Time for a Nonproliferation Posture Review?

By Micah J. Loudermilk

While the forthcoming (barring any additional delays) Nuclear Posture Review is certainly the nuclear highlight of 2010, the year holds in store a number of other important happenings as well: the 2010 NPT Review Conference, an April summit on securing loose nuclear material, the pursuit of CTBT ratification, the completion of a new START treaty, and a renewed commitment – complete with funding – from the Obama administration to the U.S. nuclear infrastructure. In essence, all of these are pieces of a much larger puzzle – President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons, outlined to the world in his Prague speech. While the nuclear table is clearly extremely full already this year, perhaps it would be wise to consider adding something else to the mix: a nonproliferation posture review. While many people may see this as wholly unnecessary, given that all of the topics above deal with nonproliferation in some capacity, it seems clear that a review of this type could serve as the catalyst for a reassessment of U.S. nonproliferation goals in addition to providing a base for global action on nonproliferation objectives. More specifically, a nonproliferation review would demonstrate U.S. commitment to and leadership on the nonproliferation front and most importantly, unite the increasingly fractured global nonproliferation regime. The last point is of key importance because the world – not just the United States – faces an array of nuclear problems that the existing framework is simply unable to handle and some of which are discussed here.

Potential for Progress: India and Pakistan 

Iran and North Korea aside for now, the India-Pakistan front is one area where significant, and purposeful, progress is possible in the near future. The bitter relationship between the two countries not only complicates the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, but is constantly shadowed by the specter of nuclear arsenals. Without either country as a signatory of the NPT, the regime is significantly weakened. The good news here though is that both countries have signaled a willingness to negotiate on the subject – agreeing to meet on February 25. A significant shift in the state of things-nuclear in India and Pakistan, mediated by the United States, could provide a much-needed boost to the nonproliferation regime. Additionally, India has expressed an interest in joining the NPT as a nuclear weapons state, which, while containing a slew of potential problems (including Pakistan’s probable echoing of India), may be a helpful step. As put by David Fidler and Sumit Ganguly: 

India’s willingness to join the NPT contains the potential to strengthen the NPT…but to exclude a nuclear-armed but non-proliferating India when it is now willing to join would not strengthen efforts against nuclear proliferation.

Additionally, Luv Puri writes that:

It seems clear then that granting both countries de-facto nuclear weapons state status…would be the best way of curbing the on-going arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism by making it easier for the International Atomic Energy Agency to hold the nuclear infrastructures of both countries to the highest scrutiny.

As a final point here, India, if its statements are any basis for action, is probably one of the nuclear states more willing to work with the United States towards its goal of nuclear weapons elimination. At the Global Zero summit, Indian envoy Shyam Saran said that:

Over the long term, it is also our view that it is only through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and by putting in place universally applicable, nondiscriminatory and fully transparent verification procedures, that we can fully prevent and deny nuclear materials from falling into dangerous hands.

This, of course, is not to imply that India would ever disarm without reciprocal action by Pakistan, nor is it an attempt to claim that this step is anything approaching easy. Rather, it is recognition of an important and neglected region for potential nonproliferation progress. In undertaking the nonproliferation review suggested here, it is assumed that ample attention will be given to each of the world’s major nuclear problems (India and Pakistan comprising one), while similarly outlining a long-term strategy for proceeding.

The “Other” Threat: Nuclear Terrorism

Relating the idea of nuclear terrorism to September 11, Graham Allison writes that the first step to the prevention of nuclear terrorism is to recognize that is possible. Although the idea of a terrorist-acquired nuclear bomb exploding in an American city seems inconceivable, it is exactly the “failure to imagine the worst” which could allow such an attack to happen.

Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many Americans are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. Either it hasn’t happened, so it’s not going to happen; or, if it is going to happen, there’s nothing we can do to stop it. Both propositions are wrong. The countdown to a nuclear 9/11 can be stopped, but only by a realistic recognition of the threat, a clear agenda for action, and relentless determination to pursue it.

Any consideration of nonproliferation must start, obviously, from the base of preventing the spread of nuclear materials. The nuclear states are not going away anytime in the near future – arms control and elimination is a process that takes time. However, the threat of nuclear terrorism is not a threat faced by America alone, and that is the other crucial recognition on the nuclear terrorism front. To that end, the Obama administration has taken the first step to preventing nuclear terrorism and establishing American leadership on this front: the convening of a summit in April to secure all loose nuclear material – in the foreseeable timetable of four years. As put by Joe Biden in his NDU speech:

We cannot wait for an act of nuclear terrorism before coming together to share best practices and raise security standards, and we will seek firm commitments from our partners to do just that.

The nuclear terrorism front is a place where the U.S. can obtain a united global front – it simply requires leadership and clear direction. The continuous trickle of news on nuclear activity (not counting Iran and the like of course) – most recently focusing on Syria – serve as constant reminders that this problem requires attention sooner rather than later. To put it more simply, it should be clear that there’s a serious problem when both Dick Cheney and Joe Cirincione agree.

Other Issues – START and Global Arms Control

The START negotiations have been in progress for some time – with updates seemingly weekly stating that the two sides are nearly in agreement. Regardless, the START treaties have proven to be incredibly successful arms reduction treaties and certainly must be continued. Henry Sokolski though, notes that the U.S. should take its time on START – given the crucial importance of getting it right – despite the Obama administration fears that a lack of agreement on START could undermine the NPT Review Conference and April’s nuclear summit. Without at all implying that START be abandoned, Sokolski suggests that the arms control talks need to enter a more global context.

The White House should diversify its arms-control portfolio to address nuclear threats outside of Russia. Moscow’s deployed nuclear capabilities may be important, but they have declined steadily since 1985. Also, the chances for war are small and declining in Europe. Meanwhile…those chances in Asia – in China, Pakistan, and India – are on the rise.

Here again, is a golden opportunity for U.S. leadership on the nonproliferation front. U.S. and Russian arms reductions can only go so far before other nuclear nations must be drawn into the process. Although other countries may balk, given the size superiority of the U.S. arsenal, they also require a significantly smaller number of weapons to fulfill their security obligations. The point remains that a true nonproliferation regime requires cooperation of all the nuclear weapon states. If the United States lays out specific goals in regards to arms reduction (without going into the modernization debate here) as tangible proof of its commitment to the existing NPT, it can serve as a crucial first step towards setting the global nonproliferation agenda.

Conclusion

While the future of a world in which nuclear weapons are neither possessed nor necessary as a tool of foreign policy is at best far off and at worst entirely unrealistic, this is not to say that there aren’t a number of steps that the United States can take in order to bolster the nonproliferation regime. While some of the potential areas for progress have been listed and discussed above, there are others as well. Daisaku Ikeda of the Japan Times believes that

We should work, based on the existing NPT system, to expand the frameworks defining a legal obligation not to use nuclear weapons, in this way laying the institutional foundations for reducing their role in national security, while establishing international norms for their eventual prohibition. This can challenge the thinking that justifies nuclear weapons…clearing the way for their abolition.

While the cases of Iran and North Korea were not discussed here, they are admittedly obstacles in the path of reforming the nonproliferation regime. However, while the current progress on these two countries is nonexistent, this is of little relevance to the discussion as a whole since, if anything, the failures of the current approach in regards to Iran and North Korea simply reaffirms the need for the remaking of the nonproliferation regime – unless these two countries are simply going to join the ranks of NPT-regime failures. Ultimately, with U.S. leadership, cooperation and progress on nonproliferation is possible, allowing eventually for a decreased reliance on nuclear weapons as security-providers – effectively enhancing both the global nonproliferation regime and the United States’ nuclear posture.