Under Test Pressure

A member of the 1998 Indian Pokhran-II nuclear test team, K. Santhanam, has added his voice to the chorus of Western sources that have argued for some time that the 40 kt yield claimed by the Indian government was substantially inflated and the thermonuclear device tested was actually a fizzle (See the comments section of ACW's post on the issue for some particularly good "I told you so" anecdotes). Why would Santhanam resurrect this debate now? There are two interrelated reasons. The first is that CTBT is back on the global agenda in a big way thanks to Obama's strong desire to seek U.S. ratification and overall entry into force. As the Indo-Asian News Service explains:

"We can't get into a stampede to sign CTBT. We should conduct more nuclear tests which are necessary from the point of view of security," K Santhanam told IANS in New Delhi. "We should not get railroaded into signing the CTBT," Santhanam said when asked about reports of the US pressuring India to sign the CTBT and fresh efforts by the Obama administration to revive non-proliferation activism.

It is not surprising that those critical of the 1998 test are opposed to India joining that CTBT and want to test again but it is interesting to note the strong language with which Santhanam discusses the CTBT train. "Stampede" and "railroaded" conjure up fast and thorough efforts for CTBT entry into force. While the Obama has said he will aggressively pursue entry into force upon ratification, all of this presumes overcoming a major hurdle: getting 67 votes in the Senate. Even when one adds up the positives the treaty has going for it this time around including increased detection capabilities, stronger White House investment, a strongly Democratic Congress, and some sort of "modernization" I'd argue is inevitable to ensure arsenal reliability, it is still going to be a dogfight getting to 67. There's been some speculation that influential Dick Lugar might change his mind which could bring with it a few more votes but the Democrats are probably still going to have their work cut out for them which is why it is surprising an India today article also seems to take U.S. ratification as a given:

This time, the Obama administration, which has a super- majority in the Senate, is determined to push it through. Once that happens, India will be confronted with the same dilemma it faced prior to the Pokhran- II tests of 1998.

Regardless, the second related motivation that Santhanam has for leaking this now (and why CTBT is problematic hindrance) is the desire to conduct another test. In nothing it is "rare for Indian scientists to break ranks on a sensitive national security issue," the Times of India quoted Henry Sokolski who cut right to the chase in explaining why Santhanam would conveniently resurrect the debate about the 1998 yield:

''You bet he wants to test again,'' said Henry Sokolski . . . "Imagine you are a nuclear weapons designer who has corrected the mistakes and ironed out the wrinkles. You would be crazy not to want to test again.'' ''You have to look at the DNA of a weapons designer. They always want to make the weapons smaller, lighter, more powerful,'' Sokolski added. ''If you blindfold them, tie their hands and leave them in the middle of a forest, they will still make their way to a test site.''

As Sokolski's rhetoric hints at, part of it has a science component. The scientists who were part of the first "fizzled" test want to prove they have corrected what went wrong. This also has serious strategic implications for those who strongly feel that the technical credibility of a weapon matters a great deal for its deterrent value. Former AEC Chairman PK Iyengar told BBC:

"If India wants to declare itself as a nuclear power and confirm to the military that you have all the means of designing a thermo-nuclear device which can go into a missile, which can be dropped from an aircraft or can be launched from a submarine, you need many more tests," Mr Iyengar, the former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), told the BBC. Mr Iyengar also said that India's 1998 nuclear test was not a deterrent against China, though it was against Pakistan. "The Chinese are aware of it and that should be a worry for India," he said.

The China problem is a particularly vexing one for India who are clearly in an asymmetric military position vis-a-vis China. Brahma Chellaney picks this argument up and runs with it to argue for a test:

More than 35 years after Pokhran I, India stands out as a reluctant and tentative nuclear power, still lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against China. Given the growing military asymmetry with China, a proven and weaponised Indian thermonuclear capability, backed by long-range missiles, is critical to deter the assertive and ambitious northern neighbour. But today, India does not have a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment. Had India developed and deployed a minimal but credible nuclear-weapons capability, China would not have dared to mess with India. But the increasing Chinese bellicosity, reflected in rising border incursions and hardening of Beijing’s stance on territorial disputes, suggests China is only getting emboldened against a weaker India.

He goes on to expand his call for testing in a larger discussion about the importance of nuclear deterrence:

Conventional weapons simply cannot deter a nuclear adversary. Deterrence against a nuclear foe can only be built on nuclear capability, especially a second-strike capability that can survive the enemy’s first strike to inflict massive retaliation. More broadly, Indian policymakers have yet to recognise that no nation can be a major power without three attributes: A high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously; and a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. India is deficient in all the three areas . . . In such a setting — with critics within and outside the country questioning the success of the test — India must be ready to convincingly re-demonstrate its thermonuclear capability, should a propitious international opportunity arise from a nuclear test conducted by another power. Nuclear deterrence, after all, is like beauty: It lies in the eyes of the beholder. It is not what India’s nuclear establishment claims but what outsiders, especially regional adversaries, believe that constitutes deterrence (or the lack of it).

The justification for this strong hardline argument does seem to conflate deterrence in that because deterrence is in the eye of the beholder one cannot automatically conclude if we have x, y, z, or a tested hydronuclear weapon that said deterrent will therefore be achieved. The issue at hand, however, is not necessarily whether one agrees about the deterrence arguments made but the fact there is such strong worded support for a test. While the government has been quick to rebut claims that its deterrent is lacking, the renewed the calls for testing should still raise some eyebrows due the the problems that could stem from a test. An Indian decision to test would almost certainly scrap the India deal which sends a very worrying regional signal that India is intentionally foregoing cooperation with the United States so they can test thermonuclear weapons. That's particularly worrying given that the highly unstable state bordering India that is briskly modernizing its nuclear program would feel compelled to respond in some way.