U.S. Now Opposing China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal

Jun 17, 2010

by Anna Newby

The debate continues over a deal in which China has agreed to help Pakistan construct at least two new 650-megawatt reactors at Chashma in Punjab province. China insisted today that the cooperation is peaceful. As the BBC reported:

China's foreign ministry spokesman [Qin Gang] said: "I want to stress that the civilian nuclear co-operation between China and Pakistan is in line with each side's international obligations. It is for peaceful purposes, and is under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency," he told a news briefing in Beijing.

Last week, the Obama administration seemed to support the deal. As Sarah Bulley reported on June 8^th: “The United States, instead of opposing the deal, is implying its support for the arrangement.” She noted that the U.S. “has several reasons to allow China to move forward with their plans,” citing a need for Chinese support in dealing with North Korea and Security Council sanctions against Iran. She cited Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment as saying: “It would be reasonable for China to expect reciprocity from the United States in the NSG, given that it was Washington that started changing the rules.”

In recent days, however, the State Department has announced that it will oppose the deal at next week’s meeting of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the international export and sale of nuclear technology. International guidelines forbid countries to export nuclear materials to states that have not signed the treaty or do not have international safeguards on reactors.

On Tuesday the State Department asked for clarification on the deal. Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said:

"We have asked China to clarify the details of its sale of additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This appears to extend beyond cooperation that was grandfathered when China was approved for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group…We believe that such cooperation would require a specific exemption approved by consensus of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.”

Despite China’s claims that the sale is grandfathered from before it joined the nuclear export group in 2004 (when it was finishing work on two earlier reactors for Pakistan), U.S. officials disagree, adding that consensus approval of the deal by the NSG was not likely. Gordon DuGuid, spokesman for the State Department, said the U.S. "has reiterated to the Chinese government that the United States expects Beijing to cooperate with Pakistan in ways consistent with Chinese nonproliferation obligations."

The administration’s new stance on the deal begs the question: why the change of heart? After all, the US is a key ally of Pakistan’s, and it also struck a similar deal with India in 2008. As the BBC points out, however, the US has expressed concerns about Pakistan’s proliferation record. In particular, “[f]ears over Pakistan's nuclear activities rose in 2004 after a top scientist admitted leaking nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran.”

A commentary published yesterday by Howard LaFranchi of the Christian Science Monitor suggests that U.S. opposition to the China-Pakistan deal is hypocritical. He wonders how the administration can

“oppose that plan while dodging charges of hypocrisy, given the administration only last year sealed a US deal to supply India with civilian nuclear equipment? And how to press to halt the intended sale while preserving relations with two crucial partners, China and Pakistan?”

Pointing out that China would need the same NSG exemption that the U.S. won in its deal with India, LaFranchi quotes Crowley as asserting that the US is seeking to apply the same level of international examination that it received in seeking a deal with India: “We’re not looking at any difference between the two,” according to Crowley.

LaFranchi continues:

But some nuclear nonproliferation experts say the US opened the door to deals like China’s by pursuing a deal with India that will provide nuclear materials and technology to a country that is a non-signatory of the NPT and thus outside international inspection requirements. “Two wrongs make a wrong, but it was to be expected once we made the case for an exemption [for the US-India deal],” says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington….But Sokolski says that sooner or later the US, which wants China’s cooperation on other issues like Iran, will still be faced with the repercussions of the US-India nuclear agreement. “The Chinese will back off for the moment to prevent embarrassment,” he says. “But in the long run the problem will persist, and when it comes back around I fear we will roll.”

When the U.S. completed its deal with India in 2008, critics expressed the fear that it would set a precedent allowing civilian nuclear assistance for countries that are not signatories of the NPT. Moreover, it raises the problem of “selective privileging” in civilian nuclear cooperation – if the U.S. defends its own deal with India on the grounds that India has demonstrated “good behavior,” what steps would Pakistan need to take to demonstrate the same? Critics have cautioned that the logic of exceptionalism can only be pushed so far before damaging the legitimacy of the broader nonproliferation effort. Perhaps the proposed China-Pakistan deal is a reflection of those fears coming to fruition. In that case, LaFranchi’s charge of hypocrisy should be given serious consideration.