel bank proposal. We could make clear that we support their right to nuclear energy and support a proposal to place a fuel bank in a country like Russia or Kazakhstan, where Iran would have more confidence that they would be able to have a stable access to nuclear fuel. In exchange for giving the full fuel cycle, the United States could offer increased economic cooperation and a promise to no longer pursue or threaten regime change. Iran’s initial positive comments suggest they might be willing to accept this offer. However, they would likely say no. Bruno Pellaud, the IAEA’s former deputy director-general for safeguards, has said that current fuel bank proposals wouldn’t be accepted by Iran because they would not be on Iran’s soil,

But Pellaud says a fuel bank is not likely to be a short-term solution for the Iran crisis. He says there is a deep feeling in Iran, currently projected by its hard-line government, that it should have the whole fuel cycle and not depend on foreign resources. Tehran so far only appears interested in international partnerships involving uranium-enrichment programs on Iranian soil.

However, if we want to find a negotiated solution, we should not stop there. As a fallback, the United States should propose a single pilot facility on Iran’s soil that would contribute to the international fuel bank, along with even more economic cooperation, such as investment in Iran’s gasoline refinery sector. The reactor could provide fuel to Iran, and excess fuel to be sold to other developing countries. According to Gareth Evans, a former foreign minister of Australia, who is president of the International Crisis Group, this is the only solution that could be politically acceptable for all sides,

The red line that matters is the one at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, between civilian and military capability. If Iran’s neighbors, including Israel, and the wider world could be confident that that line would hold, it would not matter whether Iran was capable of producing its own nuclear fuel. That line will hold if we can get Iran to accept a highly intrusive monitoring, verification and inspection regime that goes well beyond basic Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards…and to have any industrial-scale activity conducted not by Iran alone but by an international consortium. Although Iran will hold out for as much as it can get and for as long as it can, it is capable of being persuaded…But negotiations won’t go anywhere if the United States and European Union continue to insist on zero enrichment. In Iran two weeks ago, I heard nothing from anyone, in or out of government, to suggest that any member of the current power elite thought the benefits of a nuclear weapons program — including for deterrence or asserting regional authority — could possibly outweigh the costs…Unconditional negotiations aimed at achieving “delayed limited enrichment with maximum safeguards” rather than the failed policy of “zero enrichment” can produce a win-win outcome. Such negotiations won’t be easy to start or conclude, given the parties’ long-held public positions. But if the objective is to ensure that Iran won’t backslide and be newly tempted to go down the nuclear weapons road, this is the only way to go.

Flint Leverett, a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, agrees that a solution like this is the most restrictive that Iran would accept,

But, as Iran has developed its enrichment infrastructure over the past several years, a strong consensus seems to have taken hold in Tehran that the Islamic Republic must be allowed to operate at least a pilot enrichment facility as part of an overall settlement.. senior Iranian officials have suggested both publicly and privately that Tehran would be open to constant, “embedded” monitoring of a pilot enrichment plant by the International Atomic Energy Agency…it seems increasingly that this is a genuine Iranian “red line” and that Tehran will not agree to negotiated limits on its nuclear activities without being allowed to operate such a facility. And, while Tehran might be willing to accept terms restricting the development of Iran’s fuel cycle infrastructure beyond a pilot enrichment facility, it will almost certainly not accept such limits without an American security guarantee as part of the agreement.

As we discussed previously, U.S. intelligence sources believe Iran has not yet made a decision on whether to acquire nuclear weapons, but with intensive monitoring would be unlikely to try it. Therefore, from an Iranian perspective, this proposal would be extremely tempting. Iranian leaders could go to their people and say that they have “won” because the United States is willing to let them have access to the fuel cycle on their soil. This would fulfill the vision of Iran’s leaders of Iran being an important and proud country in the Middle East. Furthermore, acceptance of a internationally monitored facility would be linked directly with increased economic investment in Iran, including investment in their oil and gas sector. In the same article quoted above, Cirincioni argues that this would create a powerful domestic constituency in Iran that would push to make sure Iran remained in compliance with the strings attached.

It’s Good for Iran…But Why Should the US Do It?

The main benefit of this proposal is that it provides a real opportunity to find a negotiated solution. Iran has demonstrated that they are not willing to back down on the enrichment issue. A new round of sanctions is unlikely to change that. Unless we find a middle ground, the United States will be forced to accept an Iranian nuclear capability or start another military conflict in the Middle East. However, an internationally monitored facility is not just a way to avoid war, it also solves current concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. First, it could be sold as a political victory -- Obama could say that he has found a way to ensure that Iran has no nuclear weapons program. An international consortium is the one solution that allows both Iranian and American leaders to declare victory, and is therefore the most likely to be accepted by both sides. Second, this proposal would ease proliferation concerns. The facility, while on Iranian soil, would be run in cooperation with the international community. Current IAEA challenge inspections are seen as ineffective because they give Iran too much of an opportunity to divert nuclear fuel to a weapons program, but a permanent IAEA presence would alleviate those concerns. Dr. Geoffrey Forden and Sir John Thomson, who advocate this proposal and have written about it a few times, believe verification would be extremely effective,

The IAEA would be consulted on the design of the plant and would operate three forms of safeguards: full-scope, Additional Protocol, and specially agreed transparency measures. Each shift of workers would have a majority of non-Iranians and non-Iranians would hold key positions in the management company. Together, these measures would protect both against diversion of material and against the establishment of a clandestine facility. Other security measures, especially “black boxing” and disabling mechanisms are considered. The risks of an Iranian “breakout” by expropriating the multilaterally owned facility are minor and the risks that the Iranians would and could establish a clandestine facility are, in comparison with other schemes, negligible.

