U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

By John K. Warden

In an article that focused primarily on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), New York Times columnists David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker note that the Obama administration is beginning discussions with European allies about withdrawing non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) from Europe:

Other officials, not officially allowed to speak on the issue, say that in back-channel discussions with allies, the administration has also been quietly broaching the question of whether to withdraw American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, where they provide more political reassurance than actual defense. Those weapons are now believed to be in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands.

The Obama administration is committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons on the way to global disarmament.  And as part of the NPR process, the Administration has been consulting key allies, hoping to receive their approval to phase out capabilities that are no longer necessary.  This process seems to be paying dividends.  A couple weeks ago, Kyodo reported that the United States plans to retire its nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles, which were once considered critical to extended deterrence in East Asia.

In Europe, the push to withdraw nuclear weapons is gaining momentum.  Last month, the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden wrote an op-ed calling for substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe.  The piece argues that “The focus now must be on deep reductions and their eventual elimination.”  Now, Kent Harris of Stars and Stripes reports that a group of NATO countries will soon make a more forceful push for withdrawal, hoping to reinvigorate debate in Europe:

A group of NATO allies plans to call on the U.S. to take its nuclear arsenal out of Europe.
The countries — Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway — will discuss the issue with the rest of their NATO allies at a November summit in Lisbon, Portugal.
“This does not mean a call for an immediate withdrawal for all these weapons,” Bart Ouvry, spokesman for Belgium’s Foreign Ministry, said by telephone on Thursday.
Ouvry declined to elaborate, saying he would reserve further comments for his partners at the NATO meetings.
[snip]
Media outlets in France and Germany touched on the issue in recent articles. German reports said that a letter signed by the foreign ministers of the five countries was to be sent to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Der Spiegel magazine reported that German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also asked for the removal of 20 nuclear weapons from his country.
“Presumably, there will be an initiative from certain foreign ministers in order to put the subject of nuclear weapons on the agenda of the next NATO meeting,” Maike Tribbels, a spokeswoman for the German Foreign Ministry, said in a telephone interview Thursday.

2010 is an important year for those who hope to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO and potentially withdraw nuclear weapons from Europe.  NATO foreign ministers are meeting in Estonia in April, and near the end of 2010, NATO Heads of State and Heads of Government are scheduled to meet in Portugal to determine NATO’s next Strategic Concept.  A couple days ago, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that nuclear weapons policy will be on the agenda at the upcoming meeting in Estonia:

The goal of working towards a world free of nuclear weapons is one which we can all embrace. And I’ve scheduled a discussion at our next Foreign Ministers meeting in Tallinn on how NATO can contribute to arms control and disarmament, including with an eye to our new Strategic Concept.
With that in mind, I think it is also important to be pragmatic. There are a lot of nuclear weapons in the world, and a number of countries that either have them, would like to have them, or could have them quickly if they decided they needed them. That is just the way it is. So whatever we do in support of arms control and disarmament should be balanced with deterrence.
Finally, it is important that anything that affects NATO’s nuclear policy or posture be decided by the Allies together, without any unilateral moves. Solidarity is very important when it comes to this issue, and I will work hard to preserve it, beginning with the discussion in Tallinn.

While some European countries have become more vocal, high-level opposition remains. Marc Ambinder points out that “senior officials in the governments of countries like…Germany have, in public and private, called for the U.S. to reduce the role that nuclear weapons play in providing threat deterrence for their countries. But they face internal opposition from their defense establishments.”  A prominent example is the recent article by Frank Miller, a former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson, a former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

According to Miller, Robertson, and Schanke, maintaining NSNW in Europe is essential to deterring adversaries, preventing proliferation, and maintaining a trans-Atlantic link.  They argue that, in particular, Poland and the Baltic states fear Russian aggression, while Turkey fears both Russian aggression and the possibility of a nuclear Iran.

Of these three justifications, deterring adversaries is the weakest.  Most people agree that NSNW in Europe have limited military utility.  Pavel Podvig of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford argues that “If there is any consensus in NATO's ‘corrosive internal debate,’ it's that the U.S. weapons in Europe are irrelevant militarily.”  Even Miller, Robertson, and Schanake acknowledge that NATO has drastically reduced both the number and importance of NSNW when they write, “NATO also reduced the readiness of its aircraft and crews involved in nuclear missions from response times measured in minutes and hours to times measured in months.”

Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening of RAND argue that “The credibility of a deterrent threat depends on whether the challenger believes the deterrer will do what he says he will do, i.e., on his perception of the deterrer’s intent (resolve and commitment are synonyms16)…For a threat to be credible, both intent and capability must be in evidence.”  Whether it’s conventional aggression by Russia fueled by territorial expansion, a political threat by Russia in a natural gas dispute, or an attack on Europe by an adversary (such as Iran) with chemical or biological weapons, NSNW can only serve as an effective deterrent if the capability is backed up by credibility.

NSNW in Europe are not a credible deterrent.  The capabilities have deteriorated, readiness has been reduced, military exercises with nuclear capabilities are rare, and most importantly, European allies have shown that they have no intention of relying on nuclear weapons in a conflict.  Since Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden have already called to withdraw or drastically reduce these weapons, one could easily question NATO’s resolve in using them.  While it’s true that a lot of these concerns could be solved with increased training exercises and more investment in nuclear capabilities, NATO countries seem unwilling to make these commitments.

Fortunately, U.S. defense of Europe doesn’t rely on NSNW.  To whatever extent nuclear weapons do deter adversaries, the United States (along with Britain and France) will continue protect NATO allies under the umbrella of its strategic nuclear weapons (these are the weapons that would be actually used in an nuclear conflict anyway).  The United States will also continue to station troops in Europe and give our allies access to effective missile defense technology.  Opponents might argue that nuclear deployments are critical because they are the most stable U.S. commitment.  While certainly a reasonable argument, there’s no reason other capabilities can’t be a more permanent part of the alliance in the future.  George Perkovich of the Carnegie Foundation identifies a number of far more effective commitments that the United States can make to defend NATO allies:

Debate over the fate of the NATO-based nuclear bombs will be constructive only if it puts much-needed attention on the need to reduce threats in Europe and to deploy strategies and capabilities to deter and defeat at an appropriate scale those threats that cannot be removed. NATO nuclear bombs are no substitute for cyber defense and deterrence; diversification of natural gas supply lines to reduce Russia’s coercive power; renovated confidencebuilding measures between Russia and NATO states to limit the scale and offensive character of military exercises, or if Russia refuses, enhanced forward deployment of defensive capabilities in new NATO states that would deter by denying Russia the prospect of a quick successful incursion. The moral hazard in Europe today is not in taking useless tactical nuclear weapons out, it is in pretending that they can protect allies from twenty-first century threats and doing too little in the meantime to develop capabilities and diplomatic strategies to deny those threats.

A second objection to withdrawing NSNW from Europe is allied proliferation.  In particular, Miller, Robertson, and Schanke argue that U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey play an important role in dissuading Turkey from acquiring an arsenal of their own.  This is certainly an important concern, especially as Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, while ignoring its obligations under the NPT.

However, for the same reasons that NSNW are an ineffective deterrent, they are unlikely dissuade Turkish proliferation.  According to Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke of the Ploughshares Fund, the readiness problem is even more pronounced in Turkey:

Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed.

Other capabilities, such as missile defense and strategic deterrence are more important in demonstrating U.S. commitment to Turkey (there are rumors that the United States will place an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey).  According to Johan Bergenäs of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they ‘would not insist’ that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.”

Therefore, the greater worry is not that nuclear weapons are withdrawn, but that friction between the United States and Turkey convinces Ankara that they can’t rely on the United States for protection.  Just yesterday, Turkey withdrew its ambassador after a House committee approved a resolution calling the killing of Armenians during World War I a genocide.

However, it’s also possible that no outside assurance will dissuade Turkey from acquiring its own nuclear capability.  While nuclear weapons are seen by some as the ultimate guarantee of security, others view them as an essential component of international prestige.  If Iran did acquire a nuclear weapons capability, Turkey, envisioning itself as a leader of the Muslim world, might be unwilling to continue as a non-nuclear state.

The third argument Miller, Robertson, and Schanke make is that NSNW are an important coupling mechanism that maintains the trans-Atlantic link:

Their presence in Europe, however, affirms the coupling of US nuclear forces – including US strategic forces – to the defence of NATO’s territory. Bluntly put, the nuclear arsenal in Europe serves to put the US homeland at risk to nuclear attack if NATO is forced to resort to using Europe-based nuclear bombs to defend its borders. This in turn signals to any potential aggressor that the risks of an attack against NATO far outweigh any possible gains.

The argument goes that with U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, allies have a say in planning, which increases their confidence in U.S. commitment to their security.  At the same time, allies take on the burden of storing and maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities, which helps convince Washington that European allies are holding up their end of the bargain.

