An Update on START: Now’s Not the Time to ‘Halt Our Participation’

By John K. Warden

Russia and the United States have reached an “agreement in principle” on a new START.

According to some reports, the major issues have been worked out and we should expect an agreement soon.  As I wrote a couple weeks ago, the major hold-up in negotiations was verification details, specifically the sharing of telemetry data.  According to Jonathan Weisman at the Wall Street Journal, that and other disagreements were worked out in the last couple weeks:

The breakthrough on a follow-on treaty to the now-lapsed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty came two weeks ago when National Security Adviser James Jones and Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to Moscow to work through two issues on verification, the sharing of data on missile flight tests and inspections at missile production facilities, White House officials said.
The deal was approved in principle last week during a phone conversation between Mr. Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
Under the agreement, the Russians will share flight-test data, something they had resisted as they develop more-modern ballistic missiles. But monitoring of a key ballistic-missile site in Russia, which ended in 2008, won't resume, according to officials familiar with the accord.

However, many are skeptical of the report.  After all, various Russian and American officials have said an agreement was “very close” and “nearing completion” for months now.  Is “agreement in principle” just another way of saying “almost there”?

After all, Weisman’s article and others quote officials on both sides saying that translating the agreement to treaty text could take months.  A Russian presidential aide said that it would be realistic to expect a signed agreement by March or April.

If in fact the major issues have been resolved, then the latest reports might mean more than “almost there.”  There has already been speculation about where the signing ceremony will take place, and a Russian lawmaker is planning on visiting the United States to begin coordinating the ratification effort.  These are signs that agreement on START is less a matter of if then when.

However, even as negotiations are nearing completion, some are still calling for the United States to walk away.  Retired Admiral James A. Lyons writes:

The Obama administration is involved in negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to replace the 1991 START Treaty, which expired on Dec. 5. Fortunately, a number of unresolved issues remain between the United States and Russia that must be solved before the conclusion of a new treaty. Not the least of these is Russia's demand that missile defenses be included in the treaty as well as the sharing of telemetry data and Russia's demand to monitor U.S. missile-defense interceptors.

Lyons raises three familiar objections:  1) With a declining stockpile, the United States cannot afford to cut its nuclear arsenal; 2) The United States should not accept restrictions on missile defenses in START; and 3) a bilateral U.S.-Russian treaty ignores Chinese nuclear modernization.  Gordon Chang raises a similar concern about China in the Wall Street Journal.

None of these provide a compelling reason to “halt our participation in START negotiations.”  The Obama administration’s FY2011 budged includes a substantial increase in funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), including $2 billion for stockpile support activities.  As Vice President Biden writes, this funding will ensure that the United States maintains an effective deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.  With substantial commitments to modernization and an arsenal that still includes around 1,500 warheads, there’s no reason to think a new START will harm U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Furthermore, there is still no evidence that restrictions on missile defense will be included in the final treaty.  To the contrary, the Obama administration has consistently resisted Russian pressure to include restrictions on missile defenses.  Travis Sharp has a good post that quotes the Ballistic Missile Defense Review saying that the Administration “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.”

The final objection is that START won’t include restriction on China’s arsenal.  Lyons and Chang’s primary concern is that China is upgrading its arsenal, while the United States is not.  Most of this objection is resolved by the Administration’s commitment to modernization.

The second part of their argument is that because the United States does not know the exact composition of China’s arsenal, reducing the United States' arsenal could undermine deterrence and extended deterrence.  Chang argues that older estimates had China’s arsenal at around 400, and the arsenal could be much larger now.  However, even if he’s right, no one believes China’s arsenal is anywhere near the 1,500 or so warheads that the United States will retain after a new START.

If Japan, the country most threatened by China’s arsenal, is now more comfortable with reduced numbers and even a reduced role for nuclear weapons, there’s no reason the U.S. shouldn’t be  as well (at least as it relates to China).