If Iran tried to kick the IAEA out or build another nuclear facility somewhere else, it would be a clear indication that Iran was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, allowing the United States to respond in-kind. Also, just the offer would be a test of Iranian intentions. If Iran said no to a pilot enrichment facility on its soil that would guarantee access to nuclear fuel, the UnS and the international community could be fairly certain that Iran intended to acquire nuclear weapons.

What About Opposition From Developing Countries?

Developing countries have opposed a potential fuel bank,

But emerging nations, who fear “multinationalizing” control over the fuel cycle would curb their right to home-grown atomic energy for electricity, rejected a request by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei to develop a detailed plan for approval in September. While developing states agreed to let talks go on, they warned others on the IAEA’s 35-nation governing board against “attempts meant to discourage the pursuit of any peaceful nuclear technology on grounds of its alleged ’sensitivity’.”

In fact, the opposition of developing countries blocked the proposal a few months ago,

On the backburner for decades, the fuel bank has been given a strong boost [by] U.S. President Barack Obama, and got further impetus from Iran’s expanding enrichment programme which the West suspects is aimed at yielding atom bombs. The IAEA forecasts that demand for nuclear energy, most visible so far in countries across the conflict-ridden Middle East, will almost double over the next generation as nations seek an alternative to high-polluting and finite fossil fuels. But the uranium used in nuclear power plants can also be enriched to high levels to form the fissile core of atom bombs — something the West fears Iran could be pursuing but Tehran denies, saying its programme is intended only for electricity. “This is an issue which will increasingly demand the attention of the (IAEA) director-general — to manage the expansion of nuclear power in ways that provide for confidence,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, senior non-proliferation fellow at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. ElBaradei, backed by uranium producer Russia, has been trying to propel the plan forward but was blocked at a June IAEA board meeting by developing states, who fear it could limit their right to establishing their own atomic energy programmes. Some 60 countries want to develop projects according to the IAEA.

However, this proposal could overcome the opposition of developing countries. First, if the United States and Iran could come to an agreement it would provide a jolt of momentum. Developing countries, especially those who worry about instability in the Middle East that could result from a military conflict or a nuclear Iran, would be quick to support the proposal. The United States would hope that other countries would be willing to accept international fuel and not have a desire to develop their own reactors. But, if they weren’t, this proposal creates an opening for a compromise. Developing countries oppose the idea of a fuel bank because they fear that multilateral control is a way to exclude them from having their own nuclear power plants. However, that criticism doesn’t apply to this proposal. There’s no reason the international fuel bank has to be located in one country. Instead, the fuel bank might be a constellation of reactors that are all monitored and jointly-run by the IAEA. As a result, those developing countries that wanted to participate in the enrichment process would be able to, while others would be able to buy the fuel. This could still prevent proliferation because there would be a multilateral presence and a number of safeguards at each facility. It is important to note that such a proposal would place a heavy burden on the IAEA. Their mandate would likely have to be expanded and their funding increased (the United States has already committed a large amount to the fuel bank, and should provide more if it can help resolve the conflict with Iran). Finally, the United States could get developing country support by showing our own commitment to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. One of the underlying reasons that developing countries want nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is they dislike double standards. If the US took concrete steps to show that we are committed to nonproliferation, such as ratifying the CTBT, we would have more credibility to get developing countries to support a fuel bank.

Would Israel Support a Fuel Bank on Iran’s Soil?

Israel has said that they believe that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is an existential threat and, therefore, have opposed giving Iran access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. It is likely that Israel would be reluctant to accept a multilateral enrichment facility on Iran’s soil, but they might be able to be talked into it. As Evans said in a quote above, a multilateral enrichment facility could ease Israel’s concern because diversion would be extremely unlikely. Also, in an informative article about Israel’s concern, Chuck Freilich, a former Deputy National Security Adviser in Israel, says,

Both the United States and Israel would clearly prefer a resolution of the issue that provides for complete cessation of all nuclear activity in Iran, at least of fuel cycle–related activity, though what precisely this means is a complex technical issue that they would have to work out. Over the years, however, they have come to realize that Iran cannot be prevented from having a domestic nuclear power-generating capability, and they have resigned themselves to the ultimate completion of the Bushehr reactor and presumably of future power reactors as well…In the past, Israel appears to have feared that a U.S.-Iranian dialogue might be the start of a “slippery slope” that would harm its interests. Today, however, although its instinctual response might be one of alarm, a more sober analysis might lead Israel to endorse such an effort fully, not out of belief in its efficacy but as an essential way station on the route to quasi-military and military measures. Indeed, given the overwhelming importance Israel attaches to the nuclear program, it might actually welcome a U.S.-Iranian dialogue and accede to virtually any agreement that put an end to the nuclear threat, even at the expense of its other concerns regarding Iran. To this end, Israel would presumably support providing the Iranians with a broad set of incentives, whether directly related to the nuclear issue, such as U.S. security guarantees for Iran, or indirectly related, such as a U.S. commitment to forgo regime change and end sanctions.

With U.S. support, it is likely that Israel would support the idea. The United States could also provide an additional guarantee to Israel, such as improved missile defense systems, to provide greater assurance. However, even if Israel was uncomfortable with the idea, it is extremely unlikely that they would green-light a military strike on a multilateral enrichment facility that includes an IAEA and U.S. presence.

Conclusion

The details of a possible fuel bank and multilateral pilot facility in Iran have not been worked out, and there will be a number of complications and modifications that will be required a make it a reality. However, a fuel bank on Iran’s soil is the type of creative solution that we need if we actually want to reach a negotiated agreement with Iran over its nuclear program.