Again, while this concern is important, it’s unclear that deploying U.S. NSNW in Europe is needed to maintain the trans-Atlantic link.  According to Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats of CSIS, “the assurance-strengthening attributes of the NATO mechanisms – namely monitoring and participating in U.S. analysis, planning, and decision-making as it relates to the ally’s ability to resist intimidation – do not intrinsically depend on the forward presence of nuclear weapons and can be applied, with time and creativity, to new contexts.”  The United States has, after all, maintained a robust alliance and credible extended deterrent in East Asia without deploying nuclear weapons in Japan or South Korea.

Instead of keeping up with nuclear capabilities, allies might be expected to contribute to new conventional capabilities deemed important to NATO’s security.  Indeed, establishing trust that goes beyond nuclear deployments may be essential.  Pavel Podvig argues that “NATO should admit that if its members cannot trust each other unless they are held together by a nuclear booby trap, the alliance has significant problems.”  George Perkovich adds:

Here, again, the bigger challenge is to marshal high-level, sustained work within NATO to clarify the commitments, strategies, and various capabilities that member states are prepared to mobilize for their collective security. Germany’s unilateral move to urge the withdrawal of a few unusable nuclear weapons from its soil does not help in this regard, but nor should it distract from NATO’s larger agenda. Turkey, in the meantime, should be assured that as long as the United States retains nuclear weapons, wherever they are based, and Turkey is a member of NATO and the NPT, the United States will use whatever means necessary to deter threats to Turkey.

However, it is important to note that most opponents of NSNW in Europe are not arguing for a unilateral withdraw of nuclear weapons from Europe (or what those on the right like to call “unilateral disarmament”).  The Obama administration, along with U.S. European allies, realizes that withdrawing NSNW from Europe will be a process.  Any change in NATO’s defense priorities should take place via the new NATO Strategic Concept with input from all NATO members ensuring that allies are comfortable without NSNW.

However, there are a range of options on the “not unilateral” spectrum.  Miller, Robertson, and Schanke agree that reductions might be possible in a reciprocal negotiation with Russia, but insist that the United States and NATO only reduce NSNW deployed in Europe if Russia agrees to reduce its arsenal by an equal percentage.  However, it’s unlikely that Russia would accept such an agreement.  Pavel Podvig proposes another solution:

One possible first step would be for Moscow and Washington to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, moving them to centralized storage facilities deep inside their national territories...Once such an agreement was reached, other aspects of the deal could be discussed…Eventually, they would have to make a commitment to eliminating these weapons altogether, but securing them at storage facilities would be a reasonable first step.

Two former German defense officials agree that this proposal would solve the problems with U.S. deployments in Europe, while having a better chance of securing Russian cooperation.   The United States would immediately reducing the role of nuclear weapons and demonstrating compliance with the NPT.  More importantly, both U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, currently vulnerable to theft by terrorist organizations, would be much more secure.  Furthermore, by retaining NSNW in storage, the United States would maintain leverage that could be used in future negotiations with Russia.

However, Miller, Robertson, and Schanke disagree, arguing that this “remove and deploy” strategy could “heighten tensions during a crisis” and make it difficult for allies to keep forces in “top fighting shape.”  These objections assume that NSNW in Europe are an important deterrent and would need to be deployed for the United States to have a credible deterrent.  However, in present circumstances, this is not the case.  Deterrence could be better enhanced if both the United States and European members of NATO commit to bolstering other forms of defense.

Miller, Robertson, and Schanke agree that in present circumstances NSNW in Europe have little utility, but argue that circumstances can change:

To some, these calculations may seem outdated; the use of nuclear weapons seems a very distant prospect. But we should not lose sight of the fact that more and more countries are seeking to acquire these weapons. The world may look very different in even ten years if Iran’s nuclear ambitions set off a spiral of proliferation in the Middle East, or if concerns grow about the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Fortunately, by withdrawing NSNW from Europe, while retaining the capability for the time being, the U.S. would still be able to redeploy these weapons if they are deemed essential for NATO’s defense.

A number of changes are possible.  NATO countries might decide to maintain the same number of NSNW in fewer bases, substantially reduce the number forward deployed in Europe, or withdraw them altogether.  Whatever solution is agreed upon, the decision should be made within NATO.  No single country, the United States included, should unilaterally alter NATO’s defense.  That being said, if support exists, the United States should be open to, and even encouraging of, efforts to move NATO’s defense beyond forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons.