U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan, Where Does it Go From Here?

  Photo taken by MC1 Shawn Graham, DoD phtographer. Gen.Patraeus shaking hands with Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, 5 Nov. 2008. Pakistanis hope the idea of ‘change’ ushered in on November 4 will also extend to U.S. policy toward Pakistan.  This was demonstrated most poignantly when a group of Pakistani school children in expressing solidarity with the children of Swat and FATA, raised $260 for support of Barack Obama, asking him to resolve the situation through peaceful means. At a time when efforts are being made to develop a national consensus around Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, the most serious threat to the process comes from a U.S. policy that in recent weeks appears to be entirely centered on drone attacks in the country. The double strike last week in North Waziristan, which killed at least 30 people, was the nineteenth such incident since August and came two days after the American ambassador had been summoned by the foreign office and a protest lodged against drone attacks. And so despite similar protests made to General Petraeus and Richard Boucher on their recent trip to Pakistan, there is increasing recognition among Pakistanis that diplomatic means of preventing these strikes are proving ineffective and more aggressive measures are needed. Suggestions have ranged from “suspending logistics supply route for NATO/US forces; leaving the trilateral commission, reclaiming bases from the US and removing US undercover and military personnel from Pakistan.” If however, it is revealed that Pakistani government officials have secretly consented to these strikes as suggested in the recent Washington Post article, the popular support the government has been trying to build against militants will instantly evaporate and recent measures, such as the in-camera briefing to parliament will seem meaningless and might even appear to be deliberate attempts to distract the public’s attention. What is also puzzling about the alleged ‘understanding the Pakistani government has reached’ with the United States is that not only have these strikes killed innocent Pakistanis but that they have undermined Pakistan’s own policy in the tribal belt.  For instance, last week’s strikes in the Waziristans had targeted and almost killed Mullah Nazir, a pro-government militant with whom NWFP’s governor, Owais Ghani had signed a peace agreement on October 18th. Thus there appears to be a growing divide between Pakistan and America’s perceptions of who the ‘bad guys’ are, with both sides going after their own sets of ‘legitimate targets’. General Petraeus is quoted to have said on his recent visit: “Haqqanis are for us what Baitullahs are for you.” Meanwhile, Pakistan, U.S., and Afghan strategies continue to shift regarding negotiations with militants.  A recent Post story suggests that Americans are now willing to talk to the notorious Gulbudeen Hekmatyar whom they had once deemed a ‘global terrorist,’ while the recent Afghan-Pakistan jirga concluded they would talk to all groups, hence giving up their earlier condition of talks only with those who surrendered their weapons.